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Abstract
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are potentially applicable for various
railway applications, especially the safety-related applications such as train local-
isation for the purpose of train control. In order to integrate GNSS for train local-
isation, a trustable stand-alone GNSS-based localisation unit should be developed.
Then to comply with EN 50126 (reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety;
RAMS) standards, the demonstration of GNSS quality of service (QoS) should be
evaluated in consistent with RAMS. However there are currently no appropriate
performance evaluation methods on GNSS for railway safety-related applications.
This dissertation identifies the required performance for train localisation in con-
sideration of GNSS QoS and railway RAMS. The common and different properties
of the performance are analysed in detail using consistent attribute hierarchy struc-
tures based on UML class diagram. Then formalised performance requirements are
proposed quantitatively on four properties (accuracy, reliability, availability, and
safety integrity). After that, the evaluation and verification methodologies are in-
troduced. The evaluation methodology is using a reference measurement system
for GNSS receiver measured train location accuracy identification, and a stochastic
Petri net (SPN) model for GNSS receiver measured train location accuracy categor-
isation. The SPN model illustrates the GNSS receiver measured train locations into
three states (up state, degraded state, and faulty state). Then the four proposed
properties are allocated and estimated formally using the three states in the SPN
model. The verification methodology is used to verify the GNSS receiver meas-
ured train location in real time based on a localisation unit. The GNSS receiver
measured train locations are verified using hypothesis testing methods based on the
accurate digital track map provided beforehand. Then train location estimation
from the localisation unit is verified according to the mileage of the train. With
the verified train location estimation from the localisation unit, the corresponding
safety margin for each train location is calculated.
The data for evaluation and verification methodologies are collected from a test
train running on a railway track in High Tatra Mountains. The results show an
approach of the possible certification procedure for the GNSS receivers in railway
safety-related applications.
vii

Kurzfassung
Globales Satellitennavigationssystem (GNSS) ko¨nnen fu¨r verschiedene Anwendun-
gen im Schienenverkehr, vor allem fu¨r sicherheitsrelevante Anwendungen wie Zugor-
tung zum Zweck der Zugsicherung gestu¨tzt werden. Um GNSS fu¨r Zugortung
zu integrieren, muss eine eigensta¨ndige satellitenbasierte Ortungseinheit entwick-
elt werden. Um die Entwicklung in Einklang mit EN 50126 (U¨berlebensfa¨higkeit,
Verfu¨gbarkeit, Instandhaltbarkeit, und Sicherheit; RAMS) durchzufu¨hren, muss der
Nachweis der Gu¨te von GNSS (Quality of Service; QoS) entsprechend in Einklang
mit dieser Norm bewertet werden. Allerdings gibt es zurzeit keine RAMS Bewer-
tungsverfahren fu¨r satellitenbasierte sicherheitsrelevante Anwendungen im Schien-
enverkehr.
Diese Dissertation identifiziert die notwendigen Anforderungen fu¨r die Zugortung
unter Beru¨cksichtigung der Gu¨te von GNSS und den bestehenden Normen bezu¨glich
RAMS im Schienenverkehr. Die gemeinsamen und unterschiedlichen Eigenschaften
der Anforderungen werden detailliert mit Nutzung einer Attributhierarchie basier-
end auf UML-Klassendiagrammen dargestellt. Danach werden formalisierte Leis-
tungsanforderungen quantitativ fu¨r vier Eigenschaften (Genauigkeit, Zuverla¨ssigkeit,
Verfu¨gbarkeit und Sicherheitsintegrita¨t) vorgeschlagen. Darauf aufbauend werden
die Bewertungs- und Verifikations- Methoden eingefu¨hrt. Die Bewertungsmeth-
ode nutzt ein Referenzmesssystem zur Identifikation der Zugortungsgenauigkeit der
GNSS Empfa¨nger und ein stochastischen Petri-Netz-Modell (SPN-Modell) fu¨r die
Kategorisierung der GNSS Empfa¨nger Zugortmessungen. Das SPN-Modell ver-
anschaulicht die GNSS Empfa¨nger Zugortmessungen in drei Zusta¨nden (up state,
degraded state, faulty state). Dann werden die vier vorgeschlagenen Eigenschaften
zugeordnet und formal mit Nutzung der drei Zusta¨nde im SPN-Modell gescha¨tzt.
Die Verifikationsmethode wird verwendet, um die GNSS Empfa¨nger Zugortmessun-
gen in Echtzeit zu verifizieren. Die GNSS Empfa¨nger Zugortmessungen werden mit
einer Hypothesentestmethode auf der Grundlage der genauen digitalen Streckenk-
arte verifiziert. Mit der verifizierten gescha¨tzten Zugortmessung wird der resultier-
ende Sicherheitsbereich fu¨r jeden Zugort berechnet.
Die Daten fu¨r die Auswertungs- und Verifikationsmethoden wurden von einem Zug
im Regelbetrieb auf einer Eisenbahnstrecke in der Hohen Tatra gesammelt. Die
Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit zeigen einen Ansatz der mo¨glichen Zertifizierungsverfahren
fu¨r die GNSS-Empfa¨nger fu¨r sicherheitsrelevante Anwendungen im Schienenverkehr.
ix
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The first navigation satellite was launched into space in 1978 by the United States
of America (USA) as part of the Global Positioning System (GPS), then in 1993
GPS reached its Initial Operation Capability (IOC). Three years later in 1996
Globalnaya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema (GLONASS) also reached its
IOC. In the 21st century, both European Union (EU) and China are launching nav-
igation satellites for their Galileo and BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS)
to provide similar functions and performances like GPS and GLONASS. These four
systems and the upcoming satellite-based localisation systems are summarised as
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). A brief history and expectation of
GNSS satellite numbers for the four navigation systems are shown in Figure 1.1.
BDS has formally commenced regional operations on 27 December 2012 [1]. Galileo
is in its In-Orbit Validation (IOV) phase since 12 October 2012 [2]. This IOV phase
is as the fundamental phase when the European navigation system really goes from
theory to practice, both the satellites and the supporting ground stations working
together and being checked in real time [2]. So up to now there are more than 70
navigation satellites over the sky. As expected there will be over 120 navigation
satellites in 2020 [3]. A short summary of number of satellites for four GNSS in
2013 and prediction in 2020 is shown in Table 1.1.
GNSS provide the capability for determining the time, location, and velocity. These
huge number of GNSS satellites will provide more satellites for these three capabil-
ities thus improving the performance of the GNSS in general. This also brings more
chances for emerging applications, such as safety-related applications in transport-
ation. In the design phase of Galileo, the Safety of Life (SoL) service was de-
signed as an elementary service thus distinguishing it from other three GNSS [4].
But later, this plan was cancelled, since SoL service has been implemented by
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Figure 1.1: GNSS Satellite Number History and Expectation
Table 1.1: Satellite Numbers of Each GNSS in Operation and Expectation
GNSS Satellites in Operation (2013) Satellites in Expectation (2020)
GPS 31 31
GLONASS 24 24
Galileo 4 30
BDS 14 36
Sum 73 121
European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) since March 2011.
The EGNOS SoL service is provided openly and is freely accessible without any
direct charge and is tailored to safety-related transport applications in various do-
mains, the use of the EGNOS SoL service may require specific authorisation by the
relevant authorities in the application sectors concerned [5].
In surface transportation, especially in railway domain, GNSS can be applied in
many applications, for example the safety-related railway signalling systems. The
railway signalling systems are providing essential traffic management and traffic
control information for both passenger trains and freight trains in the network.
One of the important issues of railway signalling is to locate the train as accurate as
possible through train detection and train localisation techniques. The full range of
train detection and localisation functions may include proving the absence of a train,
proving the presence of a train, and (directly or indirectly) measuring or indicating
the velocity of a train [6]. The European railway calls for harmonised train control
systems, European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS)/European Train
Control System (ETCS) came from an EU directive in 1991 [7]. ETCS is specified
at four levels, with the ETCS-3 (Level 3) it goes beyond the pure train protection
functionality with the implementation of full radio-based train spacing called moving
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block [8]. The Radio Block Centre (RBC) needs to receive the vital information
via Global System for Mobile Communications for Railway (GSM-R) such as the
train location [9]. GNSS receiver is exactly at the place to deliver train location. To
integrate GNSS into the railway signalling systems, GNSS receiver can be installed
on the train as part of the train On-Board Unit (OBU), and then GNSS receiver
is treated as an instance performing train localisation function. The OBU should
report the location of the train regularly to the Train Control Centre (TCC) in
accordance with the requirements, local laws, and regulations [10] [11]. However,
GNSS receivers are currently neither standardised nor certified for train localisation
purpose.
Since the birth of railway, there are safety specifications for train operation and man-
agements. Currently, there are many national, regional, and international safety
standards. For example, the safety standard and safety targets for general elec-
tronic devices published by International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) as
an international standard called IEC 61508 [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17]. And there
are also railway specific safety-related application standards published by Comite´
Europe´en de Normalisation E´lectrotechnique (CENELEC) as a regional standard
for Europe. The CENELEC EN 50126 concerns demonstrating the performance of
railway signalling system [18]; CENELEC EN 50128 concentrates on the methods
needed to provide software which meets the demands for safety integrity [19]; and
CENELEC EN 50129 addresses the approval process for individual systems which
may exist within the overall railway control and protection system [20]. These
standards are also published by Deutsches Institut fu¨r Normung (DIN) as national
standards. All the standards introduced above are used accordingly for over 10
years. Any new devices or equipments performing safety-related functions should
obey the standards. So the implementation of GNSS for train localisation should
also obey the stands mentioned above [10] [21].
1.1 Purpose of the Dissertation
The purpose of this dissertation is to show how to trust the performance of GNSS
for train localisation. This requires a clear understanding of the properties of the
performance. This also requires GNSS for train localisation to conform the related
standards, specifications, and advisories, thus brings a certifiable GNSS-based loc-
alisation unit to be applied for train localisation. This purpose can be decomposed
into three objectives.
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The first objective is the formal definition and migration of “GNSS for train loc-
alisation performance” properties with the consideration of both GNSS Quality of
Service (QoS) performance properties [22] and railway RAMS performance proper-
ties [18]. The migration process uses the terminologies of dependability engineering
and safety engineering in both GNSS and railway applications. The definition and
migration of GNSS for train localisation performance properties in a formal struc-
tural way is the foundation to answer “What is the performance?” and “How to
trust?”, and yet, not done by any others.1
The second objective is the quantitative evaluation of the properties resulting from
the achieved first objective. This objective is aiming to answer the question: “What
is the performance?” The performance evaluation requires the help of a train loca-
tion reference measurement system. The reference system together with the GNSS
receiver generates the train location at the same timestamp, the deviation between
GNSS receiver and reference locations are quantified through stochastic analysis.
The performance of GNSS receiver measured train location is quantified according
to the definition of the properties. Then the quantified performance is identified
according to the performance specifications.
The third objective is the acceptance of the GNSS receiver train location by real-
time verification. This objective is to answer the question “How can we trust?”.
This calls for other localisation sensors together with GNSS receiver composing
a GNSS-based train localisation unit. The design of the localisation unit helps to
execute the verification process by redundancy and voting schemes. The verification
process also uses the identified performance values as the basic knowledge of the
GNSS performance. Then, the acceptance of train location decision is made.
These three objectives can be attributed to different phases of the system lifecycle.
The three objectives as migration, evaluation, and verification can be shown in a
complete process in Figure 1.2.
In order to evaluate the train location measured by GNSS receiver, a reference meas-
urement system is used as an external resource. Then in the real-time verification
of the train location measured by the GNSS receiver, there is no reference meas-
urement system anymore. The GNSS-based localisation unit is using its internal
resources to decide the acceptance of GNSS receiver measured train location. So
these two objectives differs each other from many aspects as shown in Table 1.2.
1The structralised performance properties intended in GNSS for train localisation is not raised
by any others. Based on this, the performance values in a medium density railway line is also not
calculated by any others.
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Figure 1.2: Three Objectives and Relations of the Dissertation
The external evaluation is the foundation for the real-time internal operation. This
brings the system from design phase to operation phase.
The terminology migration is to analyse the GNSS performance properties and the
railway RAMS properties. During the definition of the properties, the common and
necessary properties of GNSS for train localisation performance is migrated. The
migrated performance properties sets the direction for the performance evaluation.
The evaluation results also calls for quantitative values, the GNSS for train localisa-
tion performance properties are also quantified according to the requirements from
GNSS performance and railway RAMS as performance specifications.
The evaluation is using the reference measurement system together to deliver the
train location from both sides. The GNSS receiver measured train location and the
reference measured train location are generated, then the time for the locations is
matched. The analysis results show the performance in values and units. The per-
formance values can be identified with the specification as the identified performance
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Table 1.2: Evaluation and Verification in Comparison
Objective GNSS receiver with stand-alone
reference measurement system for
evaluation
GNSS receiver inside a
GNSS-based localisation unit for
real-time operation
Architecture two independent systems multi-sensor, redundant
Function evaluation verification
Data Usage macro study micro study
Reference external internal
Phase design operation
values. This shows the understanding of the performance both in properties and
values. The process of the evaluation requires the clear definition of the evaluation
process to reproduce the performance values again.
The real-time verification of the train location is the micro study of the GNSS
receiver measurements. The successful micro study of the GNSS performance is
based on the macro study of it. The macro study evaluates performance values. The
evaluation is using a complete stand-alone reference system, but the verification is
involving another localisation sensor together as internal source building a GNSS-
based localisation unit. The verification process is using the evaluated and identified
performance values as characteristic values for the micro study. This brings the
acceptance of the train location measurements.
So, the train location measurement can be finally trusted which answers the ques-
tions proposes at the beginning. The whole process shown in Figure 1.2 also leads
naturally to the structure of the dissertation in Section 1.2.
1.2 Structure of the Dissertation
The dissertation consists of 8 chapters, including both methodologies and numerical
analysis results from the previous experiments to support the methodologies. From
Chapter 5 to Chapter 7 are my original personal work: establish the appropriate
GNSS for train localisation performance properties; establish a certifiable process
for the evaluation of the GNSS for train localisation performance properties; and
finally a real-time verification process based on the identified performance values
from the evaluation process.
Chapter 1 describes the purpose of the dissertation and the structure of it.
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Chapter 2 investigates the state of the art of GNSS for train localisation. A short
history of train detection and localisation is introduced as the background. After
that both research projects and real application instances for GNSS-based train
localisation and train operation are presented. With this background, the evaluation
and verification research statuses on GNSS for train localisation and related topics
are introduced.
Chapter 3 describes the methodologies used in this dissertation. The Unified
Modeling Language (UML) basic theory and implication for UML in figures are
introduced. Based on that, the attribute hierarchy for clarifying the concepts and
terms is established. With the clear understanding of the terms, the possibility
and statistics theory for evaluation purposes are presented. The distributions used
in this dissertation are also mathematically illustrated. In order to formulate the
terms for the following evaluation and verification properties formally, the Petri net
and further the stochastic Petri net are both stated from the formal side viewpoint.
The optimal detection theory is also interpreted for verification purposes.
Chapter 4 illustrates the three systems in this dissertation: GNSS receiver, refer-
ence measurement system, and GNSS-based localisation unit. With the clear under-
standing of the different aspects of the systems, the GNSS receiver localisation prin-
ciples are introduced as the background of the whole process. The environmental
effects of measurement accuracy are analysed based on the localisation principles.
Then the GNSS performance requirements from both the service provider side and
the user side are introduced separately. Starting from Chapter 5 to Chapter 7, the
dissertation goes through the formal migration, performance evaluation and then
real-time verification step by step.
Chapter 5 depicts the migration of GNSS performance properties to railway train
localisation. The GNSS performance requirements introduced in Chapter 4 are
analysed in detail. The relation between the GNSS performance properties, and
the relation between the GNSS RAMS are analysed both internally and externally.
The UML class diagram modelled terms and the relation between them are ana-
lysed. Then the appropriate properties are raised formally. With the properties and
the attribute hierarchy of the properties, a specification inherited from the GNSS
performance requirements is raised.
Chapter 6 is going into detail about performance evaluation. Firstly, based on
the accuracy evaluation, a stochastic Petri net model interpreting the measure-
ment states is built for formal evaluation of the properties proposed in Chapter 5.
Secondly, general accuracy performance of GNSS for train localisation is evaluated
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as a basis, then the reliability and availability are evaluated based on the accuracy
performance values. Finally, different environments are analysed for the safety in-
tegrity property, GNSS parameters such as number of visible satellites and Dilution
Of Precision (DOP) are inputs for the evaluation. Two environmental scenarios are
investigated with the consideration of both safe and dangerous failures of GNSS for
train localisation and the corresponding safety integrity level. The data collected
in the High Tatra Mountains is shown as the numerical results from the evaluation
methodology.
Chapter 7 introduces the necessity of operation without reference measurement
system for real-time verification of the GNSS receiver measured train location. Then
the optimal detection methods are applied to decide the GNSS receiver measured
train locations are acceptable as on the track or not. And then a safe two layer 2oo2
structure is introduced for failure diagnosis and elimination for the GNSS-based
localisation unit. The dangerous undetected and detected failures are analysed as
part of the verification methodology. The numerical results are shown to present
the verification algorithm performance.
With the methodologies and numerical results, the conclusions in Chapter 8 are
made on GNSS for train localisation both evaluation and verification. Then the
evaluation methodology is generalised as a universal approach to quantify the per-
formance of other sensors in consideration of a certifiable process of the sensors
for safety-related applications according to standards. Besides, further possible
research topics are recommended.
The whole structure of the dissertation is shown in Figure 1.3.
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Chapter 2
State of the Art
It may seem obvious, but to control the route of the trains on a rail network, train
location and velocity information are essential. It is a problem since the railway was
invented, many researchers are always devoted to find more advanced solutions2.
2.1 Train Detection and Localisation Methods in Railway
In the early days of railways, the train location information was collected by and
passed between humans [6]. Long time after that, they began to use electric energy
to detect the trains, the first recorded use of which was in Turner, New York, in
1851 [23]. And then in 1872, the failsafe track circuit was invented by William
Robinson [23]. At that time, track circuit was recognised as the key element for the
automatic train control. As train velocities and traffic densities rise the risks and
consequences of a failure of the train detection system become more acute, more
advanced technologies are used for train detection such as axle counter, Balise, light
cable, etc. [23] [24] [25]
There are two different approaches to get the train location information. One is
traditional train detection, they are devices like track circuit, axle counter, passive
and positive balise, etc. All of them need to be installed along the track, the
accuracy of the train location depends on the length or the distance of the adjacent
two units. The other is train localisation, they are odometer, inertial sensor, Doppler
radar, Eddy Current Sensor (ECS) [26] and also the instance to be investigated
in this dissertation - GNSS. They are basically communication based approaches,
the sensors are installed on the train, the train transmits its location to TCC.
2The information about the researchers is introduced in the following sections of this chapter.
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Table 2.1: Comparison of Train Detection and Localisation Sensors
Sensor Category Cost Accuracy
track circuit [27] detection high same as track circuit length
axel counter [28] detection high same as the length between two axel
counters
balise [29] detection high same as the length between balises
odometer [30] localisation low accumulated errors with time and distance
inertial sensor [31] localisation high accumulated errors with time and distance
(only when the vehicle is moving)
Doppler radar [32] localisation high accumulated errors with time and distance,
mainly used for velocity measurement (also
significant noise in the signal)
ECS [26] localisation low mainly used for velocity calculation and
switch recognition, accuracy related to the
accuracy of the switch database
GNSS receiver [33] localisation low error varies according to satellite
constellations, environments, location and
velocity measurements are independent
The TCC then uses this location data to issue authorities to each train to permit
further safe movement. The train location may be determined by combinations of
the sensors stated above. A major benefit of the communications based approach
is that it removes equipments from track. Since the equipments are installed on the
train, they can provide more flexible and accurate location. This will increase the
capacity of the system by reducing the block section boundary. A rough comparison
of the accuracy and cost of all the mentioned technologies for train detection and
localisation sensors and equipments is shown in Table 2.1.
With the comparison stated in Table 2.1, the accuracy of GNSS receiver measured
locations change in different environments and also have relation to the satellite
geometry. The general accuracy of GNSS receiver measured location needs to be
evaluated along railway tracks. Because of the low cost and the ability of getting rid
of track side equipments, the GNSS-based train localisation is a promising instance
as part of the OBU for the railway signalling system.
2.2 GNSS for Train Localisation Researches and Applications
Since the IOC of GPS, it has been actively involved in aviation applications. The
surface transportation has also been a hot field only years after that. Aspects of
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Table 2.2: European Projects on GNSS for Train Localisation
Project Name Period System Funding Goal
APOLO [34] 1999-
2001
GPS FP5 test the base element of GPS for
train localisation
LOCOPROL [35] 2001-
2004
GPS FP5 for low density lines, extend the
ERTMS train protection systems
LOCOLOC [36] 2002-
2004
GPS ESA development of a complete low cost
fail-safe train navigation and
integrity system based on GNSS,
service centre for LOCOPROL
INTEGRAIL [37] 2001-
2004
EGNOS ESA EGNOS signal in safety-critical
railway traffic management and
control, provide reliable location and
integrity information under varying
operational conditions
GADEROS [38] 2001-
2004
Galileo FP5 perform tests on a number of
prototypes on a low traffic line
within ERTMS/ETCS
ECORAIL [39] 2001-
2005
GNSS ESA integration of GNSS into safety
critical railway applications
RUNE [40] 2001-
2006
GNSS ESA GNSS as a virtual balise, safety
application with EGNOS
GEORAIL [41] 2004-
2008
none UIC guidelines for the application of
CNTD for train localisation
GRAIL-1 [42] 2005-
2008
GNSS FP6 a common specification for the
GNSS subsystem at different levels
of ERTMS/ETCS architecture
GRAIL-2 [43] 2010-
2012
GNSS GSA to define, develop and validate a
GNSS-based Enhanced Odometry
(ETCS) application in high speed
railway lines
GaLoROI [44] 2012-
2013
Galileo FP7 develop a certifiable safety relevant
satellite based localisation unit for
low density railway lines
EATS [45] 2012-
2016
Galileo FP7 a model of the complete on-board
ERTMS system behaviour to
eliminate interpretation differences
high meteorological quality as well as safety relevance of the GNSS-based train
localisation have been focused equally.
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2.2.1 GNSS for Train Localisation Research Projects
Starting from 1999, there have been a lot of research projects in GNSS for train
localisation. The Advanced Position Locator (APOLO) project was at the very
beginning of attempt for bringing GNSS into railway signalling system. After that,
there are many research projects under EU Framework Programme (FP)s or sup-
ported by European Space Agency (ESA). Table 2.2 shows the research projects
in Europe aiming at GNSS into train localisation.
The projects in Table 2.2 are trying to introduce the prototype and the specific-
ations at the early stages, including application in railway specific scenario such
as level crossing in ECORAIL, and integrated localisation unit such as in INTEG-
RAIL. Later the project GEORAIL by UIC, is aiming at providing the guideline
for the track map structure for railway domain, called Coordinate based continuous
Numerical Track Description (CNTD). The GaLoROI project is going to intro-
duce a localisation unit and a complete safety process dealing with safety cases for
the localisation unit. A systematic evaluation and verification of GNSS for train
localisation is on demand.
2.2.2 GNSS for Train Localisation Researches at iVA
Scientific research of location measurement performance for surface vehicles has
been a central and systematic work of the Institute of Traffic Safety and Automation
Engineering (iVA) at TU Braunschweig. For the train localisation part, Table 2.3
shows the dissertations working on localisation unit, the performance of GNSS, the
performance of the localisation unit in a time sequence.
The research started from establishing a GNSS-based localisation unit, then analys-
ing the performance of the localisation unit. In order to quantify the performance
of GNSS receiver, a reference measurement system to validate the GNSS receiver
performance was built. The measurement accuracy and reliability of the reference
measurement system and the GNSS receiver is the topic then. Now the research
topic upgrades to the standardised process for GNSS receiver performance qualific-
ation.
2.2.3 GNSS for Train Localisation Applications
Not only the academic institutes are investigating possible integrations of GNSS
for railway applications, the industry companies have also implemented GNSS for
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Table 2.3: Train Localisation Related Dissertations of iVA at TU Braunschweig
Name Year Category Goal
Kiriczi [46] 1996 localisation QoS safe localisation with fault diagnose
Leinhos [25] 1996 localisation unit & QoS localisation unit architecture
Klinge [47] 1997 localisation unit localisation platform
Bikker [48] [49] 2002 localisation unit reference measurement system
Poliak [50] 2007 localisation unit & QoS reference measurement system and
validation of GNSS
Ha¨nsel [51] 2008 localisation unit certification process of GNSS after
technical standards
Wegener [52] 2014 localisation QoS measurement uncertainty of GNSS
in dynamic measurements
Lu 2014 localisation unit & QoS QoS evaluation for a certifiable
process and localisation unit
structure
train localisation in some lines. The following is a list of GNSS for train localisation
applications on some lines.
• Integrated Train Protection System (KLUB-U)
KLUB-U was implemented in Russia using satellite based localisation in 2010 near
Sochi, Russia [53]. The system determines train movement qualitative values (co-
ordinates, speed) by the data from satellite navigation devices, the digital track map
of a railway section and distance-and-speed sensors/meters, which are installed on
a wheel-set journal box [54]. Different issues shall be addressed by this modern
train control system. This is on the one hand the low visibility of signals at difficult
environmental conditions like fog, rain and snow, on the other hand the targeted
high speeds where driving at sight to signals is not possible. This technology still
needs to be improved for extreme environments.
• Incremental Train Control System (ITCS)
The ITCS has been implemented in USA for Positive Train Control (PTC) pur-
poses. ITCS consists of three main components - communication network, wayside
component, and on-board component. The wayside component for ITCS is an over-
lay on existing signalling system, it reports in a conventional way. And the on-board
component uses a vital location determination system, based either on balises or
GPS, to locate the train and an on-board database to determine the relative location
of all features of the railroad such as signals, switches, and crossings [55].
ITCS has been applied on the Michigan corridor line between Detroit and Chicago
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since 2000. ITCS in Michigan is a fail-safe (vital) positive train control system that
overlays the existing signal system for improved safety and provides a cost-effective
solution for high-speed train operation. ITCS has also been applied in Qinghai-
Tibet railway line in China. Because of the harsh environment of this new railroad
(5,000 meters at its peak with track laid over permafrost), the traditional signalling
system was not installed [56]. This system is also under construction in Nigeria by
the railway company Eko Rail since 2011 [57]. Besides, the system is also under
construction in Australia from 2011, this line will be operated by Fortescue Metals
Group [58].
• Signalised Train Control (ZLB STH)
ZugLeitBetrieb (Signalised Train Control) is a satellite based train control system
developed by the University of Applied Sciences Upper Austria and operated by
Stern & Hafferl [59]. The trains equipped with the signalling system have an on-
board unit including a device for the driver as well as a GPS receiver. This unit
communicates through a data radio system with the work-place for a train controller
which is responsible for the movement authority for the trains. Spring switches make
sure that train meetings in stations do not lead to accidents because this type of
switches allow only driving on one specific switch in stations from one direction. In
case the satellite based localisation is not operational, radio communication is used
as fallback option [60].
• Satellite-based Operation and Management of Local Low Traffic Lines (SATLOC)
The SATLOC project is funded by the European Commission in the FP7 program.
a railway line in Romania shall be equipped with satellite based localisation techno-
logy. The 28 kilometres long demonstration line from Bras¸ov to Zaˇrnes¸ti is located
in the Romanian region of Transylvania and is operated by the private Romanian
company Regiotrans. The target of SATLOC is to prove the applicability of GNSS
for ERTMS/ETCS level 3. The application contributes to the adoption of EGNOS
in rail primary safety and paves the way to the introduction of Galileo in the railway
safety domain. The ERTMS Regional will directly benefit from this line [61].
As seen from the three train control systems and one still in development, they are
different technologies but all using GNSS performing the main localisation func-
tion and also obeying the safety requirements. The Figure 2.1 shows the mentioned
GNSS-based railway operation and train control systems according to the geograph-
ical locations of them. These technologies are only applied on several pilot lines.
The first three technologies are all having a fall back system to keep them as safe
train control systems. The complete safety evaluation and verification process are
still waiting to be performed.
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Figure 2.1: GNSS-based Train Control Systems in Operation
2.3 Migration of GNSS QoS and Railway RAMS
GPS is already standardised and then applied for civil aviation applications, such
as en-route, Approach Procedure with Vertical guidance (APV), etc. From a more
general viewpoint, GNSS is also freely available to surface transportation, such as
automobiles and locomotives.
The safety concept of railway has a significant difference from aviation one. Firstly,
the aviation domain uses “integrity”, while the railway domain uses “safety”. The
definitions and differences of both terms will be illustrated in Chapter 5. Secondly,
the aviation domain normally concerns both horizontal and vertical accuracies, rail-
way domain concerns more horizontal accuracy. Thirdly, the aviation domain has
its own definition of GNSS in precise approaching applications for risk acceptance
by per approach (one approach is 150 seconds), the railway society normally defines
the hazard rate in the time span of one hour.
GNSS avionic standards are international standards. For example, the Standards
And Recommended Practices (SARPs) were first adopted by International Civil
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in 2001, then subsequently amended 11 times [62].
Aviation has been not only using stand-alone GNSS navigation, but also using
Space Based Augmentation System (SBAS) and Ground Based Augmentation
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System (GBAS) accordingly. SBAS and GBAS provide integrity in a multi-step pro-
cedure laid out in Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Minimum
Operational Performance Standards (MOPS). They are RTCA DO-208 for air-
borne supplemental navigation equipment using GPS [63], RTCA DO-229D for
Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) [64], and RTCA DO-253C for Local
Area Augmentation System (LAAS) [65]. These systems indicate which ranging
measurements should be excluded as unsafe to use and providing bounding er-
ror standard deviations for the remaining usable measurements. There are several
researchers trying to make a appropriate migration of GNSS QoS into surface trans-
portation, as illustrated as follows.
Sam Pullen from Standford WAAS lab differentiates the aviation “specific risk” and
non-aviation “average risk”. The “average risk” is the foundation for Probabilistic
Risk Assessment (PRA) in non-aviation applications. The research results show
several means to migrate the “specific risk” requirements from SBAS and GBAS
for non-aviation users. The results indicates smaller error bounds and improved
availability for non-aviation applications [66]. The work, which is generally for non-
aviation users, is not directly applicable in railway applications since in railway
there already exists standards for risk assessment of the equipment or software for
railway safety-related applications.
Alesˇ Filip and Julie Beugin have presented an interpretation of Galileo SoL service
requirements corresponding to railway Reliability, Availability, Maintainability,
Safety (RAMS). They introduce the relation of reliability, availability, and safety in
a “pyramid”, then illustrate the probability of failure allocation into the “pyramid”
[67] [68] [69]. Their work provided a method to migrate the existing EGNOS re-
quirement for aviation into railway using Markov chain based process. But a more
formal migration is required for it from concept, qualitative, and also quantitative
representation.
In this dissertation, the GNSS performance requirements for train localisation are
defined consistently after comparing the requirements in GNSS, avionic and railway
standards, and appropriate GNSS for train localisation performance properties are
migrated, then the values and the units of each property are formally proposed.
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2.4 Evaluation of GNSS Receiver for Train Localisation Per-
formance
The research applications of GNSS for train localisation has been shown by Table 2.2
and Figure 2.1 above. The most demanding work is the standardisation and certi-
fication of GNSS localisation in railway safety-related applications. GNSS receiver
measured location is sensible to the environments along the track as mentioned
in Table 2.1. In order to have a complete understanding of GNSS receiver meas-
ured train location performance for railway signalling systems, it is both necessary
and important to test the GNSS for train localisation on existing railway tracks,
and then find the rules behind GNSS for train localisation performances in certain
railway environmental scenarios. For each identified environmental scenario, the
GNSS for train localisation performance needs to be evaluated and then verified as
a general statement for this kind of environment.
It is true that GNSS receivers are expected to operate under railway environment
conditions. The practicalities of testing how a GNSS receiver deals with the real
environmental scenarios will be very difficult. The test setup will be unwieldy as it
would be necessary to isolate and quantify all the GNSS signals reaching the receiver
as well as assessing its own response to the signals. And the necessity to test the
GNSS receiver with a representative sample of different multipath and other effects
would make the process both long-winded and open to a myriad of uncertainty. As
a matter of fact, there are several standards and procedures for evaluating GNSS
for train localisation in a more general performance [70]. But actually for GNSS
in safety-related applications in aviation, the environmental situations are much
easier to deal with than railways. When a plane is in en-route mode, the multipath
and shadowing problem are not a problem. The environmental scenarios affecting
the accuracy performance in aviation is approaching with vertical guidance phase.
It is quite different from GNSS for surface transportation applications. In surface
transportation, the multipath and other affects will affect GNSS performance almost
everywhere. There are only a handful of people doing research on evaluating GNSS
performances in railway requirements [49] [50] [71] [72] [73].
Alesˇ Filip has been trying to applying SoL services of Galileo/EGNOS to railway
localisation. The different performance requirements set up by EGNOS are ana-
lysed and the one fits for railway applications is determined. Based on this, the
EGNOS data are evaluated on this purpose [71] [72]. This sets up a first example
for evaluating GNSS performances for railway application purpose.
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Julie Beugin and Juliette Marais have been doing evaluation of GNSS in railway
performances by simulation methods [73]. The availability and reliability aspects
of different environmental scenarios are analysed, but safety is still not stated.
Gert Bikker describes the basic possibilities of reference measurement systems for
GNSS applications in railway traffic and gives an outline of it and then explains one
of the first approaches [49]. This provides a solid background for the evaluation of
the necessary properties of GNSS for train localisation. Then Jan Poliak shows the
validation method of GNSS for railway applications using the reference measurement
system [50].
For evaluation purpose, the formal method is also required for safety-related ap-
plications. In this dissertation, a stochastic Petri net model for GNSS receiver
performance evaluation is built, and the safety issues are analysed for two environ-
mental scenarios.
2.5 Verification of GNSS-based Localisation Unit Performance
The evaluation of GNSS receiver for train localisation performances is the basis
for any further realisation and the ruler for hazard analysis and risk assessment
on GNSS for train localisation. So the purpose of verifying the performance of
GNSS in real time is requested. The verification includes diagnostic of the GNSS
receiver measured train location. Basically, the verification process should be in-
cluded in the design phase of the localisation unit as part of the OBU. Then, the
designed structure can have the capability of verifying the GNSS receiver measured
train location together with other sources. With this, the acceptance of possible
measurement errors are also verified to see whether the error is acceptable as still
accepting GNSS receiver measured train location to be on the track.
From the GNSS receiver side, there has been integrating Receiver Autonomous
Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) or the newly developed NIORAIM [74] algorithms to
observe the integrity of the GNSS receivers. When there are more than four pseudor-
anges used for determining the GNSS receiver location, a least square residual can
be calculated from the final measurement result and the pseudoranges, this residual
is often used as a measure of the quality [75], and is normally called RAIM. RAIM
algorithm uses only the “snapshot” of measurement pseudorange, there area many
derived algorithms from this, including pseudorange comparison method [76], the
least square residual method [77], parity space method [78]. From the mathematical
point of view, they equal to each other [79]. In most GNSS receivers, normally the
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least square residual method and parity method is widely used. The earlier paper
on RAIM techniques dates back to the one presented by Bradford W. Parkinson
and Penina Axelrad in 1988 [77]. After that, there are many improvements for
the similar algorithms. Researchers are also trying to apply similar algorithms into
railway applications. For example, a sequential RAIM was proposed by Igor V.
Nikiforov to improve GNSS for safe rail operations [80].
For the composition of a verifiable localisation unit, Karl-Albrecht Klinge and other
colleagues from iVA TU Braunschweig designed a localisation unit with inertial
sensor, GNSS receiver, and GNSS reference receiver (for differential GNSS) together
to deliver failure tolerable location of the vehicle [81]. This structure uses the GNSS
receiver location with a failure model to provide correction data for the inertial
sensor.
From the localisation unit perspective, χ2 testing is widely used for fault diagnose.
The good side is no state equation is needed, the measurement directly reflects
the performance of each GNSS receiver measured train location. Adrian Waegli
analysed the coupled localisation unit of GNSS/Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)
together. He proposed a integrated IMU sensor fusion structure, then analysed the
geometry of satellites. This method is good for detecting the error and no error
propagation will affect the following measurements [82].
For railway applications, Jiang Liu proposed a localisation unit structure of GNSS,
odometer, and Inertial Navigation Sensor (INS) together, the system has a principle
component analysis fault detection method, and also a probability based filter for
GNSS receiver measured train location verification [83].
Jana Heckenbergerova from Czech Republic proposed a discrete train location in-
tegrity monitoring algorithm to monitor the GNSS measurements along with the
digital track map to verify the GNSS receiver measured train location deviation and
thus calculate the horizontal protection limit [84].
The application of the methodology or algorithm are applicable for the GNSS-based
localisation unit. The ultimate goal is to use the GNSS receiver measured location
and quickly verifying the train locations measured by the GNSS receiver. In this
dissertation, the verification procedure is achieved through two steps. The first step
is the comparison of GNSS receiver measured train location with the digital track
map, the second step is the comparison of the accepted train location together with
the relative mileage estimated from both the Doppler radar velocity and GNSS
receiver velocity in the given time interval.

Chapter 3
Fundamentals of Used Means of
Descriptions and Theories
This chapter introduces the methodologies as the basis for the objectives introduced
in Chapter 1: terminology migration, evaluation, and verification. The methodo-
logies are UML class diagram and attribute hierarchy for terminology migration
methodology, Petri net and statistics for evaluation methodology, and optimal de-
tection theory for verification methodology.
3.1 UML Class Diagram
This section introduces the UML used in this dissertation as one means of descrip-
tion for introducing the structure of both systems and concepts.
UML is a graphical language that may be used to visualise, specify, construct, and
document the artifacts of a software-intensive system [85]. The UML is appropriate
for modelling software as well as workflow, structure, and behaviour of a system.
UML can also be used for designing the hardware. Basically, UML is only a mod-
elling language.
The vocabulary of the UML encompasses three kinds of building blocks: things,
relationships and diagrams. Things are the abstractions; relationships tie these
things together; diagrams group interesting collections of things. This dissertation
uses UML class diagram as the diagram for modelling. The related building blocks
are introduced as follows.
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+operation()
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Figure 3.1: Class as a Kind of Structure Things for UML Class Diagram
3.1.1 Class
Class is one of the structural things of the UML class diagram. Structural things
are the nouns of UML models. They are mostly static parts of a model, representing
elements that are either conceptual or physical. Class is used in this dissertation as
one kind of structural things.
Definition 3.1 Class (from [85])
Class is a description of a set of objects that share the same attributes, operations,
relationships, and semantics. A class implements one or more interfaces. Graphic-
ally, a class is rendered as a rectangle, usually including its name, attributes, and
operations.
Remark 3.1 Class Graphical Representation
The class notation permits to visualise graphically an abstraction apart from any
programing language and in a way to emphasise the most important parts of an
abstract: its name, attributes, and operation. A class example in Figure 3.1 shows
the structure of a class. The + sign besides the attribute and operation mean that
both attribute and operation are public. Besides, the attribute as system property
is deeply used in Section 3.2.1 Chapter 3. Operations are not concerned in this
dissertation. In some situations in the dissertation, classes are illustrated as a
simple box such as in Figure 3.3.
Besides classes, the structural things also contain interfaces, collaborations, use
cases, and so on. Since they are not used in this dissertation, the definitions are not
introduced.
3.1.2 Relationships
There are many kinds of relationships in UML class diagram, only two of them
are used in the dissertation, they are generalisation and association. For associ-
ation, more sophisticated relations are also used in the dissertation: multiplicity,
aggregation and composition.
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Figure 3.2: Generalisation as a Kind of Relationship in UML Class Diagram
Definition 3.2 Generalisation (from [85])
A generalisation is a relationship between a general class (called the “supper class”
or “parent”) and a more specific kind of that (called the “subclass” or “child”).
Generalisation is sometimes called an “is-a-kind-of” relationship.
Remark 3.2 Generalisation Example
A class may have zero, one or more parents. A class that has no parents and one
or more children is called a root class or a base class. Most often, generalisations
among classes are used to show inheritance relationship. A generalisation example
is shown in Figure 3.2.
Definition 3.3 Association (from [85])
An association is a structural relationship that specifies the objects of one thing
are connected to objects of another thing. Graphically, an association relationship
is rendered as a solid line, possibly directed, occasionally including a label, an
association connects the same or different classes. An association is a more general
relationship, it derives multiplicity, aggregation and also composition. These three
kinds of associations represent the association between classes more in detail.
Definition 3.4 Multiplicity (from [85])
An association represents a structural relationship among classes. In many model-
ing situations, it’s important to state how many objects may be connected across
an instance of an association. This “how many” is called the multiplicity of an
association’s role.
Remark 3.3 Multiplicity Representation
In this dissertation, the “how many” is used as one (1) and one or more (1...∗). An
example of two multiplicity is shown in Figure 3.3. The (1) to (1) shows between
class 1 and class 2 there is only one and only one association. The (1) to (1...∗)
shows class 1 may have many class 2.
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Figure 3.3: Multiplicity as a Kind of Relation in UML Class Diagram
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Class 2
Class 3
Class 4
Figure 3.4: Aggregation (left) & Composition (right)
Definition 3.5 Aggregation (from [85])
An aggregation is a plain association between two classes representing a structural
relationship between peers, meaning that both classes are conceptually at the same
level, no one is more important than the other.
Definition 3.6 Composition (from [85])
Composition is a variation of simple aggregation, with strong ownership and co-
incident lifetime as part of the whole. Parts with non-fixed multiplicity may be
created after the composite itself, but once created they live and die with it.
Remark 3.4 Difference between Aggregation and Composition
Aggregation turns out to be a simple concept with some fairly deep semantics.
Simple aggregation is entirely conceptual and does nothing more than distinguish a
whole from a “part”. Simple aggregation does not change the meaning of navigation
across the association between the whole and its parts, nor does it link the lifetime
of the whole and its parts. In composite aggregation, an object may be part of only
one composite at a time. Aggregation is specified by adorning a plain association
with a empty diamond at the whole end, meanwhile composition is specified using
a filled diamond. The example of both is shown in Figure 3.4.
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3.1.3 Diagrams
Diagrams are the means by which you view these building blocks. A diagram is
a graphical presentation of a set of elements, most often rendered as a connected
graph of things and relationships [85]. Typically, when viewing the static parts of
a system using one of the four following diagrams:
1. class diagram
2. object diagram
3. component diagram
4. deployment diagram
Class diagrams are the most common diagram found in modelling object-oriented
systems and also concepts.
Definition 3.7 Class Diagram (from [85])
A class diagram shows a set of classes, interfaces, and collaborations and their
relationships.
The examples for UML class diagrams has been shown in Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3,
and Figure 3.4.
3.2 Consistent Terminology
The first step that needs to be done for GNSS for train localisation evaluation
and verification is to find the common properties for both GNSS in space from
service provider side and GNSS receiver in railway applications from the user side.
The heterogeneous understanding of terms is the essential difficulty of inter-domain
communication. Clearly controlled definition of terms are used to reduce ambiguity
and complexity by reducing a wide range of possibilities of interpretations to an
essential and common understanding subset. So terminology is treated as the basis
bracket for the research of safety-related applications.
The conceptual content of a linguistic sign is constituted by the semantic relation
of other linguistic signs. The concept can derive the corresponding controlled and
specified research domain which can be treated as the property of the concept, go-
ing deep a model can be built. This new model of a linguistic sign is of immense
explanatory power for the differences which currently exist between the same term
used in different application domains and different terms for the same application
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domain. Using this approach it will be possible to model concepts in its complete
complexity. For this reason a major focus is laid on linguistic relations such as
different degrees of synonymy, homonym, overlapping terminology, equivalence, do-
main specificity, multiple possibilities of translation etc. This approach is leading a
formalisation of the terms.
3.2.1 Attribute Hierarchy for Concept Intension
Definition 3.8 Concept
Concepts will be defined as “unit of thoughts of a group or class of objects formed
by common properties, the properties determine the meaning of the abstraction”
according to DIN 2342 [86]. Concepts are used to detect objects of understanding
about objects and the conceptual ordering of objects. A concept has intension and
extension. A term is used to name a concept.
The intension of a concept is any property or quality connoted by the concept [86].
On the opposite side, the extension of a concept consists of the things to which
a term applies [86]. For example, the intension of “GNSS” defines the properties
of it as satellites determine user location. The extension of “GNSS” can be GPS,
Galileo, etc.
The intension of a concept is described using property, characteristic, quantity,
value, and unit. This structure is called attribute hierarchy by the iglos research
group at the Institute of Traffic Safety and Automation Engineering (iVA) [87] [88]
[89] [90] [91], the attribute hierarchy is inspired and developed from Rudolf Carnap’s
contribution [92]. A description of this method is displayed in UML class diagram
[93] in Figure 3.5. The definitions of property, characteristic, quantity, value, and
unit are as follows.
Definition 3.9 Property
Properties are related to the generally and abstractly perceivable states of reality.
Properties can be expressed in natural language by denominations and present terms
in the sense of the previously presented meta linguistic model. For a precise ter-
minological clarification, the observed properties are based on empirical observable
characteristics. Properties develop by an abstraction of characteristics.
Definition 3.10 Characteristic
Characteristics are basic elements for the recognition and description of objects and
consequently a major for the order within a terminology building. Characteristics
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Figure 3.5: Attribute Hierarchy for Term Intension in UML Class Diagram
are objectively determinable and therefore in objective way of specified proper-
ties. The properties of objects of the extra linguistic reality become quantifiable or
measurable by them. An object can show characteristic values of different charac-
teristics but only one characteristic value of each characteristic corresponds to it.
These characteristic values have to be determined in a sufficiently specified way for
the particular purpose. Thus, there have to be a principal method (e.g. observation,
proving, test, counting and measurement) for determining the characteristic proper-
ties for a given characteristic holders. This is normally the specification of a system
of characteristic values (scale level) which shows how to classify the characteristic
value. Characteristics are accessible for a measurement (continuous characteristics)
or counting (discrete characteristics).
Definition 3.11 Quantity
Physical quantities are related to a class of classes of physical phenomena or to a
class of physical properties which amount a scale of numeric indicated value and
which can be ascribed to concrete phenomena which can be produced under well-
defined experimental conditions. The determination of physical quantity includes
in addition to the topological definition (equivalence and order relation) the metric
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definition (determinations in relation to scale forms, zero point and unit). A con-
tinuing distinction of quantities between basic quantities and derived quantities is
the result of this embedding of a particular quantity into a quantity system.
Definition 3.12 Value
Values of a quantity can be presented as a product of numerical value and scale
unit. In this context, the scale unit is a defined real scalar value by international
agreement with which any other value of the quantity can be compared. As numer-
ical value, it can be expressed as relation of both quantity values. Analogous to the
quantity, it can be also differentiated between basic unit (second as basic unit of
the quantity time) and derived unit in relation to units, e.g. Failure in Time (FIT)
as derived unit of the quantity failure rate which is quoted in number of failures in
109 hours.
Definition 3.13 Unit
A unit of measurement is a definite magnitude of a physical quantity, defined and
adopted by convention or by law, that is used as a standard for measurement of the
same physical quantity. Any other value of the physical quantity can be expressed
as a simple multiple of the unit of measurement.
The attribute hierarchy can be divided into two levels. One level is the terminology
foundation, the other level is the qualitative evaluation or quantitative numbers.
This is the process from the basic abstraction to a real measurement. Each concept
is introduced in this structural diagram. The concepts can be interpreted from
properties, there could be one or more properties, so it is shown as (1...∗). The
other parts of this attribute hierarchy are following the same philosophy.
This kind of hierarchy sets up the identical structure for different concepts. It gen-
erates the interpretations of different concepts in the same way. So by this method,
the difference between similar concepts can be easily judged and analysed. This is
of great help to distinguish the different requirements of GNSS for different applic-
ations. This is shown in detail in Chapter 4, and then analysed in the migration
process in Chapter 5.
3.2.2 System as a Concept in UML Class Diagram and Attribute Hierarchy
System is a very important concept. System as the basis for uniformed connotation
should be defined as general as possible. The system can be interpreted by four
basic principles: structure principle, decomposition principle, causal principle, and
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Figure 3.6: Elementary Properties of System Model Concept in UML Class
Diagram [94]
temporal principle [94]. Among these principles, the decomposition principle is the
most important for understanding the complexity and the general system properties.
The decomposition principle (in German language “Dekompositionsprinzip”) shows
the system is composed of components. The relation between the components build
up the system structure. The components can be characterised through properties,
then the properties are specified through characteristics, the characteristics are de-
scribed by quantity; normally the quantity is composed by value and its unit [94]
[95]. The relation can be illustrated using UML class diagram [93] in Figure 3.6.
The definition of the terms in Figure 3.6 are cited from the VDI 4004 [96]. This
standard defines the essential terms, this decomposition structure is used as the
foundation.
The system is decomposed into four properties: structure, state, function, and beha-
viour. Then these four concepts are defined in the attribute hierarchy. This brings
the system and the concept into the same form of definition for this dissertation.
For example, the structure of a GNSS system is composed by three segments: space
segment, control segment and user segment. The state of a GNSS system can be
defined as usable state, unusable state. The function of a GNSS system is to provide
locations with the satellites. And, the behaviour of the system can be evaluated
through evaluation methodologies about the performance of the behaviours, such
as accuracy, etc.
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The four concepts are further defined and compared in Chapter 4 for the three
different systems investigated in this dissertation.
3.2.3 Relation between Terms
It is necessary to analyse and differentiate the relation between terms. The right
relation between two terms helps to differentiate the concepts based on the terms.
The terms are referring to each other. A relation always consists two terms. One
of the terms performs the role of a subject, and the other performs the role of an
object. The relation between two terms is specified by a relation type.
Definition 3.14 Relation Between Two Terms
Relation is an unspecified connection between terms. Relation simply indicates that
there is a connection existing between two terms, but not of which sort it is. By
the subordinate relation types, this relation can be further specified. If there are
uncertainties concerning the type of relation between two terms, but simultaneously
assurance about the existence of a relation, this may be indicated by a relation [97].
The terms in the attribute hierarchy shown in the UML class diagram are repres-
ented through the relationship types in UML. They are generalisation, association,
and multiplicity. These relationship types in UML show the hierarchical relation-
ships for terms. There are other relations need to be defined and compared for the
consistency of the terminologies.
There are two level of relations. The first level are the elementary relation types, the
second level are the specific relation types. The elementary relation types serve as
the first relation of terms and the construction of a rough terminological structure
that relates terms linguistically and conceptually. The specific relation types can
be used to give a more accurate model of the terminological system, thus they are
more specific relation types after elementary relation types. The relation types and
the meaning of them are shown in Table 3.1.
An example showing the relation between two terms “continuity” and “reliability”
is stated below. The attribute hierarchy representation of the two terms is shown
in Figure 3.7. The definitions of both continuity and reliability show only difference
in the names. That is to say, the “continuity” can be replaced by “reliability”.
But concerning the attributes in attribute hierarchy, the failure rate of “continuity”
λc and the failure rate of “reliability” λr, shows that λr = λc + λothers
3. Thus
3The more detailed analysis is shown in Chapter 5 Section 5.3.
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Table 3.1: Relation Types in the Dissertation
Elementary Relation Type Specific Relation Type Definition
risk of confusion mixed up with one of the possible or
commonly used translations
as the preferred translation
translation has translation the two terms are the same
meaning, but in different
languages
hierarchy has part of same as UML composition
relationship
has equivalence definition texts of their definitions
differ only in formulations
but not in their general
content
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 definition
Figure 3.7: Relation between “Continuity” and “Reliability”
R(t) < C(t), which means reliability is part of the continuity in definition and also
in formulation.
With the relation between the attributes, it is easier to distinguish the difference
between the two properties and also find the appropriate one in the appropriate
context.
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3.3 Formalisation with Petri nets
Petri nets are considered as a formal and graphical means of description for sys-
tem modelling. Petri nets are introduced in the PhD dissertation of Carl Adams
Petri [98] at Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt in 1962. The original theory was
developed as an approach to model and analyse communication systems. Petri nets
also have very strong mathematical foundation.
Since the seminal work, many representations and extensions have been proposed for
allowing more concise descriptions and for representing system features not observed
on the early models. The simple Petri nets have subsequently been adopted and
extended in several directions, in which timed, stochastic, high-level, object-oriented
and coloured nets are a few examples of the proposed extensions.
Petri nets simulate the flow of objects, their states, their creation and their van-
ishing. The delay of flow is modelled explicitly by the parameters of so-called
transitions which are one of the two types of nodes of a Petri net [99].
3.3.1 Place/Transition nets
The base of all Petri net models is the definition of a net.
Definition 3.15 Net Definition (from [100] [101])
A net is defined by giving a set of states (denoted by S), a set of transitions (denoted
by T ), and a relation for “flow” or “followed by” (denoted by F ) telling which old
states will be replaced by which new states. Sometimes, instead of S, the letter of
P is used, coming from places.
Formally it is defined as a triple Σ = (P, T, F ) where,
• P is a set of places;
• T is a set of transitions, disjoint from P (P ∩ T = ∅);
• F is a flow relation F ⊆ (P × T ) ∪ (T × P ) for the set of arcs.
If P and T are finite, the net Σ is said to be finite.
Place/Transition nets are in a sense of net definition in Definition 3.15 together with
a definition of arc weights. Place/Transition nets are one of the most prominent
and best studied class of Petri nets, and it is sometimes just called Petri nets (PN).
A marked Place/Transition net is a bipartite directed graph, usually defined as
follows.
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Definition 3.16 Place/Transition nets (from [102])
A Place/Transition net (also called P/T net) is defined by Σ = [P, T, F,W,M0]
where,
• P = {p1, p2, ..., pm} is a finite set of places;
• T = {t1, t2, ..., tn} is a finite set of transitions;
• F ⊆ (P × T ) ∪ (T × P ) is a set of arcs (flow relation);
• W : F → {0, 1, 2, 3, ...} is a weight function;
• M0 : P → {0, 1, 2, 3, ...} is the initial marking.
Remark 3.5 Markings
Markings is the most important element to differ a net and a Petri net. It is
convenient to define markings as vector of integers, assuming a total ordering of
the places. With the initial marking M0, different transitions ti have the priority
to fire, then a new marking M
′
is generated. For ∀ pj ∈ P , if M(pj) = k, it means
the place pj has k tokens.
One P/T net has the following transition firing rule. For any t ∈ T , if
p ∈ P : p ∈ •t→M(p) > 1
It means the transition t at marking M is enabled, is written as M [t >. When t
fires, the marking M goes to a new marking M
′
, is written as M [t > M
′
. Generally
for any p ∈ P ,
M
′
(p) =

M(p)− 1 if p ∈ •t− t•
M(p) + 1 if p ∈ t• − •t
M(p) others
Remark 3.6 Elements of a P/T net and Representations (from [102])
This class of P/T nets has two kinds of nodes, place and transition. Place (P) is
represented by circles and transitions (T) is represented by bars. Figure 3.8 depicts
the basic elements of a simple PN. The set of arcs F is used to denote the places
connected to a transition (and vice-versa).
Place and transitions may have several interpretations. Using the concept of con-
ditions and events, places represent conditions, and transitions represent events,
such that an event may have several pre-conditions and post-conditions. For more
interpretations, Table 3.2 shows other meaning for places and transitions. It is
important to show that there are another way to represent P/T net elements.
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Figure 3.8: Petri net Basic Elements
Table 3.2: Interpretation for Places and Transitions
Input Places Transitions Output Places
pre-conditions events post-conditions
input data computation step output data
input signals signal processing output signals
resource needed task performing resource releasing
conditions logical clauses conclusions
buffers processing buffers
Definition 3.17 Reachability Graph
The state graphs, i.e. those of a momentary marking (irrespective of the details of
switching delays used-up) are called reachability graphs. Since each node of the
Reachability Graph (RG) of a given PN corresponds uniquely to a marking ( at
time τ)
M(τ) = (M1(τ),M2(τ), ...,Mm(τ))
The total number of states of the RG M(τ)|τ=1...f , i.e., is bounded by a finite number
f when the reachability graph can be drawn.
Clearly, edges in RG correspond to the switching of transitions in the PN under
discussion. Therefore the RG is a digraph with an edge marking.
3.3.2 Stochastic Petri nets
Petri nets are classic means of description for modelling and analysing discrete
event systems which are too complex to be described by automata or queueing
models. Time and probabilistic choices are essential aspects for a performance
evaluation model. Stochastic Petri nets (SPN) emerged as a modelling formalism
for performance analysis in the early 1980s. SPN have two different classes of
transitions: immediate transitions and timed transitions. Once enabled, immediate
transitions fire in zero time. Timed transitions fire after a random, distributed
enabling time [103].
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immediate (no time delay)
only time delay
negative exponential 
distribution
normal distribution
Figure 3.9: Stochastic Petri net Transition Category
Definition 3.18 Stochastic Petri nets (from [103])
Let SPN = (P, T, F,W,M0, T1, T2, E) be a stochastic Petri net, where:
• P = {p1, p2, ..., pm} is a finite set of places;
• T = {t1, t2, ..., tn} is a finite set of transitions;
• F is a flow relation F ⊆ (P × T ) ∪ (T × P ) for the set of arcs;
• W : F → {0, 1, 2, 3, ...} is a weight function;
• M0 : P → {0, 1, 2, 3, ...} is initial marking;
• T1 ⊆ T is the set of timed transitions. T1 6= ∅;
• T2 ⊆ T denotes the rest of immediate transitions T1 ∩ T2 = ∅, T = T1 ∪ T2;
• E = (e1, ..., e|T |) is an array whose entry et ∈ R+.
- et is a rate of negative exponential distribution/normal distribution or other
distributions specifying the firing delay, when transition tt is a timed trans-
ition, i.e. tt ∈ T1
- et is a firing weight, when transition tt is a immediate transition, i.e. tt ∈ T2
The difference between the SPN and a P/T net is only the rates on several trans-
itions. The possible transitions appeared in this dissertation are defined in Fig-
ure 3.9.
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3.4 Probability and Distribution
GNSS receivers delivers location measurements are assumed to be delivered as at
a constant rate4, the measurements can be regarded as a stochastic process. The
stochastic performance needs to be studied. With the correct understanding of the
measurements for this GNSS receiver, the performance characteristics can be used
to detect and predict the ongoing measurement outputs from the GNSS receiver.
3.4.1 Probability
Probability is a measure or estimation of how likely it is that something will happen
or that a statement is true. Probabilities are given a value between 0 (0% chance
or will not happen) and 1 (100% chance or will happen). The higher the degree of
probability, the more likely the event is to happen, or, in a longer series of samples,
the greater the number of times such event is expected to happen.
Definition 3.19 Random Variable (from [104])
Considering a random experiment having sample space S, A is a random variable,
X is a function that assigns a real value to each outcome in S. For any set of real
numbers A, the probability that X will assume a value that is contained in the set
A is equal to the probability that the outcome of the experiment is contained in
X−1(A). That is:
P{X ∈ A} = P (X−1(A)) (3.1)
where X−1(A) is the event consisting of all points s ∈ S such that X(s) ∈ A. A
random variable X is said to be discrete if its set of possible values is countable.
Remark 3.7 GNSS Receiver Measurements As A Discrete Random Variable
The measurement set from the GNSS receivers is regarded as countable values not
as continuous in time. So the measurement set is considered as a discrete random
variable X. The following definitions, theorems as well as remarks will consider
only based on discrete random variable.
Definition 3.20 Distribution of A Random Variable (from [105])
When a probability distribution has been specified on the sample space s of an
experiment, we can determine a probability distribution for the possible values of
any random variable X. A is any subset of the real line. Denote P (X ∈ A) the
probability that the value of X belongs to subset A. Then P (X ∈ A) is equal to the
4But the GNSS receiver clock jitter problem exists in the measurements.
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probability that outcomes s of the experiment will be such that X(s) ∈ A. That is:
P (X ∈ A) = P{s : X(s) ∈ A} (3.2)
Definition 3.21 Distribution Function (from [104])
The distribution function F of the discrete random variable X is defined for any
real number x by:
F (x) =
∑
y6x
P{X = y} = P (X 6 x),−∞ < x <∞ (3.3)
in that F (x) 6 1. In reliability theory, F (x) is used to describe the probability of
failure for the system, at the specific time x, F (x) is describing the probability the
system is failed [106].
Definition 3.22 Probability Density Function (from [104])
A Probability Density Function (PDF) is a function that describes the relative
likelihood for this random variable to take on a given value. It can be derived from
the distribution function F (x).
f(x) =
d
dx
F (x) (3.4)
Definition 3.23 Expectation (from [104])
The expectation or mean value of the discrete random variable X, denoted by E[X],
is defined by:
E[X] =
∑
x
xP{X = x} (3.5)
The mean value is named as µ, in this situation µ = E[X].
Definition 3.24 Variance (from [104])
The variance of the random variable X is defined by:
var(X) = E[(X − E[X])2]
= E[X2]− E2[X] (3.6)
Normally, the square root of var(X) is called standard deviation. In that it is
represented by σ =
√
var(X).
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3.4.2 Distributions
In this dissertation, the negative exponential distribution, normal distribution,
gamma function, chi-squared distribution, student t-distribution are used. This
subsection introduces these distributions in detail.
Definition 3.25 Negative Exponential Distribution (from [104])
The negative exponential distribution is a family of continuous probability distri-
butions. It describes the time between events in a Poisson process. The PDF can
be defined as:
f(x;λ) =
{
λe−λx x > 0
0 x < 0
(3.7)
Definition 3.26 Normal Distribution (from [104])
In probability theory, the normal distribution or Gaussian distribution is a very
commonly occurring continuous probability distribution - a function that tells the
probability of a number in some context falling between any two real numbers. The
probability density function is denoted by:
f(x;µ, σ) =
1
σ
√
2pi
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 (3.8)
Normally a normal distribution is written as X ∼ N(µ, σ). It is called standard
normal distribution when µ = 0, σ = 1, and is denotes as X ∼ N(0, 1).
Definition 3.27 Log-normal Distribution (from [107])
A Log-normal distribution is a continuous probability distribution of a random
variable whose logarithm is normally distributed. If X is log-normally distributed,
then lnX is normally distributed. The probability density function of Log-normal
distribution is given by:
f(x;µ, σ) = 1
xσ
√
2pi
e−
1
2
( lnx−µ
σ
)
2
x > 0 (3.9)
Definition 3.28 Rayleigh Distribution (from [107])
Rayleigh distribution is often observed when the overall magnitude of a vector is
related to its directional components. A random variable R is Rayleigh distributed
if R =
√
X2 + Y 2, where X ∼ N(0, σ2) and Y ∼ N(0, σ2) are independent nor-
mal random variables. The commonly used σ is the only parameter for Rayleigh
distribution. The probability density function of Rayleigh distribution is given by:
f(x;σ) = x
σ2
e−
x2
2σ2 x > 0 (3.10)
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Definition 3.29 Gamma Function (from [105])
The gamma function (represented by the capital Greek letter G) is an extension of
the factorial function, with its argument shifted down by 1, to real and complex
numbers. That is, if n is a positive integer, then Γ(n) is denoted by:
Γ(n) = (n− 1)!
For positive half integers, the function values are given exactly by:
Γ(
1
2
n) =
√
pi
(n− 2)!!
2
n−1
2
Definition 3.30 Chi-squared Distribution (from [105])
The chi-squared distribution (also chi-square or χ2-distribution) with n degrees
of freedom is the distribution of a sum of the squares of n independent standard
normal random variables. It is one of the most widely used probability distributions
in inferential statistics, e.g., in hypothesis testing or in construction of confidence
intervals.
If X1, X2, ..., Xn are independent, standard normal distribution random variables as
N(0, 1), then the sum of their corresponding squares,
χ2 = X21 +X
2
2 + ...+X
2
n
is distributed according to the chi-squared distribution with n degrees of freedom.
It is usually denoted as χ2 ∼ χ2(n). The probability density function is:
f(x;n) =

x
n
2−1e−
x
2
2
n
2 Γ(n
2
))
x > 0
0 x 6 0
(3.11)
In that, Γ(n
2
) denotes Gamma function, which has the closed-form value for integer
n.
Definition 3.31 Student t-distribution (from [105])
Student t-distribution or simply (t-distribution) is a family of continuous probab-
ility distributions that arises when estimating the mean of a normally distributed
population in situations where the sample size is small and population standard
deviation is unknown.
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If X is the standard normal distribution as X ∼ N(0, 1), Y is the chi-squared
distribution as Y ∼ χ2(n), and X and Y are independent, the random variable:
T =
X√
Y/n
is with n degrees of freedom. It is denoted as T ∼ t(n). The probability density
function of t-distribution is given by:
f(t;n) =
Γ(n+1
2
)√
pinΓ(n
2
)
(1 + t
2
n
)−
n+1
2 −∞ < t < +∞ (3.12)
3.4.3 Distribution Fitting
Distribution fitting, or to be more precisely probability distribution fitting, is to fit
a probability distribution to a series of measured data concerning the repeatness of
a variable phenomenon. In the context of this dissertation, it is to find the accuracy
distribution of GNSS receiver calculated train location measurements. Besides, the
other properties of GNSS for train localisation distribution performance can also be
estimated through distribution fitting.
With the fitted distribution, the fitting result can be used to predict the probability
of the failure and forecast the frequency of occurrence of the magnitude of the failure
in a given time interval. The selection of the appropriate distribution depends on
the presence or absence of symmetry of the data set with respect to the mean value.
There are three kinds of distributions: symmetrical distribution, negatively skewed
distribution (skew distribution to the left), positively skewed distribution (skew
distribution to the right). The latter two kinds are non-symmetrical distributions.
The distributions introduced in the last subsection are categorised into these three
kinds:
• symmetrical distribution: normal distribution, student t-distribution;
• negatively skewed distribution: negative exponential distribution;
• positively skewed distribution: Log-normal distribution, Rayleigh distribu-
tion, chi-squared distribution.
The fitting techniques are parametric methods or regression methods. In this dis-
sertation, the parametric methods are considered, mainly the maximum likelihood
method is used. With the fitted distribution, the parameters can be used together
with the stochastic Petri net model to estimate the GNSS performance at the system
level.
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3.5 Optimal Detection Theory
The GNSS measurements normally contain errors and measurement noise. In this
dissertation, the errors are called deviations5. Normally, the deviations needs to be
evaluated to see whether the deviations are too large to be used for train localisation,
thus an optimal detection methodology is needed. Statistical tools enable systematic
solutions for optimal detection and decision making, this provides the ability to
detect the GNSS measurement deviations and optimal detection of big deviations.
The most general and popular way is using hypothesis testing methods [105] [108].
3.5.1 Hypothesis Testing
The raw material of a statistical investigation is a set of observations, these are the
values taken by the random variables X whose distribution P (X) is at least partly
unknown. The need for statistical analysis stems from the fact that the distribution
of X, and hence some aspect of the situation underlying the mathematical model
is not known. The consequence of such a lack of knowledge is uncertainty as to the
best mode behaviour. The problem is to determine a rule which, for each set of
values of the observations, specifies what decisions should be taken.
Hypothesis testing is appropriate for situations in which one wants to guess which
of two possible statements about a population is correct.
Definition 3.32 Samples and Estimate
A reasonable guess of the unknown value of a designated quantity, e.g. the mean
or the variance. The quantity that hoping to guess is called estimand.
From the mean value perspective, suppose the estimand is µ. Considering a sample
−→x = {x1, ..., xn} in that µ = xn for the mean value.
xn =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi
A random variable that is a function of the random variables X1, ..., Xn, and is
represented as
Xn =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Xi
This is the rule for guessing, an estimation procedure or estimator.
5The error of the reference measurement system is not investigated in this dissertation.
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Definition 3.33 Loss Function (from [105])
The foremost requirement of a good estimator δ is that it yield an estimate of θ
′
which is close to the actual value of θ. In other words, a good estimator is one
for which it is highly probable that the error δ(X)− θ will be close to 0. For each
possible value of θ and each possible estimate a, the number L(θ, a) measures the
loss or cost to the statistician.
We assume the expectation E[L(θ, a)] is a minimum, this is called loss function.
Definition 3.34 Test of the Hypothesis (from [108])
Hypothesis testing or significance testing is a method for testing a claim or hypo-
thesis about a parameter in a population, using data measured in a sample. In this
method, we test some hypothesis by determining the likelihood that a sample stat-
istic could have been selected, if the hypothesis regarding the population parameter
were true.
Definition 3.35 Null Hypothesis and Alternative Hypothesis (from [108])
The null hypothesis (H0) is a statement about a population parameter, such as the
population mean, that is assumed to be true. The null hypothesis is a starting
point. We will test whether the value stated in the null hypothesis is likely to be
true.
An alternative hypothesis (H1) is a statement that directly contradicts a null hy-
pothesis by stating that the actual value of a population parameter is less than,
greater than, or not equal to the value stated in the null hypothesis.
Definition 3.36 Level of Significance (from [109])
Level of significance (or significance level, denoted by α), refers to a criterion of
judgement upon which a decision is made regarding the value stated in a null
hypothesis H0. The criterion is based on the probability of obtaining a statistic
measurand in a sample if the value stated in the null hypothesis were true.
In behavioural science, the criterion or level of significance is typically set at 5%.
When the probability of obtaining a sample mean is less than 5% (α = 0.05) if the
null hypothesis were true, then we reject the value stated in the null hypothesis.
This 5% is also used as the criterion in this dissertation.
3.5.2 Hypothesis Testing for One Sample
One sample test is the traditional one in hypothesis testing. According to the ac-
curacy evaluation, the deviation of GNSS measurements can be attributed as normal
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distribution.6 Assume the normal distribution population x ∼ N(µ, σ2), (x1, x2, ..., xn1)
is a sample from x. The parameters for the sample is recorded as:
x =
1
n1
n1∑
i=1
xi, s
2
1 =
1
n1 − 1
n1∑
i=1
(xi − x)2
The test statistic to be used depends largely on the information about the popu-
lation, the information about the sample is basically µ or σ of it. There are three
kinds of testings based on these two parameters with the consideration of the known
and unknown of the parameters. They are:
• testing of µ with the basis of known σ,
• testing of µ with unknown σ,
• testing of σ.
For the first situation, when µ and σ are both known, it is called one-independent
sample z test. It is the statistical procedure used to test hypothesis concerning the
mean in a single population with a known variance. The test statistic can be given
as:
z =
x− µ0
σ/
√
n
With the consideration of the hypothesis H0 : µ = µ0 ↔ H1 : µ 6= µ0 the rejection
area is {|z| > k}, when H0 is true, µ ∼ N(0, 1), so for the significance level α the
probability is regarded as:
PH0{|µ| > zα/2} = α
And the rejection region is:
C = {|z| > zα/2}
3.5.3 Hypothesis Testing for Two Samples
Two-sample hypothesis testing is statistical analysis designed to test if there is a
difference between two means from two different populations. A two-sample hypo-
thesis test could also be used to test if the mean number of defective parts produced
using assembly line A is greater than the mean number of defective parts produced
using assembly line B [108].
6Normal distribution is recognised as the most common used distribution for GNSS measure-
ment deviations, but the real measurement deviation results can be fitted to other distributions.
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Assume the normal distribution population x ∼ N(µ1, σ21), (x1, x2, ..., xn1) is a
sample from x. The population y ∼ N(µ2, σ22), (y1, y2, ..., yn2) is a sample from y.
And the samples from x and y are independent from each other. The parameters
for the samples are recorded as:
x =
1
n1
n1∑
i=1
xi, s
2
1 =
1
n1 − 1
n1∑
i=1
(xi − x)2
y =
1
n2
n2∑
i=1
yi, s
2
2 =
1
n2 − 1
n2∑
i=1
(yi − y)2
The methodology for testing two samples can be regarded as different categories:
• σ1 and σ2 known, the hypothesis testing for µ1 − µ2,
• σ1 = σ2 = σ, the hypothesis testing for µ1 − µ2,
• both µ1 and µ2 unknown, the hypothesis testing for σ1σ2 .
Among the three categories, the unknown µ and unknown σ is used in this disser-
tation. The test statistic for it can be:
t =
x¯− y¯
Sw
√
1
n1
+ 1
n2
in that
s2w =
(n1 − 1)s21 + (n2 − 1)s22
n1 + n2 − 2
With the consideration of the hypothesis H0 : µ1 − µ2 = 0↔ H1 : µ1 − µ2 6= 0 the
rejection area is {|t| > k}, when H0 is true, t t(n1 + n2 − 2), so for the significance
level α the probability is regarded as:
PH0{|t| > k} = α
And the rejection region is:
C = {|t| > tα/2(n1 + n2 − 2)}
3.5.4 Quantitative Attribute for Detection Results
The states of nature having been partitioned into two hypotheses as H0 and H1.
The decision maker or the decision algorithm needs to choose the two logically. If
3.5 Optimal Detection Theory 47
Table 3.3: State of Nature V.S. Decision Choice
State of Nature
True False
Decision Choice
H0 (1− α) type II error (β)
H1 type I error (α) (1− β)
the decision choice is H1 when in fact H0 is true, then that is to say a type I error
has been committed. If the decision choice is H0 when in fact H1 is true, then that
is to say a type II error has been committed. In a safety-related application, the
type II error is highly important to investigate. So comparing the states of nature
and the decision algorithm, there are four possible outcomes as shown in Table 3.3,
two of which are favourable and two of which are unfavourable.
Type I error is normally called False Alarm (FA), and the probability is represented
by PFA, type II error is normally called Missed Detection (MD) and the probability
is represented by PMD. The false alarms are actually safe, because the measurements
are acceptable but erroneously reported as too big deviation. On the other hand,
the missed detections are dangerous, because they are unacceptable deviations, so
the probability of the missed detections needs to be as low as possible for the safety-
related applications.
For safety-related applications, the decision choice failures can be categorised as
dangerous failures (type II error) and safe failures (type I error). The safe failures,
whether detected or undetected, have no influence on the technical safety functions
of the system. Dangerous failures in the safety function lead on the other hand to
a dangerous state of the system. The detection failure probability analysed in the
time interval can be expressed as failure rate. The type I error, false alarm rate is
denoted by λS in an hour’s time interval as safe failure rate, it is calculated through:
λS =
PFA
time interval
(hour)
The type II error, missed detection rate is denoted by λD in an hour’s time interval
as dangerous failure rate, it is calculated through:
λD =
PMD
time interval
(hour)
The connection between λS and λD is described by the safety-related factor S, the
S factor gives the ratio between all dangerous failures and the total of all possible
failures, see Equation 3.13.
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S =
λD
λS + λD
(3.13)
Safe and dangerous failures are furthermore divided into:
• Safe Detected Failures (SD);
• Safe Undetected Failures (SU) (type II error)7;
• Dangerous Detected Failures (DD);
• Dangerous Undetected Failures (DU) (type II error).
The Diagnostic Coverage (DC) parameter describes the relation between the failure
rate for dangerous detected failures and the failure rate for dangerous failure. This
parameter represents the ratios between the failure rates which can be detected by
diagnostics and the failure rate for dangerous failures.
DC =
λDD
λDD + λDU
(3.14)
The failures can be shown graphically in Figure 3.10 as a UML representation
[110] [111]. In the figure, the system performance contains failures, the failures
are divided into safe and dangerous failures. Among the failures, the dangerous
undetected failures are type II error and needs to be studied carefully.
GNSS for train localisation decision making are mainly relying on the software or to
be more specific algorithms applied in the localisation unit. The performance of the
detection algorithm needs to analyse considering both two types of errors and also
evaluate the probability of both safe undetected and dangerous undetected failures.
So in the algorithm the type I error can be regarded as a false positive error, the same
meaning as the false alarms. The probability of FA is the same as the significance
level definition in Definition 3.36, according to this hypothesis testing is also called
significance test. The probability of type I error is registered as α, in that:
PFA = P{reject H0 | H0 is true}
= P [test statistic > τ | θ = θ0]
= α
(3.15)
7Safe undetected failures are type II errors since they are false but remain undetected as shown
in Table 3.3.
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Figure 3.10: Failure Analysis and Rates Categories
Type II error (both λSU and λDU) is regarded as a false negative error, the same
meaning as missed detections. And the probability of type II error is registered as
β, in that:
PMD = P{accept H0 | H0 is false}
= P [test statistic < τ | θ = θ1]
= β
(3.16)
This two kind of failures give guidelines for the performance of the verification
methodology introduced later in Chapter 7.

Chapter 4
GNSS Measurement Principles and
Performance Requirements
The GNSS measurement principle is the foundation for applying GNSS into any
applications. The principle is the key to the performance.
The performance requirements of GNSS are based on the idea that all applications
need a minimum level of performance for the required function, and yet not all
applications require the same performance requirement [112]. Thus the existing
GNSS requirements for different applications also need to be studied as the reference
to propose the GNSS for train localisation application.
4.1 Localisation Terminology
As one of the main work of this dissertation, it is necessary to have a clear definition
and understanding of the localisation terminology. This section defines position,
location and other important terms for the following parts of this dissertation. Of
course, the definition starts from localisation.
Definition 4.1 Localisation
Localisation is the determination of the geographical movement state of a certain
means of transportation (that means location and speed according to amount and
direction in relation to a point of reference of the vehicle) in a spatial reference
system [21].
Definition 4.2 Navigation
Navigation is defined as: localisation of a vehicle and its guidance from a location
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Table 4.1: Positioning, Position, Localisation, and Location Definition
Terminology Definition
positioning (DE. Positionierung) process of putting an object in a place [21]
position (DE. Position) the information of a place related to a coordinate
system [116]
localisation (DE. Ortung) the act of delivering a location [21]
location (DE. Ort) location describes a position in terms of
topological relations [116]
to a destination [113]. Navigation is also defined as the science of getting ships, air-
craft, spacecraft or people from place to place; especially: the method of estimating
location, course, and distance travelled [114].
According to the definition of location (Definition 4.1) and the definition of navig-
ation (Definition 4.2), localisation is only part of navigation purpose. According to
the current train control systems, operating a train on the railway track, the routes
for the trains are already defined previously by the train time table plan and also
adjusted by the train conductor at the TCC [115]. So for railway train localisation,
only localisation is required.
Localisation is a process, the result of the process is a location. This process requires
a resource that is the GNSS receiver. In many published documents related to
GNSS, position is also used. For example GPS, in that P stands for “positioning”.
So “positioning” and “localisation” are mixed with each other, it is also necessary
to distinguish between the two terms.
Formally, the definition of the four terms “positioning, position, localisation, loca-
tion” can be treated as a data process sequence. The definition of the four terms are
in Table 4.1. One thing is basically clear, the result of “positioning” is a position;
and the result of “localisation” is location. Positioning and localisation distinguish
from each other through resources. The resource for executing the positioning pro-
cess is the energy or a person to move the object. The resource for executing the
localisation process is a measurement device. So the measurement devices are trying
to measure the position. But since there is always error (random error or meas-
urement system error) inside the measurement result, the result is always called a
“location”.
In the context of this dissertation, the resource for “positioning” can be a train
driver, the resource for “localisation” can be a GNSS receiver. The difference can
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Figure 4.1: Positioning, Position, Localisation, Location in Petri net Interpret-
ation
be shown clearly in the Petri net model in Figure 4.18. The processes are shown in
transitions, and the resources and results are shown in states.
So the train position is changing when the train is moving under the inspection of
the train driver. The GNSS receiver installed on the train receives signal from the
satellites, the GNSS receiver generates GNSS receiver measured train location.
This information is transferred into a GNSS-based localisation unit, the localisation
unit generates localisation unit measured train location. Since all the locations
in this dissertation are train locations, they are simply called GNSS receiver
location and localisation unit location in the following text.
But the common understood terms such as GPS, Positioning, Navigation, and
Timing (PNT) and so on, among them “P” actually means localisation in the
definition of this dissertation. But since the abbreviations are already long time
recognised by many people, the name will still stay unchanged in this dissertation9.
4.2 Three GNSS-related Systems
The GNSS receiver location and the localisation unit location can be considered
as the output of two different systems. Besides, to evaluate the GNSS receiver
performance, a stand-alone reference measurement system is also built. So there
are three systems applied in this dissertation, they are GNSS receiver, reference
8This two processes are also related, GNSS receiver is normally mounted on the train to measure
the current train location.
9PVT is more appropriate to represent the information from a GNSS receiver. But the GNSS
standards are using PNT, this dissertation follows the usage in the standards. Thus, PNT is
adopted in this dissertation.
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Figure 4.2: Three GNSS-related Systems
measurement system, and a GNSS-based localisation unit. This section is going to
introduce the three systems.
The properties of the systems have been introduced in Chapter 3 Section 3.2.2 as
structure, state, function, and behaviour. This section introduces the structure of
each system and then illustrates the function of the GNSS-based localisation unit.
The three systems are related to each other, the relation between the three systems
are shown in Figure 4.2. Basically, the GNSS-based localisation unit and the refer-
ence measurement system are both on the user segment, both need the support of
a accurate digital track map.
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4.2.1 GNSS Structure
The four GNSS as GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, and Beidou are sharing the same
system structure. The four GNSS are comprised of three segments:
• space segment: satellite constellation;
• control segment: ground control/monitoring network;
• user segment: user receiving equipment.
All these three segments operate together to provide accurate three-dimensional
PNT services to users. The following content is introducing the three segments in
detail using the most mature GPS.
The satellite constellation is the set of satellites in orbit that provide the ranging
signals and data messages to the user equipment. The GPS satellite constellation
has 24 satellites in six 55◦ orbital planes, with four satellites in each plane, with room
for spares. For example, currently there are 31 satellites in the sky, this number of
satellites keep the availability of the satellites providing localisation service. The
orbit period of each satellite is approximately 12 hours at an altitude of 20180 km
[117]. With this satellite constellation, the user equipment is expected to have at
least 6 satellites in view from any point of the earth. GLONASS, Beidou and Galileo
use satellites in different orbits and orbit period.
The control segment (CS) tracks and maintains the satellites in space. The CS
monitors satellite health and signal integrity and maintains the orbital configuration
of the satellites. Furthermore, the CS updates the satellite clock corrections and
ephemeris as well as numerous other parameters essential to deliver PNT services
to users. The GPS control segment consists of a master control station, five base
stations and three data up-loading stations in locations around the world. The
base stations track and monitor the satellites via their broadcast signals. These
signals are passed to the master control station where orbital parameters and timing
corrections are computed. The resulting corrections are transmitted back to the
satellites via the data up-loading stations.
Finally, the user receiver equipment performs the localisation, timing, or other re-
lated functions (e.g., surveying). User receiver equipments are capable of simultan-
eously processing the signals from a minimum of four satellites to obtain accurate
location, velocity and timing measurements. However the accuracy and the reli-
ability of the measurement is enhanced as the geometry of the satellites in good
situation.
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Figure 4.3: GNSS Segments [118]
The structure of the three segments are more vividly shown in Figure 4.3 [118].
The space segment and control segment are communicating with each other bi-
directionally. But the user segment only receives signal from the satellites.
4.2.2 Digital Track Map
The digital track map is another essential component for GNSS user segment ap-
plications. This, in the content of this dissertation, means to merge the GNSS
receiver measurement to the railway long-history-used mileage. The GNSS receiver
measurements are always located in the 3D World Geodetic System (WGS) 84 co-
ordinate (longitude, latitude, altitude), in order to fit the measurements to mileage,
an accurate digital track map is needed both for coordinate conversion and accurate
localisation.
The making of a digital track map includes two processes: one is the survey of the
track, the other is the database for the surveyed information. In GNSS for survey
applications, more accurate GNSS receivers and techniques are requested, such as
differential GNSS, Real Time Kinematic (RTK) and so on. The data process of
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Figure 4.4: Structure of the Digital Track Map
the surveyed data is the other important process for making the digital track map,
the process to identify the false surveyed data and exclude them is on high demand.
There have been some researches on this topic for railway application scenarios [31].
The digital track map can be stored or edited using either KML [119] or XML [120]
format. The XML digital track map is used in this dissertation.
The structure of the digital track map can be shown in Figure 4.4. Basically the
structure of the digital track map are divided into different sections. Each section is
composed by surveyed points, there are two kind of points: Point of Interest (POI)
and nodes. Each section has two POIs and a handful of nodes. The length of the
section is also stored for checking the correct mileage of the train.
The structure of the XML-based digital track map can be shown as the code be-
low. Each track is divided into many track sections, named as “tracksection” in the
XML file. Then each track section is divided into many small sections, named as
“section”. Each small section is composed by existing measured POIs and nodes,
named as “POI” and “NODE” accordingly.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf -8"?>
<track>
<tracksection ID = "1" Trackdistance = "32.52">
...
<section ID = "n" sectiondistance = "12.42">
<POI ID = "POIm" WGS84_Lat = "" WGS84_Long = ""
WGS84_Height = "" GK_East = "" GK_North = ""/>
<NODE ID = "NODEi" WGS84_Lat = "" WGS84_Long = ""
WGS84_Height = "" GK_East = "" GK_North = ""/>
<NODE ID = "NODEi +1" WGS84_Lat = "" WGS84_Long = ""
WGS84_Height = "" GK_East = "" GK_North = ""/>
<NODE ID = "NODEi +2" WGS84_Lat = "" WGS84_Long = ""
WGS84_Height = "" GK_East = "" GK_North = ""/>
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...
<POI ID = "POIm+1" WGS84_Lat = "" WGS84_Long = ""
WGS84_Height = "" GK_East = "" GK_North = ""/>
</section >
...
<section ID = "n+1" sectiondistance = "20.10">
<POI ID = "POIm+2" WGS84_Lat = "" WGS84_Long = ""
WGS84_Height = "" GK_East = "" GK_North = ""/>
<NODE ID = "NODEm" WGS84_Lat = "" WGS84_Long = ""
WGS84_Height = "" GK_East = "" GK_North = ""/>
...
<POI ID = "POIm+3" WGS84_Lat = "" WGS84_Long = ""
WGS84_Height = "" GK_East = "" GK_North = ""/>
</section >
</tracksection >
...
</track >
The XML-based digital track map is not only used for GNSS receiver performance
evaluation in Chapter 6, but also applied as the basic element for GNSS-based
localisation unit real-time operation verification process for matching the GNSS
receiver measured train location to the track in Chapter 7.
4.2.3 Reference Measurement System Structure
A reference measurement system is a kind of localisation system, thus a subset of
navigation system. The sensors, as the components of the localisation system, can
be divided as active sensors and passive sensors [121]. The reference measurement
system contains both active sensors and passive sensors.
In railway the alternative location measurement or detection sensors are balise [29]
or odometer [122] etc. As described in the functional requirement of balise, balises
are installed along the railway track as track-side equipments. They can provide 1
Hz location data only when large amount of balise group is installed along the track.
This requires a lot of capital for the reference measurement system. An alternative
choice is the RFID transponder installed on the track, and the RFID sensor installed
on the train. In order to build a reference measurement system delivering the same
frequency as GNSS receiver location, other sensors such as radar or odometer are
needed. They are active sensors.
The possible structure for the reference measurement system is shown in Figure 4.5.
There are three kinds of sensors forming the sensor fusion scheme: track side sensor,
train side sensor, and the frozen sensor. The frozen sensor is the digital track map,
which provides track information only on demand, that is a passive sensor. After a
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Figure 4.6: Structure of a GNSS-based Localisation Unit
performance evaluation of the reference measurement system, the accuracy level of
the system meets the setup as “reference” of GNSS receiver location [50] [123].
4.2.4 GNSS-based Localisation Unit Structure and Functions
The structure of the GNSS-based localisation unit is shown in Figure 4.610. Consid-
ering the structure of the GNSS-based localisation unit, the instances for the train
side sensors can be interchanged to other localisation sensors compared in Chapter 2
Table 2.1.
Besides, the evaluation performance as the behaviour of the system is related to
the functions of it. The functions of the localisation unit can be summarised in
Table 4.2.
10The sensor fusion process means multiple resource voting structure.
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Table 4.2: GNSS-based Train Localisation Unit Functions
No. Function Descriptions
F1 receive GNSS receiver location and velocity information from GNSS receiver
F2 generate localisation unit measured train location
F3 provide the information of the location data integrity
F4 provide the information of the train driving direction
For function 1 (F1), the ability to receive GNSS receiver location, velocity and
time in the required time limit is considered as highly safety-related, redundant
components are on demand. The safety aspect of this function is based on the
indication of information not received in time.
Function 2 (F2) is regarded as the ability of processing the received location and
velocity information from GNSS receiver and processing the data with the other
parts in the localisation unit such as the digital track map. The safety aspect of
this function is based on the successful indication of GNSS localisation deviation
under required value.
Function 3 (F3) is the self-diagnosis of the localisation unit, the integrity information
also tells whether the data can be trusted or not. The safety aspect of this function
is based on the correct diagnostic of the GNSS receiver location data.
Function (F4) is the driving direction information of the train. The safety aspect of
this function is based on the GNSS information being accurately one after another
as the time sequence and successfully matched the map.
Among the stated four functions, the F1 and F2 will be the main functions to be
investigated in this dissertation.
4.3 GNSS Localisation Principles
The GNSS localisation principles is important to understand the performance of
GNSS. The GNSS localisation measurement is using the time of arrival, the accuracy
of the location is determined by the accuracy of time measurement.
4.3.1 Concept of Ranging Using Time of Arrival Measurements
GPS utilises the concept of Time of Arrival (TOA) ranging to determine user
location. This concept entails measuring the time it takes for a signal transmitted
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Figure 4.7: 2D Localisation [124]
by an emitter (e.g., foghorn, radio beacon, or satellite) at a known location to reach
a user receiver.
This time interval, referred to as the signal propagation time, is then multiplied by
the speed of the signal (e.g., speed of sound or speed of light) to obtain the emitter-
to-receiver distance. By measuring the propagation time of the signal broadcast
from multiple emitters (i.e., navigation aids) at known locations, the receiver can
determine its own location. An example of two-dimensional localisation is provided
in Figure 4.7.
As shown in Figure 4.7, when only two emitters are used, the user can either at
place A or at place B. When there are three emitters, we can eliminate the one
possibility, and determine the right place for the user. For 3D localisation, it is
almost the same. Also three satellites are needed for localisation [125].
Three satellites are in some situation still enough for localisation purpose. Assuming
that the user position to be measured is bounded on the earth’s surface, the fourth
satellite can be at the geocentric; the distance to the “fourth satellite” is the radius
of the earth. Therefore the necessary fourth satellite necessary for the calculation
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Figure 4.8: User and GNSS Satellite Vector Representation [124]
is given, but the calculation is restricted to the user positions on the earth surface,
and the clock on the user side should be as accurate as the clock on the satellites.11
Generally, a signal starts from the satellite to travelling to the user from the satellite
at time t1, the user receives the signal at time t2. Then ∆t = t2 − t1. To calculate
∆t, it needs the receiver clock and the satellite clock to be perfectly synchronised.
However, the satellite and receiver clocks are generally not synchronised. The satel-
lites have atomic clocks which can be synchronised to the level of nanosecond, but
this is not the case with current receivers, as the atomic clocks are big in size and
also expensive (i.e., more than $100,000 each) [126]. Therefore, receivers manufac-
tures use inexpensive crystal clocks. However, one nanosecond synchronisation error
leads to a location error of 0.3 meters. The receiver clock will generally have a bias
error from system time. Thus, a real fourth satellite is necessary to mitigate the
time synchronisation error. And the range determined by the correlation process is
denoted as the pseudorange ρ. To know the geometric satellite-to-user range, the
following measurement and offsets need to be considered:
• the geometric satellite-to-user range ri;
• an offset attributed to the difference between system time and the user clock
(c× δtu);
• an offset between system time and the satellite clock (c× δts).
11This is just an assumption, the clock in the GNSS receiver is far less accurate than an atomic
clock.
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Figure 4.9: Range Measurement and Related Time [124]
Figure 4.8 shows the earth centre, user position, and satellite position in a relation
with the vectors. In that, the vector u needs to be determined, which represents the
user receiver’s position in accordance with a Earth Centred Earth Fixed (ECEF)
coordinate system. Set the coordinate origin of the ECEF to be (0, 0, 0), the user
position is (xu, yu, zu). The vector si represents the position of the satellite i relative
to the coordinate origin. So the satellite-to-user vector geometric range ri is:
ri = si − u = c×∆t
As seen in Figure 4.9, the pseudorange is calculated as:
ρi = ri + c× (δtui − δtsi)
Normally the GNSS ground-monitoring network determines the corrections for these
offset contributions and transmits the corrections to the satellites for rebroadcast to
the users in the navigation message. Therefore, the δtsi is known by the user receiver
through navigation message. Hence, the pseudorange equation can be rewritten as:
ρi − c× δtu = |si − u|
In that, the δtui no longer related to the number i satellite, since it is affected by
the user side, so it is written as δtu in the last equation, and will be used in the
following equations. With this, the equations to solve the user position is denoted
by:
ρi =
√
(xi − xu)2 + (yi − yu)2 + (zi − zu)2 + c× δtu (4.1)
So, there are four unknown parameters (xu, yu, zu and δtu), thus at least four equa-
tions is required to calculate the parameters, a fourth satellite signal is needed. As a
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matter of fact, using more satellites not only allows δtu calculation, but also increase
the accuracy of user location calculation, because δtu also contains propagation time
delay etc. (measurement errors are analysed in the next part of this chapter).
So according to Equation 4.1, in order to calculate user location in a linearised
measurement equation, the user position and the time offset at the user side can
be considered as an appropriate component and an incremental component. The
incremental component is calculated in least square and is expressed as ∆ρ as:
∆ρ = H∆x̂+ ε (4.2)
where ∆ρ is the misclosure vector, that is, the difference between the predicted
and measured pseudorange measurements, the matrix H is the geometry or design
matrix, and ε is the vector containing pseudorange measurement errors assumed
to be normally distributed with zero-mean, that is εi ∼ N(0, σ2i ). The epoch-by-
epoch least squares localisation was used in this research instead of more practical
filtering due to sensitivity analysis purposes. The incremental component from the
linearisation point ∆x̂ can be estimated as follows using the least square estimation:
∆x̂ = (HTH)−1HT (∆ρ− ε) (4.3)
In that, the ∆x̂ is denoted by:
∆x̂ =

∆xu
∆yu
∆zu
−c× δtu

4.3.2 Measurement Errors and Satellite Geometry
Loosely speaking, measurement error in GNSS solution is estimated by the formula
(error in GNSS solution) = (geometry factor)× (pseudorange error factor)
Geometry factor is always regarded as DOP, and measurement errors are caused
by many sources. In the last section, the range measurement uses four equations to
solve δtu, but the error still exists. The possible sources of pseudorange error are
[124]:
• satellite clock error;
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Table 4.3: GPS Standard Localisation Service Typical UERE Budget
Segment Source Error Source 1 σ Error (m)
space/control broadcast clock 1.1
L1 P(Y)-L1 C/A group delay 0.3
broadcast ephemeris 0.8
user ionospheric delay 7.0∗
tropospheric delay 0.2
receiver noise and resolution 0.1
multipath 0.2
system UERE total (RSS) 7.1∗
∗Note that residual ionospheric errors tend to be highly correlated among satellites
resulting in location errors being far less than predicted using DOP × UERE. [124]
• ephemeris error;
• relativistic effect;
• atmospheric effects (ionospheric, tropospheric);
• receiver noise and resolution;
• receiver dynamics and jitter;
• multipath and shadowing effects;
• hardware bias errors.
Based on the error sources, a pseudorange error budgets can be developed to show
the stand-alone GNSS accuracy. The total User Equivalent Range Error (UERE)
comprises components from each system segment. Table 4.3 shows the UERE
budget for a single-frequency C/A code GPS receiver from both signal in space
and user side [124].
The other side for measurement error is geometry which has been stated in the
content before many times as DOP. Consider the 2D localisation in Figure 4.7, in
the presence of accurate time synchronisation, the user location is determined by
the intersection of three circles. But in the presence of measurement errors, the
range rings used to compute the position will be in error thus resulting a interval
for the location. Different geometry will cause different size of the intervals. This
is the basic concept for DOP.
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A formal derivation of the DOP relations in GPS begins with the linearisation of
the pseudorange equation in Equation 4.2. The vector ∆x has four components.
The first three are the position offset of the user from the linearisation point; the
fourth is the offset of the user time bias from the bias assumed in the linearisation
point. H is the n× 4 matrix:
H =

ax1 ay1 az1 1
ax2 ay2 az2 1
...
...
...
axn ayn azn 1
 (4.4)
In that, the ai = (axi, ayi, azi) are the unit vectors pointing from the linearisation
point to the position of the i-th satellite. Now consider the Equation 4.3, it gives the
functional relation between the errors in the pseudorange values and the induced
errors in the computed location and time bias. On the assumptions, the covariance
of the errors in the computed location and time bias is just a scalar multiple of the
matrix (HTH)−1 in Equation 4.3. The covariance of dx has four components, which
represents the error in the computed value for the vector of error-free position xT .
So, xT is represented as xT = (xu, yu, zu, c × δtu). The covariance of dx is a 4 × 4
matrix and has an expanded representation:
cov(dx) =

σ2xu σ
2
xuyu σ
2
xuzu σ
2
xucδtu
σ2xuyu σ
2
yu σ
2
yuzu σ
2
yucδtu
σ2xuzu σ
2
yuzu σ
2
zu σ
2
zucδtu
σ2xucδtu σ
2
yucδtu
σ2zucδtu σ
2
cδtu
 (4.5)
For easier representation of the following content, denote the relation between
cov(dx) and σUERE as:
{
cov(dx)
σUERE
}2
=

D11 D12 D13 D14
D21 D22 D23 D24
D31 D32 D33 D34
D41 D42 D43 D44
 (4.6)
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Based on Equation 4.5 and Equation 4.6, the most general parameter is termed
Geometric Dilution of Precision (GDOP) and is defined as:
GDOP =
√
σ2xu+σ
2
yu
+σ2zu+σ
2
cδtu
σUERE
=
√
D11 +D22 +D33 +D44
(4.7)
So, GDOP is seen to be a function solely of the satellite/user geometry. Several
other DOP parameters in common use are also useful to characterise the accuracy of
the various component of the location/time solution. These are termed as Position
Dilution of Precision (PDOP), Horizontal Dilution of Precision (HDOP), Vertical
Dilution of Precision (VDOP), Time Dilution of Precision (TDOP), these DOP
parameters are defined in terms of satellite UERE and elements of the covariance
matrix in Equation 4.6 [127]. In this dissertation, other than general GDOP, the
HDOP is used more effectively since the GNSS for train localisation is barely an
horizontal localisation on the WGS84 coordinate ellipsoid. It is defined as:
HDOP =
√
σ2xu+σ
2
yu
σUERE
=
√
D11 +D22
(4.8)
The DOP information is transmitted to the user through NMEA data. To mention
NMEA, it means NMEA 0183 in this dissertation. It is a combined electrical and
data specification for communication between marine electronic devices such as echo
sounder, sonars, anemometer, gyro, compass, autopilot, GNSS receivers and many
other types of instruments [128]. In the GPS NMEA format, the GPGGA message
contains only HDOP information, this message is used in this dissertation.
4.3.3 Environmental Scenarios in GNSS for Train Localisation
The UERE budget shows the error source from the user segment. From the user
side, different environmental scenario brings no signal, shadowing, multipath, as
well as other effects of the signal propagation to the accuracy degradation of the
location.
In railway, the environmental scenarios along the railway track are shown in Fig-
ure 4.10. The train leaves the railway stations, going into an area with many trees.
That will have signal interruption or shadowing effect. Then, the train goes into the
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Figure 4.10: Environmental Scenarios Along the Track
Table 4.4: Railway Track Environmental Scenarios
No. Scenario Scenario Description
1 open area track laying outside town or city, very good view of tracks
2 forest track immersed in the trees
3 urban track very close to the buildings
4 tunnel track totally covered by a dome
5 t-cross track laying under a railway or road bridge
6 mountainous track with mountains on one side or close to one steep mountain
or canyons causing bad satellite geometry
7 stations many tracks, track close to the buildings
city area thus having multipath effect and bad DOP values due to canyon effects.
The accuracy of GNSS receiver locations are highly related to where the train is.
The environmental scenarios can be categorised and defined as in Table 4.4. The
GNSS receiver location performance varies a lot in these environments. To apply
GNSS for train localisation, the safety aspects of these environments need to be
analysed individually.
The GNSS receivers in these environmental scenarios will bring different GNSS
receiver location measurement accuracy levels thus affecting the qualitative and
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quantitative quantities for the performance of the receiver. They are analysed in-
dividually in Chapter 6.
One merit for railway using GNSS is that the trains are running on the tracks. With
the sufficient information stored in the digital track map, the specific environmental
scenario can be recognised and the corresponding safety functions can be performed.
4.4 GNSS Performance Requirements from Service Provider Side
The GNSS performance requirements proposed by plans or standards are highly
related to the organisation who formulate them. The GNSS control segment is
required to control the space segment to provide signals. The GNSS performance
issued from the service provider side is with the assumption that the signal reception
environment is good to receive the signals, so they are considering the Signal in
Space (SIS) more than on the earth surface. This section introduces the performance
requirements from the service provider side, as GPS, Galileo, and EGNOS.
4.4.1 GPS SPS SIS Performance Standard
The GPS Standard Positioning Service (SPS) is a localisation and timing service
provided by a way of ranging signals broadcast at the GPS L1 frequency. The L1
frequency, transmitted by all satellites, contains a coarse/acquisition (C/A) code
ranging signal, with a navigation data message, that is available for peaceful civil,
commercial, and scientific use [22].
The GPS SPS performance is specified in terms of minimum performance standards
for each performance property (accuracy, continuity, availability, and integrity).
The standard provides a definition of the properties of GPS performance that,
when combined with a signal reception environment and assumptions concerning
the GPS receiver, allows users to define for themselves the end performance values
and units they can expect for their particular applications [22].
Definition 4.3 GPS SPS SIS Accuracy (from [22])
The SPS SIS accuracy standard of GPS applies to the SIS portion of GPS error
budgets for the UERE. There are four main characteristics of SPS SIS accuracy.
The standards for each of these characteristic are given in this section. The four
main characteristics are:
• the pseudorange data set accuracy (i.e., User Range Error (URE))
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• the time derivative of the URE (i.e., User Range Rate Error (URRE))
• the second time derivative of URE (i.e., User Range Acceleration Error
(URAE))
• the UTC Offset Error (UTCOE)
Each of the four main characteristic of SPS SIS accuracy is addressed in terms of
“global average” performance standard. All of the SPS SIS performance standards
in this section are expressed at 95% probability level.
With the URE, the accuracy of user range is also defined as User Range Accuracy
(URA). The URA is a conservative representation of each satellite’s expected Root
Mean Square (RMS) URE performance based on historical data over the curve fit
interval.
Definition 4.4 GPS SPS SIS Continuity (from [22])
The SPS SIS continuity for a healthy SPS SIS is the probability that the SPS SIS
will continue to be healthy without unscheduled interruption over a specific time
interval.
So the characteristic of continuity is defined as a kind of probability. The charac-
teristic of continuity according to Definition 4.4 is shown in Equation 4.9.
Continuity = P (healthy SPS SIS)|specific time interval (4.9)
Definition 4.5 GPS SPS SIS Availability (from [22])
The SPS SIS availability is the probability that the slots in the GPS constellation
will be occupied by satellites transmitting a traceable and healthy SPS SIS. So there
are two characteristics for SPS SIS availability:
• Per Slot Availability: The fraction of time that a slot in the GPS constellation
will be occupied by a satellite that is transmitting a traceable and healthy SPS
SIS.
• Constellation Availability: The fraction of time that a specified number of
slots in the GPS constellation are occupied by satellites that are transmitting
a traceable and healthy SPS SIS.
The two characteristics are related. The per-slot availability depends primarily
on the satellite design and the control segment procedures for on-orbit mainten-
ance and failure response. The constellation availability depends primarily on the
per-slot availability coupled with the satellite launch policies and satellite disposal
4.4 GNSS Performance Requirements from Service Provider Side 71
criteria. From the service provider side, the formalised characteristic of constellation
availability can be interpreted as:
Constellation Availability =
time > 21 slots transmitting traceable healthy SIS
total time
(4.10)
Definition 4.6 GPS SPS SIS Integrity (from [22])
For a PNT system, integrity is defined as the trust which can be placed in the
correctness of the PNT information provided by the system. Integrity includes
the ability of that system to provide timely alerts when it should not be used
for PNT. The SPS SIS should not be used when it is providing Misleading SIS
Information (MSI), where the threshold for misleading is a not-to-exceed tolerance
on the SIS URE. The three characteristics for integrity are:
• Probability of A Major Service Failure: The probability that the SPS SIS’s
instantaneous URE exceeds the not-to-exceed tolerance.
• Time to Alarm: Time from the onset of MSI until an alarm indication arrives
at the receiver’s antenna.
• SPS URE Not-to-exceed Tolerance: The tolerance is ±4.42 times the upper
bound on the URA value.
The probability of a major service failure is most of the times called “integrity
risk” as the characteristic for integrity. And the formalised characteristic of integ-
rity risk is defined as:
Integrity Risk = P (URE > not-to-exceed tolerance) (4.11)
Based on the definition of the four properties and the related characteristics, the
quantitative requirements for GPS SPS SIS performance is shown in Table 4.5.
Summarise Table 4.5, the attribute hierarchy interpretation of the requirements is
shown in Figure 4.11.
4.4.2 Galileo High Level Definition SoL Service Performance
In Galileo high level definition document, the performance and features for SoL
service are defined in the latest version of the document published in 2002 [4]. But
later Galileo SoL service is cancelled. For the Galileo satellite-only services, with
different operational requirements that have been grouped around the following five
reference services:
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Table 4.5: GPS SPS SIS Performance Standard for Single Frequency C/A Code
Property Characteristic Quantity Definition (Value & Unit) in the Standard
Accuracy
URE 6 7.8 m, 95% global average URE over any 3-second
interval during normal operation over all AODs∗ and
others
URRE 6 0.006m/sec, 95% global average URRE over any
3-second interval during normal operation at any AOD
UARE 6 0.002 m/sec/sec, 95% global average URAE over any
3-second interval during normal operation at any AOD
UTCOE 6 40 nsec, 95% global average UTCOE during normal
operation at any AOD
Continuity > 0.9998 probability over any hour of not losing the
SPS SIS availability from a slot due to unscheduled
interruption.
Availability
Per-Slot > 0.957 probability that a slot in the baseline 24-slot
configuration will be occupied by a satellite
broadcasting a healthy SPS SIS
Constellation > 0.98 probability that at least 21 slots out of the 24
slots will be occupied either by a satellite broadcasting
a healthy SPS SIS in the baseline 24-slot configuration
or by a pair of satellites each broadcasting a healthy
SPS SIS in the expanded slot configuration
Integrity 6 1× 10−5 probability over any hour of the SPS SIS
instantaneous URE exceeding the NTE∗∗ tolerance
without a timely alert during normal operations
* AOD: Age of Data, ** NTE: not-to-exceed
URE NTE tolerance defined to be ±4.42 times the upper bound on the URA value.
This table is excerpted from the GPS SPS SIS standard [22].
• Galileo Open Service (OS)
• Safety of Life (SoL)
• Commercial Service (CS)
• Public Regulated Service (PRS)
• Support to Search and Rescue service (SAR)
Among the five reference services, the target market for the SoL service are safety
critical users, whose applications or operations require stringent performance levels
[4]. Like the GPS SPS SIS standard, the Galileo service will commit to provide the
quality of the SIS to achieve the specified service at end-user level. The provision
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Figure 4.11: GPS SPS SIS Performance in Attribute Hierarchy
Table 4.6: Service Performance for Galileo Safety of Life Service
Property Characteristic Value and Unit
Critical Level Non-critical Level
Accuracy
Horizontal (95%) 4 m 220 m
Vertical (95%) 8 m
Continuity Continuity Risk 10−5/ 15 s 10−4/ h to 10−8/ h
Availability 99.8% 99.8%
Integrity
Alarm Limit Horizontal 12 m 556 m
Alarm Limit Vertical 20 m
Time to Alarm 6 sec 10 sec
Integrity Risk 3.5× 10−7/ 150 sec 10−7/ h
The Galileo SoL service is on three frequencies L1, E5a, and E5b.
This table is remade from the Galileo definition document page 16 [4].
of integrity information at global level is the main characteristic of this service.
The intention of the Galileo SoL service is to provide globally according to the
performances indicated in Table 4.6.
Comparing the performances of Galileo SoL in Table 4.6 and GPS SPS SIS stand-
ard in Table 4.5, the accuracy of GPS SPS SIS has been defined from both time
and location sides, the accuracy of Galileo SoL service has been defined only from
location side. The Galileo SoL performance is defined under two levels: critical level
and non-critical level. The two levels cover two conditions of risk exposure and are
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applicable to many applications in different transportation domains. The critical
level covers time critical operations for example, in the aviation domain approach
operations with vertical guidance. The non-critical level covers extended operations
that are less time critical, such as open sea navigation in the maritime domain [4].
4.4.3 EGNOS SoL Service Performance Characteristics
EGNOS has been designed to support different types of civil aviation operations.
EGNOS has a very detailed definition of SoL service and as one of its key features
for Europe. The EGNOS service definition document - open service defines the
performance only in accuracy. This document was published in 2009 [129]. But this
document is not addressing EGNOS SoL service performance. So EGNOS open
service is only intended for non safety-related purposes, i.e. purposes that have
no impact on the safety of human life and where a failure in accuracy, continuity,
availability, or integrity of the EGNOS SIS could not cause any kind of direct or
indirect personal damage, including bodily injuries or death.
In March 2011, the European Commission launched the EGNOS SoL service for avi-
ation [130]. Then in the same time the SoL service definition document was also pub-
lished [5]. Till the time of writing this dissertation, a second version was published
in June 2013 [131]. One thing needs to mention, the Galileo SoL service is intended
for all means of transportation. But the main objective of the EGNOS SoL service
is to support civil aviation operations from en-route to Localiser Performance with
Vertical guidance (LPV) (LPV is part of the APV [132]). However, the SoL service
is also intended to support applications in a wide range of other domains such as
maritime, railways and road. So the characteristics of EGNOS SoL services are
related to aviation terms. So the performance of EGNOS is a service provider side
performance characteristic, but highly orientated for specific user applications.
EGNOS SoL adopted some guidelines from the aviation user requirements (will be
stated in the next section), and the derived quantities are shown in Table 4.7. The
minimum performance in the table is conservatively made since it has been taking
account of a number of degraded conditions or abnormal environmental conditions,
that could be experienced throughout the lifetime of the system [131].
The Galileo performance and the EGNOS performance are sharing the same struc-
ture of the properties. But the Galileo performance contains alarm limit. Since
the EGNOS performance characteristic is estimated as the performance itself, the
alarm limit is related to the application itself. Based on this understanding, the
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Table 4.7: EGNOS SoL Minimum Service Performance Characteristics
Property Characteristic Value and Unit Comments
Accuracy Horizontal (95%) 3 m Accuracy varies at
Vertical (95%) 4 m different locations
Continuity Continuity Risk 1× 10−4/h NPA: 1 - 5× 10−4/h
to 1× 10−8/h APV-I: 1 - 5× 10−4/15 sec
Availability 0.99 to 0.99999 99.9% for NPA, 99% for APV-I
Integrity Time to Alarm less than 6 sec
Integrity Risk 2× 10−7/ 150 sec
NPA: non precise approach, APV-I: approach procedure with vertical guidance
This table is excerpted from EGNOS SoL document [131].
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Figure 4.12: Galileo and EGNOS Performance in Attribute Hierarchy
Galileo and EGNOS performance can use the same attribute hierarchy structure,
the performance is illustrated in Figure 4.12.
4.5 GNSS Performance Requirements from User Side
The GNSS performance requirements from the user side are more concerning about
the application scenarios and the corresponding functions of the GNSS-based sys-
tem, thus provide more specific values for different application scenarios.
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4.5.1 PNT Performance Requirements in General
The Federal Radionavigation Plan (FRP) reflects the official PNT policy and plan-
ning for the federal government of USA. The FRP covers both terrestrial and space-
based, common use, federally operated PNT systems. The systems and services
addressed by FRP include: GPS, augmentation to GPS, etc. [133]. So the require-
ments proposed by FRP are representing the requirements of the user segment in
different domains for various applications. The definition of the properties in FRP
PNT requirements are the basis to understand the requirements proposed in other
standards and specifications.
Definition 4.7 Accuracy (from [133])
The degree of conformance of the measured location with conventional true po-
sition of the craft (vehicle, aircraft, vessel) at the given time. In general, PNT
accuracy performance depends on the quality of the pseudorange and carrier phase
measurements as well as the broadcast navigation data.
When specifying linear accuracy, or when it is necessary to specify requirements
in terms of orthogonal axes (e.g., along-track or cross-track), the 95% confidence
level (2σ) will be used. When two-dimensional accuracies are used, the 2 drms
uncertainty estimate will be used. The 2 drms is twice the radial error drms. The
radial error is defined as the root-mean-square value of the distances from the point
of the location fixes to a collection of location measurements. The distribution of the
error is normally elliptical. As the error ellipse collapses to a line the confidence level
of the 2 drms measurement approaches 95%; as the error ellipse becomes circular,
the confidence level approaches 98%.
Specifications of PNT system accuracy generally refers to one or more of the fol-
lowing types of the characteristics:
• Predictable Accuracy: The accuracy of a PNT system’s location solution with
respect to the charted solution. Both the location solution and the chart must
be based upon the same geodetic datum.
• Repeatable Accuracy: The accuracy which a user can return to a location
whose coordinates has been measured at a previous time with the same PNT
system.
• Relative Accuracy: The accuracy with which a user can measure location
relative to that of another user of the same PNT system at the same time.
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Definition 4.8 Continuity (from [133])
The continuity of a system is the ability of the total system (comprising all elements
necessary to maintain an aircraft position within the defined airspace) to perform
its function without interruption during the intended operation. More specifically,
continuity is the probability that the specified system performance will be main-
tained for the duration of a phase of operation, presuming that the system was
available at the beginning of that phase of operation. The level of the continuity
provided by PNT thus varies with the specific performance requirements for any
given application.
So the characteristic of continuity is defined as the ability of the total system, which
is represented by the probability of a function. Mathematically the characteristic
of continuity is defined as:
Continuity = P (maintained system performance)|phase of operation & duration
(4.12)
Definition 4.9 Reliability (from [133])
The reliability of a PNT system is a function of the frequency with which failures
occur within the system. It is the probability that a system will perform its func-
tion within defined performance limits for a specified period of time under given
operating conditions. Formally, reliability is one minus the probability of system
failure.
The characteristic of reliability is also defined as a probability function. The math-
ematical interpretation for reliability characteristic is:
Reliability = 1− P (system failure)|specified function & time (4.13)
Definition 4.10 Availability (from [133])
The availability of a PNT system is the percentage of time that the services of
the system are usable. Availability is an indication of the ability of the system to
provide a usable navigation service within a specified coverage area. Availability is
a function of both the physical characteristics of the environment and the technical
capabilities of the transmitter facilities.
So the characteristic of availability is defined as a percentage function. The char-
acteristic of availability can be interpreted as:
Availability =
time PNT service usable
total time
|specified coverage area (4.14)
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Table 4.8: FRP Surface Transportation PNT User Requirements
Property Accuracy Continuity Availability Integrity
Characteristic ∗ (m) 95% AL∗∗ (m) TTA∗∗∗ (sec)
navigation and
route guidance
1 - 20 **** > 95% 2 - 20 5
automated vehicle
monitoring
0.1 - 30 **** > 95% 0.2 - 30 5 - 300
automated vehicle
identification
1 **** 99.7% 3 5
public safety 0.1 - 30 **** 95 - 99.7% 0.2 - 30 2 - 15
* Trueness as Accuracy Characteristic, ** AL: Alarm Limit, *** TTA: Time to Alarm
**** Continuity applies to operations phases, not defined for surface transportation.
The requirements are excerpted from the table on FRP page 4-28 [133].
Definition 4.11 Integrity (from [133])
Integrity is the measure of the trust that can be placed in the trueness of the
information supplied by a PNT system. The characteristic of integrity includes the
ability of the system to provide timely warnings to users when the system should
not be used for navigation.
Remark 4.1 Ambiguity of Reliability and Continuity
From the definitions of reliability and continuity, the Equation 4.13 and Equa-
tion 4.12 shows the P (system failure) and P (maintained system performance)
for “its function for a specific period of time” or “the duration of a phase of op-
eration” with the accordance of “defined performance limits” or “specified system
performance”. Currently in both GNSS and airborne requirements or standards,
the continuity is always used instead of reliability. But railway standards issues reli-
ability. The relation and difference between reliability and continuity are discussed
and formally represented in Chapter 6 Section 5.3 later.
In FRP, there are different user requirements for different applications. For surface
transportation, the requirements of highway and railway are defined together [133].
As seen from the requirements listed in Table 4.8, the reliability is not required at
all; and the continuity are just mentioned, the values are still not defined.
Comparing the four categories of the applications, the accuracy requirement and
the integrity requirement are sort of related. Basically, the alarm limit is always
greater than the accuracy requirement. The accuracy level is highly related to the
purpose of the application.
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Figure 4.13: FRP User Requirements in Attribute Hierarchy
Based on the four properties of PNT performance requirements from FRP and the
attribute hierarchy for the properties, the surface user requirements according to
the properties and characteristics defined above are shown in Figure 4.13 as stated
in FRP.
4.5.2 RTCA GNSS Performance for Airborne Equipments
The DO-229D issued by RTCA provides standards for single frequency airborne
navigation equipment. The standards are intended to be applicable for GPS and also
other SBAS such as WAAS and EGNOS [64]. The RTCA GNSS performance for
airborne equipment properties also includes accuracy, continuity, availability, and
integrity. The definition of these properties are inherited from FRP ones. But the
characteristics for these four properties are defined in a more extended way. Besides
the FRP characteristics, the integrity property for RTCA GNSS performance also
includes continuity risk and protection limit.
Definition 4.12 Continuity Risk (from [134])
Continuity risk is the probability that the system will not provide guidance inform-
ation with the accuracy and the integrity required for the intended operation.
The symbol for continuity risk is represented by CR(t). Meanwhile, the symbol
of continuity is represented by C(t). The characteristic of both are denoted by
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Figure 4.14: RTCA Airborne Equipment Performance in Attribute Hierarchy
probability of functions, the sum of both is 1.
CR(t) + C(t) = 1
The characteristics for integrity property also have more meanings than both FRP
requirements and GPS SPS SIS performance standard. The integrity property con-
tains another characteristic called protection limit along with the defined alarm
limit in last section. The protection limit contains both Horizontal Protection
Limit (HPL) and Vertical Protection Limit (VPL). The most related protection
limit for this dissertation is HPL, since the GNSS for train localisation is applied
on the earth surface.
Definition 4.13 Horizontal Protection LimitFault Detection (from [64])
The Horizontal Protection LimitFault Detection (HPLFD) is the radius of a circle
in the horizontal plane (the local plane tangent to the WGS-84 ellipsoid), with its
centre being at the true position, that describes the region assured to contain the
indication horizontal position. It is a horizontal region where the missed alarm and
false alarm requirements are met for the chosen set of satellites when autonomous
fault detection is used. It is a function of the satellite, user geometry and the ex-
pected error characteristics: it is not affected by actual measurements. Its value is
predictable given reasonable assumptions regarding the expected error characterist-
ics.
So the definitions above together with other properties in FRP can be now expressed
as a new attribute hierarchy structure in Figure 4.14.
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Table 4.9: ICAO GNSS Performance Requirements (Excerpted)
Property Characteristic en-route APV-I
Accuracy Horizontal Accuracy (95%) 3.7 km 16 m
Vertical Accuracy (95%) N/A 6 - 4 m
Continuity Continuity Risk 1× 10−4/ h 8× 10−6
to 1× 10−8/ h per 15 sec
Availability 0.99 to 0.99 to
0.99999 0.99999
Integrity Integrity Risk 1× 10−7/ h 2× 10−7/ 150 sec
Horizontal Alarm Limit 1.85 - 7.4 km 40 m
Vertical Alarm Limit N/A 20 m
Time to Alarm 10 sec - 5 min 6 sec
N/A: not available
The requirement is excerpted from the ICAO recommendations [134].
Since RTCA itself is not an agency of any country, its documents are treated as
guidelines not as quantitative requirements. Under the administration of RTCA, the
ICAO published the requirement for GNSS, SBAS, and GBAS for en-route through
category I precision approach. Six categories for SIS performance requirements are
provided. The combination of GNSS elements and a fault-free GNSS user receiver
shall meet the signal-in-space requirements defined in Table 4.9 [134].
Notice that, the requirements call for horizontal accuracy and horizontal alarm limit
for en-route, but conversely calls for vertical accuracy and vertical alarm limit for
APV-I approaching and other APV modes. So vertical accuracy is requested in
near terminal operations.
4.5.3 GNSS for Railway Application Performance Advisory
Considering the performance requirements by FRP for surface transportation in
Table 4.8 and the performance guideline by RTCA for airborne equipments in
Table 4.9, there are also some advisories for the applications in railway safety-
related applications in different kind of railway lines [135]. The advisory for the
railway safety-related applications is shown in Table 4.10. Basically this advisory
follows the structure for the airborne equipments proposed by RTCA. As also men-
tioned in the notes of Table 4.10, the integrity risk is also required for accomplishing
the safety-related functions in railway domain.
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Table 4.10: GNSS Requirements Advisory for Railway Applications
Applications
I II III
ATC on high
density line
train control on
medium density
line
train control on
low density line
Horizontal Accuracy (m, 95%) 1 10 25
Continuity >99.98% >99.98% >99.98%
Availability >99.98% >99.98% >99.98%
Fix Rate (sec) 1 1 TBD
Alarm Limit (m) 2.5 20 50
Time to Alarm (sec) <1.0 <1.0 <1.0
For efficient use in architectures accomplishing safety-related functions
integrity risk should be added.
This table is remade from the table in requirements of rail applications Page 13 [135].
Similar to the other user side requirements and guidelines, the railway applica-
tion performance advisory also starts from the accuracy requirement. Then the
continuity, availability, and also integrity requirements are proposed based on it.
But the GNSS for railway performance advisory only calls for horizontal accuracy
and integrity requirements. Instead of continuity risk requested the RTCA air-
borne equipment performance guidelines, the opposite side characteristic continuity
is stated by the GNSS railway application performance advisory. Besides, the in-
tegrity risk is not mentioned in the advisory. The attribute hierarchy structure for
the advisory properties and related characteristics is shown in Figure 4.15.
4.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter defines the important terms used in this dissertation (position, posi-
tioning, location, localisation). After a clear comparison and a formal illustration
of the relation between the terms, the appropriate terms applied in the following
chapters are fixed.
After that, the GNSS, the GNSS-based localisation unit, and the evaluation pur-
pose established reference measurement system are introduced accordingly. These
three systems are used, applied, investigated, evaluated, and verified in the follow-
ing chapters. Since the GNSS receiver is a vital component for the systems, the
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Figure 4.15: GNSS Performance Advisory for Railway Applications in Attribute
Hierarchy
localisation principles of GNSS, the environmental affection of the accuracy are also
introduced.
The evaluation and the verification of GNSS for train localisation are all based on
the clear and correct understanding of the GNSS performance attributes. So the
related existing GNSS requirements from both the service provider side and the user
side are interpreted in the same form by the attribute hierarchy for the definition
of the properties, characteristics, quantities, and corresponding values. The exact
value and unit for each characteristic is also illustrated in the tables.

Chapter 5
GNSS for Train Localisation
Performance Properties Migration
GNSS performance properties have been intensively illustrated in Chapter 4. Rail-
way applications need to demonstrate RAMS as required. GNSS for train localisa-
tion converges both GNSS and RAMS performance properties. The migration of
both performance properties is to propose the new performance properties fitting
GNSS for train localisation.
5.1 Relation between GNSS Performance Properties
In Chapter 4, GNSS performances are stated from the service provider side (Sec-
tion 4.4) and the user side (Section 4.5). Although the stated GNSS performances
offer the same properties in the attribute hierarchy structure, but the characteristics
and the following quantities in values and units are having many differences. This
section analyses these GNSS performances, and then compares these GNSS per-
formance requirements quantitatively, finally the relations between the properties
are analysed.
5.1.1 Comparison of GNSS Performance Requirements from Both Sides
The GNSS performance requirements from the service provider side issue the per-
formance in a more general way. The GPS SPS SIS standard issues the requirement
with a signal reception environment and assumption to allow users to define them-
selves the end performance they can expect for their particular applications [22].
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Table 5.1: Summary of GNSS Performance Categories from Service Provider
Side
Service Provider Side Categories
GPS SPS SIS [22] no categories, applications need to define for themselves
Galileo SoL service [4] critical and non-critical
EGNOS SoL service [131] NPA and APV
The Galileo high level definition only considers two categories: critical and non-
critical. Besides, EGNOS SoL is to support civil aviation operations in both non
precision approach (NPA) and approach with vertical guidance (APV). A summary
of the categories for the GNSS performance from the service provider side is listed
in Table 5.1. The GNSS performances proposed from the service provider side are
aiming at providing enough SIS performance not considering user application and
environmental scenarios. It allows the user to define the requirement values for
specific applications.
The GNSS performance requirements from the user side are raised for a lot of spe-
cific application scenarios. The GPS FRP is the general plan for aviation, maritime,
road, and railway domains. Each domain has defined many application scenarios.
For example, as shown in Table 4.8, 11 application scenarios have been specified
for surface transportation. And also, the RTCA recommendation sets 6 applica-
tion scenarios for GNSS performances as the necessary safety-related application
scenarios. Even the GNSS performance advisory from the railway side, as shown
in Table 4.10, the performance is roughly categorised into three application scen-
arios. A summary of the application scenarios in these three documents is listed in
Table 5.2.
From the content of Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, the GNSS performance requirements
from the user side specify the performance much more in detail for their own needs.
The values of the properties in each requirement are specific for each application.
So the values of the properties in GNSS for train localisation should also be clearly
specified. This starts from understanding of the properties.
5.1.2 GNSS Performance Properties and Values
Even though the GNSS performance requirements values are raised differently for
many applications, they still follow similar attribute hierarchy structure. With a
comparison of the attribute hierarchy of the GNSS performance requirements, only
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Table 5.2: Summary of GNSS Performance Application Scenarios from User
Side
User Side Application Scenarios
FRP [133] 1. space: on-board autonomous navigation, earth
observation satellites, altimety missions, occultation
measurements (4 applications)
2. aviation: oceanic, en-route, terminal, NPA, APV-I,
APV-II, CAT I (7 applications)
3. maritime: inland waterway phase, harbour entrance and
approach phase, coastal phase, ocean phase(4 phases)
4. surface: navigation and route guidance, automated
vehicle monitoring, automated vehicle identification, public
safety, resource management, collision avoidance,
geophysical survey, geodetic control, accident survey,
emergency response, intelligent vehicle initiative (highway,
11 applications); positive train control (transit, 1
application)
5. others: geodesy and surveying, mapping, charting,
geographic information systems (GIS), agriculture and
natural resources applications, geophysical applications,
meteorological applications, timing and frequency (7
applications)
RTCA [64] [134] en-route, en-route terminal, NPA, APV-I, APV-II, CAT I (6
application scenarios)
Railway Advisory [135] ATC on high density line, train control on medium density
line, train control on low density line (3 application
scenarios)
four properties are stated in the requirements quantitatively. They are accuracy,
continuity, availability, and integrity. So these four properties can be treated
as the necessity of GNSS performance properties.
With the four properties, each GNSS performance document extends them into
similar characteristics and then different values are proposed. A comparison of
the values of them based on the same properties and characteristics are listed in
Table 5.3. The values in the table for each document is using only one specific
application as an example, the FRP part is using the navigation and route guidance
as an example, GPS SPS is using the general requirement, RTCA uses the APV-I
as an example, the railway application advisory is using the medium density line as
an example. As seen in the table, the unit of the continuity risk and integrity risk
proposed by aviation application is different from other three risk units.
The accuracy property consists of two characteristics: trueness and precision. In
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Table 5.3: Comparison of the Values from Different Document and Application
Characteristics FRP∗ GPS SPS RTCA APV-I Railway∗∗
[133] [22] [134] [135]
Horizontal Accuracy (95%) 1 - 20 m 6 7.8 m 16 m 10 m
Vertical Accuracy (95%) 4 - 6 m
Continuity Risk TBD 2× 10−4/ h 8× 10−6/15 sec 2× 10−4/ h
Availability > 95% > 98% 99% - 99.99% > 99.98%
Integrity Risk TBD 1× 10−5/ h 2× 10−7/ 150 sec TBD
Alarm Limit 2 - 20 m 34.48 m 40 m 20 m
Time to Alarm 5 sec < 6 hour 6 sec 1 sec
Protection Limit n.a. n.a. 40 m n.a.
TBD: To Be Defined, n.a.:not available
* Among the FRP applications, the navigation and route guidance is used here.
** The railway advisory uses the train control on medium density line as an example.
Table 5.3 only the trueness is written, but precision is always considered. Because
the values of the trueness requirement are always under the consideration of 2σ
precision level. Besides, the vertical trueness is specially required by RTCA for
aviation APV-I application.
The continuity property is stated by all requirements. The characteristic for con-
tinuity is the continuity risk. The interesting part is some documents leave the
definition to the user for its own applications. And the aviation applications define
the continuity risk for APV applications in 15 seconds time span, while the other
documents are define the continuity risk generally in 1 hour time span.
The availability property is stated by each requirement as stationary availability,
the difference of them can only be shown by values. The unit is also the same,
stated as %.
The last property integrity is described by four characteristics: integrity risk,
alarm limit, time to alarm, and horizontal alarm limit. The integrity risk is, like
the continuity risk, issued by all four requirements. But the unit is having several
differences, similar to continuity risk, the units are in 150 seconds time span or 1
hour time span. But the alarm limit and time to alarm is defined in the same way.
At last, the RTCA requirement also states the horizontal protection limit, leaving
all other three empty in this characteristic.
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5.1.3 Relation between the Four Properties
The most direct reflection of a GNSS-based system performance is the measure-
ment accuracy, no matter time accuracy or location accuracy. The GNSS receiver
delivers location measurements, the location measurements are in the unit of length
(meters). The accuracy performance is also represented by length measurement.
Thus, accuracy performance can be directly derived from the location measure-
ments, no transformation is required.
The continuity and availability both mention the “maintained performance” in both
definitions. The presence of both performances require a definition of the “main-
tained performance”. Since the direct measurement from the GNSS receiver is the
location, the “maintained performance” needs to be defined using location accuracy
performance values.
Taking integrity into consideration, in Table 5.3 the alarm limit is also defined
through accuracy performance. The value of the alarm limit is always greater than
the accuracy value requirement.
So the continuity, availability, and integrity characteristic values are all based on
the accuracy performance value. Accuracy can be regarded as the foundation of
all other three GNSS performance properties. The continuity and availability are
related according to the requirement of the “maintained performance”. In this
dissertation, the availability characteristic is using the stationary availability, which
is a long term evaluation result. So availability is showing the performance of a long
time span, continuity is showing the average performance in a specific time interval.
And integrity shows the performance outside the accuracy performance value. The
relation between these four properties can be shown in Figure 5.1.
Till now, the four properties are raised and considered only according to GNSS
performances. In order to apply GNSS for train localisation, the GNSS performance
properties need to be migrated to be identical with railway performance properties.
The following section introduces the railway RAMS.
5.2 RAMS Requirements for Railway Applications
The goal of a railway system is to achieve a defined level of rail traffic in a given
time, safely. Railway RAMS describes the confidence with which the system can
guarantee the achievement of this goal. Railway RAMS has a clear influence on
the quality with which the service is delivered to the customer. Quality of Service
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Figure 5.1: Relation between GNSS Performance Properties
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Figure 5.2: Relation between QoS and Railway Application RAMS [18]
Quality of Service for Railway System
Other attributes Railway RAMS
is influenced by other characteristics concerning functionality and performance, for
example frequency of service, regularity of service and fare structure. The rela-
tion between QoS and railway RAMS is shown in Figure 5.2. System RAMS, in
the context of this European standard, is a combination of reliability, availability,
maintainability, and safety [18] [86] [91]. That is in abbreviation RAMS.
RAMS is a characteristic of a system’s long term operation and is achieved by
the application of established engineering concepts, methods, tools and techniques
throughout the lifecycle of the system. The RAMS of a system can be characterised
as a qualitative and quantitative indicator of the degree that the system, or the sub-
systems and components comprising that system, can be relied upon to function as
specified and to be both available and safe.
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5.2.1 RAMS Requirements for Railway System
The definitions of the RAMS parameters are inherited from IEC 60050 standard.
Definition 5.1 Reliability (from [136])
The probability that an item can perform a required function under given conditions
for a given time interval (t1, t2).
Reliability is normally represented by R(t) or by the compliment of R(t). The com-
pliment is represented by F(t), where F (t) = 1− R(t). Since R(t) is a probability,
normally the R(t) is related to failure rate λ(t), where λ(t) = dF (t)/dt. When
the failure rate is constant, then it is represented by λ. Then the characteristic of
reliability can be estimated as
R(t) = e−λT |T=|tj−tk| (5.1)
Besides, Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) is also used to represent the reliability
performance for a repairable system. And in this background MTTF is normally
calculated as:
MTTF = E[Ti], Ti = |tj − tk| (5.2)
In that, Ti is a time span, and tj and tk are timestamps, between tj and tk, the item
is performing its required function. For a constant failure rate λ, MTTF is used to
express reliability. Normally, MTTF = 1/λ.
Definition 5.2 Maintainability (from [136])
The probability that a given active maintenance action, for an item under given con-
ditions of use can be carried out within a stated time interval when the maintenance
is performed under stated conditions and using stated procedures and resources.
Maintainability is based on the idea that the system is repairable. So the Mean
Time To Repair (MTTR) is normally used to express the performance of main-
tainability. Normally, MTTR = 1/µ.
Definition 5.3 Availability (from [18])
The ability of a product to be in a state to perform a required function under given
conditions at a given instant of time or over a given time interval assuming that the
required external resources are provided.
There are three kinds of availabilities [91], among them the stationary availability is
adopted for the evaluation purpose of GNSS for train localisation in Chapter 6. The
stationary availability is normally represented by the abbreviation of availability as
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A, the characteristic of stationary availability is estimated by:
A = MTTF
MTTF+MTTR
= µ
λ+µ
(5.3)
Definition 5.4 Safety (from [18])
Freedom from unacceptable risk of harm.
Safety is defined in a more abstract way. The necessity to estimate safety quantit-
atively calls for the safety function and safety integrity level definitions in EN 50129
[20].
Definition 5.5 Safety Function (from [15])
A safety function is defined as a function to be implemented by a safety-related
system, this system is an Electric/Electronic/Programmable Electronic (E/E/PE)
system. another technology safety-related system or external risk reduction facilit-
ies, which is intended to achieve or maintain a safe state for the Equipment Under
Control (EUC), in respect of a specific hazardous event. A safety function is not
part of machine operation: if such a function fails, the machine can still operate
normally, but the risk of injury from its operation increases.
Definition 5.6 Functional Safety (from [15])
Functional safety is part of the overall safety relating to the EUC and the EUC
control system which depends on the correct functioning of the E/E/PE safety-
related systems, other technology safety-related systems and external risk reduction
facilities.
To understand the functional safety more clearly, the risk and harm and the corres-
ponding hazard also needs to be defined.
Definition 5.7 Risk (from [18])
The probable rate of occurrence of a hazard causing harm and the degree of severity
of the harm.
Formally, the characteristic of risk can be estimated by [137]:
Risk = probability rate of occurrence of harm× severity of harm
Definition 5.8 Harm (from [18])
Injury or damage to the health of people, or damage to property or the environment.
Definition 5.9 Hazard (from [18] and [20])
In EN 50126, hazard is defined as a physical situation with a potential for human
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Table 5.4: Tolerable Hazard Rate and SIL Relation Table [20]
Tolerable Hazard Rate (THR) Safety Integrity
per hour and per function Level (SIL)
10−9 6 THR < 10−8 4
10−8 6 THR < 10−7 3
10−7 6 THR < 10−6 2
10−6 6 THR < 10−5 1
THR > 10−5 0
injury.
In EN 50129, hazard is defined as a condition that could lead to an accident.
Definition 5.10 Safety Integrity (from [15])
The safety integrity is defined as the likelihood of a system satisfactorily performing
the required safety functions under all the stated conditions within a stated period
of time.
Remark 5.1 Safety Requirements Allocation and Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
Safety requirements consists of both safety function requirements and safety integ-
rity requirements. So it is required to allocate a safety integrity level to each safety
function. Safety integrity level is a discrete level (one out of a possible four) for
specifying the safety integrity requirements of the safety functions to be allocated
to the E/E/PE safety-related systems, where safety integrity level 4 has the highest
level of safety integrity and safety integrity level 1 has the lowest.
In railway safety application standard EN 50129, SIL is expressed through tolerable
hazard rate (THR). Having followed the measures and methods required for SIL x
(x = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) there is no requirement to consider the systematic failures when
demonstrating the THR is achieved. A SIL table is shown in Table 5.4 [20]. SIL 0
means there are no safety requirement for this function.
A description of railway RAMS according to EN 50126 [18] is also made using
attribute hierarchy in Figure 5.3. This structure shows the basic and necessary
characteristics to be evaluated according to RAMS.
Availability distinguishes from reliability for the possibility of withstanding more
service outages during the system lifetime, just one outage being unacceptable for
a reliable system. Safety distinguishes from availability and reliability for the con-
sequence of the service outage, which is ranked according to a severity level. Main-
tainability is the measure of the repair process including fault diagnosis, localisation
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Figure 5.3: Railway RAMS in Attribute Hierarchy
and isolation plus repair or replacement.
5.2.2 Relation between RAMS Properties and Dependability
Definition 5.11 Dependability (from [136])
The collective term used to describe the availability performance and its influen-
cing factors: reliability performance, maintainability performance, and maintenance
support performance.
Dependability is the part of the measurement for the quality of service in time given
by the system. Reliability, availability and maintainability compose the dependab-
ility [138]. The relation between RAM and dependability can be shown more clearly
in the attribute hierarchy in Figure 5.4.
In this dissertation, maintainability is not the concern, because GNSS maintain-
ability is operated by the master control station belonging to the control segment.
From user segment, we cannot maintain GNSS. So the dependability performance
in this dissertation means reliability and availability. When no safety aspects are
considered, only dependability, we need to distinguish and make clear between error,
fault and failure. These are important terms for a pre-safety analysis.
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Definition 5.12 Error (from [136])
A discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condition and
the true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition.
Definition 5.13 Fault (from [136])
The state of an item characterized by inability to perform a required function,
excluding the inability during preventive maintenance or other planned actions, or
due to lack of external resources.
Remark 5.2 Fault and Faulty
In this dissertation, fault and faulty both means states. Actually faulty state is
more used in this dissertation.
Definition 5.14 Failure (from [136])
The event when a required function is terminated (exceeding the acceptable limits).
So error, fault are also related to the performance, they are the results of meeting
or not meeting the performance target value (requirements). The relation between
them are shown in Figure 5.5 [139].
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5.2.3 Hazard and Risk Analysis As Part of Safety Evaluation
For hazard and risk analysis according to EN 50126 (in standard Section 4.6.2 [18])
it is the normative requirement. Hazard and risk analysis should be performed at
various phases of the system lifecycle by the authority responsible for that phase
and shall be documented [18].
For the whole system lifecycle, IEC 61508 sets out a generic approach for all safety
lifecycle activities for systems comprised of E/E/PE components that are used to
perform safety functions. A product from the beginning to the end of the lifecycle,
the hazard and risk analysis is in them all. Among the lifecycle of the localisation
unit, it should follow the safety lifecycle as defined in IEC 61508 [12]. The hazard
and risk analysis in the lifecycle can be divided into two sub processes. They are
hazard identification and risk assessment. To make the third process in the lifecycle
more understandable, a extended figure is shown in Figure 5.6 [140]. Based on the
definitions of risk, harm and hazard the relation between them can be shown in
Figure 5.7 [87] [94].
Remark 5.3 Relation between Error, Failure, Faulty State, Hazard, and Accident
As shown in Figure 5.5, the system has an error that is the original deviation. If
the deviation is bigger than acceptable deviation, a failure can occur. If the system
is safety-related, the hazard identification and risk assessment process is required.
Then if the hazard is not removed, then it will cause an accident, if there is an
exposed body protected by law. The whole process can be shown in a Petri net as
in Figure 5.8.
5.2 RAMS Requirements for Railway Applications 97
Hazard and risk
analysis
3
Hazard identification
Risk assessment
Hazard identification
Probability of hazards
Identification of 
hazard effects
Evaluation of 
consequences effects
Calculation of
risk class
Identification of 
needed risk reduction
Interactive Analysis
HAZOP
FTA
FMEA
FMECA
Checklist
What If Method
Part of safety lifecycle
Hazard identification 
to risk reduction
Hazard identification 
techniques
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Safety assessment needs to identify the hazard and also the risk of the localisation
unit, particularly the safety integrity level needs to be allocated. For safety eval-
uation, actually the risk assessment is needed. The risk assessment includes the
following steps:
1. identify the hazards;
2. analyse and evaluate the risks associated with the hazards;
3. determine appropriate ways to eliminate or control of hazards.
So the risk assessment should be done according to each function of the safety-
related application. Risk is always connected to safety thus safety integrity. When
the level of safety for the application has been set and the necessary risk reduction
estimated, the safety integrity requirements can be derived for systems and com-
ponents of the application based on the risk assessment process. Safety integrity
can be viewed as a combination of quantifiable elements (generally associated with
hardware, i.e. random failures) and non-quantifiable elements (generally associated
with systematic failures in software, specification, documents, processes, etc.). Ex-
ternal risk reduction facilities and the system risk reduction facilities should match
the necessary risk reduction required for the system to meet its target level of safety.
EN 50126 does not define the correlation between safety integrity and failure prob-
abilities for railway systems, although it should be noted that a generic correlation
is defined within draft standard IEC 61508 and also EN 50129.
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5.3 Migration of GNSS Performance Properties to Railway
The GNSS performance properties have been concluded as accuracy, continuity,
availability, and integrity in Section 5.1. The railway quality of service has been
introduced as reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety in Section 5.2. The
relation between the two kinds of properties needs to be analysed, and then the gap
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between the two kinds of properties will be bridged. That is the migration process
of GNSS for train localisation performance properties.
5.3.1 Relation between GNSS Performance and RAMS in General
The performance of GNSS for train localisation can be treated as the combination
of both GNSS and RAMS performance properties. So the structure of the quality
of service shown in Figure 5.2 can be redrawn as Figure 5.9. As seen directly from
the figure, the common property of both is only availability.
According to the relation between GNSS performance properties, accuracy is the
foundation of all other three properties. The continuity and reliability are having
ambiguity between each other, both need to be compared in detail and then find
the right one to be used in GNSS for train localisation. Then both integrity and
safety are showing the information of “trust”. The characteristic of integrity can
be expressed through integrity risk, the characteristic of safety can be expressed
through tolerable hazard rate. So both characteristics can be expressed by rate, that
is the common characteristic for both. Besides, the maintainability from RAMS
cannot find the corresponding property from the GNSS performance. Since the
GNSS receiver or GNSS-based localisation unit are standing at the user segment,
the GNSS SIS cannot be maintained by the user.
The relation between the GNSS QoS and railway signalling QoS is shown in Fig-
ure 5.10. The properties are listed with the consideration of equivalence, or to be
more exactly the consideration of possible migration process.
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Figure 5.10: Relation between GNSS and Railway Signalling QoS Properties
5.3.2 Reliability and Continuity Migration
As already explained in Figure 5.3, failure rate is one of the characteristics for
reliability, which is normally illustrated by λ if it is a constant. With the concept of
failure analysis and optimal detection theory introduced in Chapter 3, the difference
between reliability and continuity can be compared.
In the FRP document introduced in Chapter 4 Section 4.5, reliability (Defini-
tion 4.9) and continuity (Definition 4.8) are defined similarly. And reliability defin-
ition (Definition 5.1) in railway RAMS is also similar to FRP reliability.
For reliability defined in FRP and RAMS, the only difference is that FRP calls for
“defined performance limits” but RAMS does not mention that. The both reliability
definitions can be decomposed by three elements as:
• perform a required function
• within defined performance limits (by FRP) and under given operation con-
dition (by RAMS and FRP)
• for a specific period time or a given time interval
And the continuity definition by FRP can also be decomposed identically with the
reliability definition into three elements as:
• perform a required function
5.3 Migration of GNSS Performance Properties to Railway 101
• without interruption
• during the intended operation
The first element is the same. The third element shows the time requirement.
Reliability is defined clearly under a specific time interval, but continuity is defined
in a intended operation which also has a time constraint. The difference exists in
the second element. The second element of reliability definition by FRP and RAMS
is the given conditions or defined performance, that is specified by a requirement
value. Using GNSS for train localisation, the given operation condition can be the
accuracy levels. The performance limit is also defined according to accuracy levels.
But continuity only calls for without interruption, no requirement value is needed.
Considering the quantitative attributes for detection results shown in Chapter 3,
the detected failures causes interruption to the system, that affects the continuity
performance. But all the failures are outside the performance limit that affects the
reliability performance. So continuity is related to detected failures λSD +λDD, but
reliability is related to all the failures λall. In that λall = λSU + λSD + λDU + λDD.
So continuity can be understood as:
C(t) = e−(λDD+λSD)t (5.4)
And reliability can be understood as:
R(t) = e−λallt (5.5)
Based on the mathematical expression, reliability is part of continuity as:
R(t) = C(t)× e−(λSU+λDU )t (5.6)
in that, e−(λSU+λDU )t < 1.
Based on the definitions and mathematical representations above, the relation
between continuity and reliability can be expressed in Figure 5.11. The initially
mixed up properties of “continuity” and “reliability” are now clearly distinguished
through definition relation between the terms and attribute hierarchy representation
of them.
The difference between continuity and reliability has also been analysed in other
ways by Venn diagrams in [68]. That result reaches the same conclusion as stated
above.
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GNSS for train localisation is a safety-related application, both the detected failures
and the undetected failures need to be considered. Then reliability answers this call.
So reliability is migrated as the property of GNSS for train localisation instead of
continuity.
With the evaluation of the GNSS receiver locations, all the failures can be identified,
thus λall can be estimated in Chapter 6. Reliability can also be estimated by MTTF
since MTTF = 1/λall.
5.3.3 Integrity and Safety Migration
The GNSS receiver location integrity is required by GNSS performance. Safety is
generally required by RAMS. Both properties are extended by several character-
istics. GNSS performance integrity is stated by four characteristics: integrity risk,
alarm limit, time to alarm, and protection limit. But RAMS safety is stated by
tolerable hazard rate in the requirements. Among the four characteristics of GNSS
receiver integrity performance property, the “integrity risk” is related to RAMS
“tolerable hazard rate”.
Both characteristics are described by rates in a certain time interval. It is easy
to mix up both characteristics when using GNSS for train localisation. As seen in
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Figure 5.12, the difference between the both in the equations is only the λIR and
λHR.
In GNSS receiver performance, the λIR is estimated according to the threshold of
accuracy. The integrity risk can be understood as the accuracy level is beyond the
alarm limit, but still no alarm is provided. This is according to the failure analysis
part as λIR = λDU .
In RAMS, The hazard rate λHR is related to a dangerous situation of the system,
that is the failure not detected in operation. That is also according to failure analysis
as λIR = λDU .
So the λIR = λHR = λDU in the context of GNSS for train localisation application.
The integrity risk and hazard rate shows the same characteristic of GNSS for train
localisation. The word “hazard rate” is chosen, because it states more clearly as a
rate.
Now going up to the property level, both properties of “integrity” and “safety”,
a new combined term is introduced as “safety integrity”. Safety integrity is the
summary of all the related characteristics: hazard rate, alarm limit, time to alarm,
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as well as protection limit. But for train localisation, the safety margin is more
commonly used than protection limit. So the safety margin is adopted instead of
protection limit. As a summary, the safety integrity in this dissertation is stated by
four characteristics:
• hazard rate: the hazard rate is considering the dangerous failures from the
GNSS for train localisation function;
• alarm limit: the maximum allowable error in the measured location before an
alarm is triggered;
• time to alarm: the maximum allowable time between an alarm condition
occurring and the alarm being present at the output;
• safety margin: the margin for the safe distance between two trains.
5.3.4 GNSS for Train Localisation Properties Summary
Based on the migration process above, the common and applicable properties of
GNSS for train localisation can be established. Since accuracy is the foundation of
all other GNSS receiver performance properties, then accuracy is still a necessary
property of GNSS for train localisation. Continuity has been migrated to reliability
in the section above. Availability definition for GNSS and railway can be treated
as the same, stated by stationary availability as A in a percentage function. Main-
tainability is not considered in this dissertation as already stated in Section 5.2.
And the integrity, safety have been migrated to safety integrity which includes four
characteristics. The comparison of the properties in Figure 5.10 can be migrated as
shown in Figure 5.13 still having four properties. Then for the four properties, the
characteristics and the quantities are shown in Figure 5.14.
With the established attribute hierarchy, the evaluation and verification methodo-
logies and processes in the following Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are basically based on
the performance properties and characteristics in the attribute hierarchy structure
in Figure 5.14.
5.4 Quantitative Requirements of GNSS for Train Localisation
The GNSS for train localisation performances need to be identified according to a
settled quantitative requirements. This is also required by the system lifecycle V
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Figure 5.14: GNSS for Train Localisation Attribute Hierarchy
model in EN 50129 [20]. Using the established properties and characteristics, the
values should be proposed.
The quantitative requirements can be mostly inherited from the GNSS for railway
application performance advisories. In the evaluation part in Chapter 6, the test
track can be regarded as a medium density line. Among the quantitative advisories,
the hazard rate is not mentioned. So a value for hazard rate needs to be formally
calculated from the existing aviation application performance value.
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5.4.1 Quantitative Formalisation of Hazard Rate
As stated in the property migration part, the hazard rate of GNSS for train localisa-
tion is actually the dangerous undetected failure as λDU . According to the hazard
rate in ICAO APV-I, it is stated as 2× 10−7/ 150 seconds. The chosen unit comes
to 150 seconds, it is not the unit of the tolerable hazard rate in one hour time unit
According to the difference in unit, a statement is describing the 150 seconds time
interval as specific risk, and the one hour time interval as average risk [66]. The
specific risk and average risk is defined as below:
Definition 5.15 Specific Risk (from [66])
Specific risk is the probability of unsafe conditions subject to the assumption that
all credible unknown events that could be known occur with a probability of one
(on individual basis).
Definition 5.16 Average Risk (from [66])
Average risk is the probability of unsafe conditions based upon the convolved (av-
eraged) estimated probabilities of all unknown events.
In order to calculate the average risk from the specific risk, a stochastic Petri net
model showing the process of the hazard is built in Figure 5.15. The one hour
average risk contains 24 rounds of 150 seconds specific risk. Each “up state” is
experiencing the 150 seconds time delay, and it is also possible to enter the haz-
ard state with the negative exponential distribution with the value of 2 × 10−7/
150 seconds. After a fulfilment of the 24 up state periods, it survivals without a
dangerous undetected failure. Thus the hazard rate in the unit of one hour can be
formally calculated.
With the Monte Carlo simulation of the stochastic Petri net, the formalised result
of the hazard rate in one hour time interval is estimated as 4.77 × 10−6/ hour12.
More details about this result can be found in a paper written by the author [141].
5.4.2 Proposed Values of GNSS for Train Localisation Performance
The migration process proposes the properties, the value of hazard rate as the
characteristic for safety integrity is formalised to the one hour time interval. So the
values of GNSS for train localisation performance on a medium density line can be
proposed.
12This result is estimated from Monte Carol simulation.
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Figure 5.15: Integrity Risk Migration in Petri net Model
The accuracy, availability properties can both use the railway advisory values for
the medium density line. The proposed reliability is related to continuity stated in
the railway advisory, it can be inherited from that too.
The continuity of GNSS for railway medium density line is proposed as 99.98%/
hour, so
λall < (1− 99.98%)/ hour
that is:
λall < 2× 10−4/ hour
The values of the four properties and the corresponding characteristics can be ex-
pressed in Table 5.5.
5.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter analyses the relation between the GNSS performance from the service
provider side and the user side, the common properties of them are summarised as
accuracy, continuity, availability, and integrity. The relation between the four prop-
erties are analysed, the accuracy is as the foundation of the other three properties.
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Table 5.5: GNSS for Train Localisation Performance Requirement on Medium
Density Line
Properties Characteristics Value and Unit
Accuracy 95% confidence level 10 m
Reliability∗ failure rate λall < 2× 10−4/ hour
Availability∗ percentage 99.98%
Safety Integrity hazard rate λDU 6 4.77× 10−6/ hour
alarm limit 20 m
time to alarm 6 1 sec
safety margin real-time calculated
* For reliability and availability analysis, HDOP > 6 should also be excluded.
The railway RAMS as the performance properties is also illustrated to show the
corresponding properties and the included characteristics. The same structure of the
GNSS performance properties and railway RAMS showing in the attribute hierarchy
helps to identify the differences of the properties. Then the migration process of
the properties aiming at GNSS for train localisation is done.
The proposed properties are accuracy, reliability, availability, and safety integrity.
The characteristics for each property are also analysed and proposed. Based on the
properties and characteristics, the values of the requirements are proposed based
on the GNSS for railway application advisories for a medium density line.
The migrated properties, characteristics, quantities, as well as the proposed values
help to identify the evaluated performance of GNSS for train localisation in next
chapter.
Chapter 6
GNSS Receiver for Train Localisation
Performance Evaluation
Evaluation is to determine system property values using criteria proposed by a set of
documents such as specifications or standards. The GNSS performance evaluation
needs a real entity that is the GNSS receiver. This chapter shows the evaluation
methodology and process for the GNSS receiver locations regarding the migrated
properties.
6.1 Accuracy Evaluation as the Foundation
When a GNSS receiver is installed on the train, the GNSS receiver delivers train
location at a settled frequency. As the train is moving along the track, the GNSS re-
ceiver delivers different train locations and velocities. That is the so called dynamic
measurement.
In dynamic measurement, precision of the locations are not easy to evaluate, because
precision is the relation between the measured location and the true position. For
statistic measurements, the mean value of the measured locations can be regarded
as the true position with the sufficient number of measurements (Sometimes the
measurement result contains an offset because of the systematic error.). In order to
evaluate a dynamic measurement, a reference measurement system is required. With
the reference measurement system, each GNSS receiver location can be compared
with the reference location logged at the same time. This dissertation only evaluates
the trueness characteristic of the accuracy, since the proposed requirement already
put a performance limit to the accuracy level. More information about the precision
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Figure 6.1: An Example of Measurement for GNSS Receiver Location and
Reference Location
and measurement uncertainty have been investigated by Marco Wegener in the
institute of traffic safety and automation engineering [142].
6.1.1 GNSS Receiver and Reference Locations
The GNSS receiver and the reference measurement system both deliver the train
location. The two locations always have differences. In this dissertation it is called
deviation. Figure 6.1 shows a train running on a track passing above a river.
Because of the trees on the track side, the GNSS receiver location accuracy level
is degraded. The GNSS receiver location indicates the train is outside of the track
in the river, but the reference location shows that the train is on the bridge above
the river. Definitely, the train should normally be on the track. The GNSS receiver
locations need to be evaluated to see what is the accuracy level of the GNSS receiver,
this requires a set of requirements to follow, and also a methodology.
Assume the GNSS receiver location to be given under Gauss-Kru¨ger coordinate,
and each GNSS receiver location at time t is recorded as Gt = (xt,G, yt,G). The x
means Gauss-Kru¨ger Easting, and the y means Gauss-Kru¨ger Northing. Each GNSS
receiver location has its corresponding reference location at the same timestamp t
named as Rt = (xt,R, yt,R). The reference locations are all located on the track
as shown in Figure 6.2 thanks to the digital track map as part of the reference
measurement system.
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Rt=(xt,R, yt,R)
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δ
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Figure 6.2: GNSS Receiver Location, Reference Location, and Deviation
The length of the vector
−−−→
GtRt is called deviation. The deviation is denoted as δt
and it is calculated using Equation 6.1.
δt = |−−−→GtRt|
=
√
(xt,G − xt,R)2 + (yt,G − yt,R)2
(6.1)
6.1.2 GNSS Receiver Location Accuracy Evaluation Process
The direct output of GNSS receiver location from the NMEA data is in WGS-84
coordinate. The components in the reference measurement system are delivering
different measurements: the Doppler radar delivers velocity, the RFID sensor de-
livers the stored train location in Gauss-Kru¨ger coordinate, the digital track map
stores the POIs also in Gauss-Kru¨ger coordinate. Finally the GNSS receiver loca-
tion and the reference location are both converted into Gauss-Kru¨ger coordinate.
Then the deviation is calculated using Equation 6.1. The merit of the Gauss-Kru¨ger
coordinate is that it is a coordinate system in a plane, this makes distance calcula-
tion of two points easier than a sphere coordinate system. The whole process can
be presented in Figure 6.3.
The deviation between GNSS receiver location and reference location indicates the
accuracy level. The deviation can be illustrated in different ways. One way is to
display the deviation as time series, the other way is to categorise the deviation
into different levels, thus the probability density function of the measurements can
be fitted to a certain probability model. As the understanding of the whole railway
service, it can be regarded as a whole stochastic process [143]. The train localisation
as part of the railway service is also a stochastic process. With the study of the
time series and the probability model, the distribution of the accuracy level can be
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Figure 6.3: Accuracy Evaluation Process
determined, the process of the train localisation can be attributed to a certain kind
of process.
6.2 GNSS Receiver Location Measurements Formalisation
The deviation value δt determines the accuracy of the GNSS receiver location.
13
For the evaluation methodology, the accuracy level needs to be identified. Thus a
categorisation of the δt and the formalisation of it should be developed.
6.2.1 Assumptions
According to the real tests along the test track, the GNSS receiver is always powered
on. So it is assumed that the GNSS receiver is running normally, systematic failures
13The accuracy of the reference system and the digital map is not the concern of this dissertation,
so the deviation represents the accuracy level of the GNSS receiver.
6.2 GNSS Receiver Location Measurements Formalisation 113
are not included, only the random failures that affected by the signal reception
environment are considered. The multipath and shadowing effect are the main
affections.
The unique aspect about GNSS location measurements is that the GNSS receiver is
delivering measurement results independent with each other, but they are affected
by the same failure problem (e.g. bad satellite geometry). The GNSS receiver
location accuracy varies in different scenarios related to the movement of the train.
When the train is running on the railway track, it passes through different railway
environmental scenarios (stated in Chapter 4). Then the strength of the signals,
the mask angles of the satellites are changing over time and the place the train is.
The GNSS receiver can deliver location measurements in one place (e.g. open area),
and the GNSS receiver cannot deliver location measurements in another place (e.g.
tunnel). This is from the system perspective regarded as self repairable. Besides,
as stated before, the maintainability is not considered as the property of GNSS for
train localisation.
The reference measurement system is considered to deliver accurate location at the
timestamps compared with GNSS receiver location measurement. The performance
of the reference measurement system will not be stated in this dissertation, it has
been investigated by other colleagues in the institute [50] [89].
6.2.2 Formalise the Locations into States
As stated before, the system can be decomposed as having structure, function, state,
and behaviour. Both structure and function have been introduced in Chapter 4,
the state helps to identify the system performance level.
For example, the reliability tells the information about the faulty-free time intervals.
The faulty-free is a state, the faulty is another. These states in the application of
GNSS for train localisation are related to location measurements. So from the GNSS
receiver perspective, three states are defined for the GNSS receiver locations. They
are defined as follows:
• Up State: the GNSS receiver is powered up, the GNSS receiver location is
reliable.
• Degraded State: the GNSS receiver is powered up, but the accuracy level of the
location measurement is degraded, but still can be used for train localisation.
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Figure 6.4: Relation between Defined States of GNSS Receiver Measurements
• Faulty State: the GNSS receiver is powered up, the measurement is unavail-
able due to GNSS signal loss or bad satellite geometry. Or when the GNSS
receiver still delivers train location, but the accuracy level is beyond the per-
formance limit, it is also a faulty state.
Remark 6.1 Faulty State Interpretation
Faulty state is the state that having failures. The undetected failures could cause
hazards. According to the optimal detection theory introduced in Chapter 3, the
faulty state can still be divided into four categories. The hazard happens when the
failure is a dangerous undetected failure.
To identify the failures, the reference measurement system is used to determine
the GNSS receiver location accuracy levels. Since each GNSS receiver location is
accompanied with a reference location, each failure leading to the faulty state can be
detected. So the undetected failures are assumed to be not existing in the evaluation
process, that is to say the diagnostic coverage DC = 100%.14
All the definitions are based on the assumption that GNSS receiver is powered up.
The accuracy level and the performance limit are both related to the deviation of
the GNSS receiver locations stated as δt. The three states and the relation between
the states and deviations can be shown very clearly in Figure 6.4.
When the deviation is lower than threshold d1, then the GNSS receiver location is
in the Up State. And, the deviation can also becomes bigger than d1 but lower than
another threshold called d2, between the two thresholds the GNSS receiver location
has higher deviation, but still under the performance limit, thus it is in the Degraded
14This number is stated as the total trust of the reference measurement system.
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Table 6.1: GNSS for Train Localisation Deviation into States (Medium Density
Line)
States Value and Unit
up state δt 6 10 m, and HDOP 6 6
degraded state 10 m < δt 6 20 m, and HDOP 6 6
faulty state δt > 20 m, or @ δt, or HDOP > 6
State. Due to this degradation, GNSS receiver location may not be as reliable as the
location in up state, but it still performs its required function, since it is under the
performance limit. The third state is called Faulty State, which indicates it ceases
to localisation function and is no longer available as a resource for the localisation
function. The judgement criteria for faulty state also includes HDOP, the threshold
for the maximum acceptable HDOP is dependent on the desired accuracy level [124].
6.2.3 Accuracy Formalisation
Accuracy is the foundation of all other three properties of GNSS for train localisa-
tion. The deviation is the basis for the accuracy evaluation. So the thresholds of
deviations conclude the accuracy level.
When the δt is allocated in d1 < δt < d2, the GNSS receiver locations are not ac-
curate but still available for train localisation because of the performance limit is
set as d2. Referring the quantitative requirements of GNSS for train localisation
raised for a railway medium density line after the migration process in Chapter 5
Table 5.5, the accuracy trueness characteristic is set as 10 m, the alarm limit char-
acteristic for safety integrity is 20 m. So the up state threshold d1 = 10 m, and
the degraded state threshold d2 = 20 m. The states and the deviations including
the consideration of HDOP values can be shown in Table 6.1 as the basis for the
deviation analysis of GNSS for train localisation on a medium density railway line.
In that the HDOP value is set as 6, according to the normal HDOP acceptance
defined in [22] and [133]. d0 is the measurement uncertainty of the measurements.
Standing above a large number of GNSS receiver locations, a distribution fitting
can be made either for all the data, or for one of the states. According to the
distribution fitting theory introduced in Chapter 3 Section 3.4.3, the distribution
of the deviation δt can be fitted to a symmetric distribution or non symmetric
distribution. With the appropriate distribution allocated, the accuracy parameter
µ and σ can be estimated.
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Figure 6.5: The Defined States, Distribution of the States, and the Petri net
Model
A model based on stochastic Petri net showing the relation between the states
according to standard IEC 62551 [144] [145] is established. The states for the Petri
net model are the three states categorised in Figure 6.4. So Figure 6.5 (a) shows
the GNSS receiver location deviations and the states again. Then in Figure 6.5
(b), the distribution of the whole GNSS receiver location measurement deviations
is fitted as a distribution, and partially the up state alone is also fitted. After that,
the transformation of the states through transitions is shown in Figure 6.5 (c).
The transition from up state to faulty state means the deviation of GNSS receiver
location is already large enough, thus it is required for safety considerations and
appropriate alarm notifications. The transition between faulty state and the other
two states means both up state and degraded state can go to unavailable situations,
and vice versa.
Comparing Figure 6.5 (a) and Figure 6.5 (c), the faulty state contains signal loss
@δt as safe failure; the faulty state also contains big deviation δt > d2 as dangerous
failure. The big deviations are dangerous because without reference measurement
system, the deviations are impossible to be quantified.
As assumed in Section 6.2.1, GNSS receiver locations are independent from the ad-
jacent location. So the deviation going from one state to another is an independent
event from the time series perspective. Normally process of the independent events
is regarded as Poisson process, such as the events of arriving of the phone calls, the
events of arriving of the customers to a shop, etc. [146]. The time between each
event in a Poisson process assumed to follow the negative exponential distribution
[146]. This leads to the reliability and availability evaluation.
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6.2.4 Reliability and Availability Formalisation
Reliability and availability are two different properties of the same system. Reli-
ability denotes the performance of the function, availability shows the result of the
function performance. Reliability tells the information about the fail-free interval,
and availability tells information about the percentage of failure-free in all the test
results. So it is necessary to evaluate the reliability first, then the availability of the
system performance can be derived from reliability performance.
The fail-free interval is the mean time to failure (MTTF ) as one of the characteristics
for reliability. So an individual fail-free interval is acknowledged as not in the
faulty state time interval according to the state modelling. The individual Time to
Failure (TTF) can be defined as:
TTFi = tk − tj + 1/f, k > j (6.2)
In that, ∀ δt, t ∈ (tj, tk) the δt follows δt 6 d2. f is the sampling rate of the GNSS
receiver, the unit is Hz.
Besides, the deviation of measurement before time j (denoted as δt(j−1)) and the
measurement after time k (denoted as δt(k+1)) obeys:{
δt(j−1) > d2 or @ δt(j−1)
δt(k+1) > d2 or @ δt(k+1)
So, all the individual fail-free intervals of TTFi in the selected test are calculated
as n, then the mean value of the TTFi can be estimated by:
MTTF = (samples of (up+degraded states))/(sampling rate)
numbers of failure free interval
=
∑n
i=1 TTFi/n
(6.3)
TTFi and MTTF are all representing the time, that is recorded in this dissertation
using second as the unit. So with the TTFi, availability can also be calculated using
it.
Availability is telling the percent of fail-free in all the tests. That is estimated by:
Availability = samples of (up+degraded states)
samples of (up+degraded+faulty states)
=
∑n
i=1 TTFi/T
(6.4)
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In Equation 6.4, T is the total test time.
6.2.5 Safety Integrity Formalisation
The safety integrity property contains four characteristics. The alarm limit, time to
alarm are considered to be settled values. The safety margin needs to be real-time
calculated, and it will be discussed in Chapter 7. The hazard rate needs to be
formalised in this section.
The hazard occurs when the deviation δt > d2 or @ δt if it is not detected. δt > d2
means that the deviation is too large to be used for train localisation, so it is
considered as a GNSS receiver location faulty state. @ δt means the deviation
cannot be calculated, the cause could be signal loss, it is also a GNSS receiver
location faulty state. With the reference measurement system, both faulty causes
can be identified. Without the reference measurement system, only the @ δt can be
identified. So @ δt is considered as a safe faulty state, and δt > d2 is considered
as a dangerous state. For safety integrity analysis, the EN 50129 defines the unit
of hazard rate as per hour per function. The function is the train localisation, the
hazard is the δt > d2 when it is not detected.
As stated earlier, evaluation with the reference measurement system makes the
DC=100%. So there are no problems with the undetected failures causing hazards.
The evaluation can divide the failures into safe failures and dangerous failures. So
rather than the hazard rate, the dangerous failure rate can be formalised and then
evaluated. In the evaluation process, when δt > d2, it can be detected and collected.
Besides, the GNSS receiver location performance varies in different environmental
scenarios as introduced in Chapter 4. So the dangerous failures needs to be analysed
individually in different environmental scenarios.
The dangerous failures are collected, and then the dangerous failure rate λD per
hour per train localisation function in a environment is estimated as:
λD =
dangerous failure numbers per environment
(samples per environment)/(sampling rate)
(6.5)
In order to analyse the dangerous failure rate in each environment, the starting
point POIS and ending point POIE of the environment in the digital track map
needs to be identified beforehand. Assume there are n times of tests in this specific
environment, the nearest GNSS receiver location to POIS is Gt=t(S) and the nearest
GNSS receiver location to POIE is Gt=t(E). The measurement time for this specific
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environment in the i test is
Ti,specific environment = |t(E)− t(S) + 1/f |
, f is still the sampling rate of the GNSS receiver.
The dangerous failure number is counted when (δt > d2) ∩ (δt−1 6 d2), so the
dangerous failure rate with m times of test in the specific environment is formalised
as:
λD =
∑m
i=1
∑max(t(S),t(E))
t=min(t(S),t(E))(δt > d2) ∩ (δt−1 6 d2)∑m
i=1 Ti, specific environment
(6.6)
The hazard in the dangerous failures are those who are not detected. The hazard
rate of big deviation is calculated as λDU = λall × (1−DC). But in the evaluation
process, the DC is considered as 100%. So in the evaluation of the GNSS receiver
location performance, only the λD is issued. The λDU is discussed and calculated
in the GNSS for train localisation real-time verification part in Chapter 7.
6.3 Performance Evaluation Process
This section provides the evaluation process based on the formalised characteristics
for each property in Section 6.2.
6.3.1 Reliability Evaluation Process
The reliability evaluation is based on deviations as shown in Equation 6.3. In the
stochastic Petri net model of Figure 6.5, reliability is represented by both up state
and degraded state. The criteria for reliability consists of two parts:
• There are GNSS receiver locations at the expected time t and δt < 20 m;
• The HDOP value is acceptable. (HDOP 6 6 according to [22])
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The transition of the measurement data can be interpreted in Figure 6.6. From
the data viewpoint, the measurements are just samples. To represent the reliability
property, a sample-based evaluation process is proposed.
The algorithm for calculating MTTF is as follows:
INPUT - NMEA data: GNSS receiver location, GNSS receiver location time,
HDOP, number of visible satellites
INPUT - reference location, reference location time
OUTPUT - MTTF
1 Synchronise the same timestamp of reference location and GNSS receiver location.
2 Calculate the deviation between GNSS receiver location and reference location.
2.1 When timestamps of GNSS receiver locations are missing, mark a zero sign. It
means a “faulty state” measurement.
2.2 When the deviation δt > d2, mark a zero sign. It also means a “faulty state”
measurement.
2.3 When the HDOP > 6, mark a zero sign. It means a “faulty state” measurement.
2.4 When there are timestamps reference is missing, ignore the current timestamp.
3 Count each sample time span when there starts and ends with zero signs.
4 Count the numbers of the time spans in TTFi.
5 Calculate the mean value of the time spans according to Equation 6.3, this rep-
resents MTTF of a test.
Now, the MTTF is calculated through the mean value of the time to failures in
one test, so each time is counted and categorised into the corresponding time span.
Meanwhile, all the TTFi are also stored. Then the possible distribution of the
transitions in the Petri net model can also be estimated for simulation purpose.
The calculation process can be shown as the following algorithm.
INPUT - NMEA data: GNSS receiver location, GNSS receiver location time,
HDOP, number of visible satellites
INPUT - reference location, reference location time
OUTPUT - distribution fitting function, distribution parameter
1 Same as MTTF evaluation 1.
2 Same as MTTF evaluation 2.
3 Calculate the time span between two zero signs.
6.3 Performance Evaluation Process 121
4 Count the number of the time spans n.
5 Categorise the time span into reasonable slots, using
√
n.
5.1 Categorise the time spans into slots till more easy fitted.
5.2 Using maximum likelihood method to find the best fitted distribution.
5.3 Estimate the parameter for the distribution, for example λ.
The distribution function and the parameter for the distribution function show the
parameter for the transitions in the stochastic Petri net model.
6.3.2 Availability Evaluation Process
Availability of GNSS receiver locations is not the same as the availability of GNSS
SIS. Availability of GNSS SIS means the percentage the system is usable with a
good signal reception environment, but availability of GNSS receiver locations is
the percentage of the locations that are acceptable for train localisation in a defined
test run.
For example, the EGNOS availability is usually calculated in relation to the per-
centage of time when the protection levels (HPL and VPL) are below their threshold
values (set for a type of operation by the alarm limits, i.e. HAL and VAL) [147].
This is the same as the defined up state and degraded state in this dissertation.
The principle and algorithm for estimating the availability is as follows:
INPUT - NMEA data: GNSS receiver location, GNSS receiver location time,
HDOP, number of visible satellites
INPUT - reference location, reference location time
OUTPUT - stationary available percentage
1 Synchronise the same timestamp of GNSS receiver location and reference location.
2 Calculate the deviation between GNSS receiver location and reference location.
3 Count the total samples of the measurement time as T .
4 Count the samples when there are deviations without zero sign from the reliability
evaluation process (
∑
TTFi).
5 Calculate the percentage of the two parameters in process 3 and 4 according to
Equation 6.4.
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The availability shows the general percentage of the GNSS receiver can be used
for train localisation. The unavailability of the GNSS receiver locations affects the
safety integrity performance, the evaluation process for dangerous failure rate as a
characteristic for safety integrity is introduced in the next section.
6.3.3 Dangerous Failure Rate Evaluation Process
Similar to reliability and availability, safety integrity is also affected by the railway
environmental scenarios. In order to show the dangerous failures with consideration
of the environmental scenarios, the dangerous failure rate evaluation process is
introduced as environmental scenarios related.
The following process is using one environmental scenario as an example. The
starting point of the environment POIS and the end point of the environment POIE
is interchangeable to other environmental scenarios. So the process of dangerous
failure rate evaluation is as follows:
INPUT - NMEA data: GNSS receiver location, GNSS receiver location time,
HDOP, number of visible satellites; environment begin POI POIS; environment
end POI POIE
INPUT - reference location, reference location time
OUTPUT - λD
1 Synchronise the same timestamp to both GNSS receiver location and reference
location.
2 Calculate the deviation between GNSS receiver location and reference location.
3 Identify the clip of the GNSS receiver location inside the environmental scenario
POIS and POIE.
4 Calculate the time of this environmental scenario as Ti.
5 Calculate the dangerous failure number in this test run.
6 Calculate the number of dangerous failures in this test run.
7 Redo the process with n times of test in this environmental scenario.
8 Estimate the dangerous failure rate λD in this environmental scenario according
to Equation 6.6.
The dangerous failure rate provides the understanding of safety issues of GNSS for
train localisation even though it is normally bigger than the hazard rate.
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With the formalised characteristics of the GNSS for train localisation performance
properties and the evaluation process based on the formalised characteristics, the
evaluation on the real data can be performed.
6.4 Setup of Evaluation Platform
In order to evaluate GNSS, an evaluation platform was built, and test scenarios
are predefined. Between 2008 and 2009, the DemoOrt project was implemented in
several test tracks [148]. The basic idea of DemoOrt is the set up of a vehicle side
on-board platform, utilising and integrating innovative technologies, with a focus
lying on satellite-based localisation (GNSS). The system is designed to be highly
available and provides localisation information for applications especially for those
with safety responsibility. To achieve these goals, a sensor data fusion on different
sources of localisation information is implemented. This also gives diversity and
redundancy of the localisation information, increasing the safety, accuracy, and
availability of the whole system [149].
6.4.1 Test Area and Test Locomotive
The GNSS receiver location data along the High Tatra Mountains railway line
was collected from May 2008 to February 2009 in different climate conditions and
seasons.
The High Tatra Mountains railway line is called Tatranska´ elektricka´ zˇeleznica in
Slovakia. It is an electrified single track narrow gauge railway in the Slovakia side
of the High Tatra Mountains. The whole line is 29.1 km long from Poprad-Tatry
to Stary´ Smokovec till Sˇtrbske´ Pleso. There are open areas, and forests, as well as
high altitude change along the line. The map of the High Tatra Mountains railway
line is shown in Figure 6.7.
The altitude of the track varies from 600 m to 1400 m, it is plotted into Matlab as
shown in Figure 6.8, the train used for the test is also illustrated in Figure 6.9.
6.4.2 Measurement Project Introduction
The DemoOrt platform consists of three parts: the GNSS receiver itself; the refer-
ence measurement system integrated by RFID sensors and antennas, Doppler radar
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Figure 6.7: Map of High Tatra Mountains Railway Line
Table 6.2: Sensors for DemoOrt Platform
Sensor Data Frequency Function
GNSS Receiver 2 Hz real-time train localisation
Doppler Radar 10 Hz velocity measurement
RFID Sensor/Transponder n.a. detect transponders on the track
Digital Track Map n.a. reference for sensor fusion
and a digital track map; and the software data processing. The composition of De-
moOrt platform is displayed in Figure 6.10. GNSS receiver, reference measurement
system, and process control are marked in different grey level. The data frequencies
and functions of each sensor in Figure 6.10 are listed in Table 6.2.
Including the hardware and sensors above, a software called qDemoOrt is developed,
which is part of the software data processing. qDemoOrt processes all the inform-
ation from the sensors except GNSS receiver. An electronic track map is used as a
reference for sensor fusion, thus relating all the location data directly on the track.
The fusion result of all the sensors is synchronised with GNSS receiver output all
at same timestamps. The output frequency of qDemoOrt is the same as GNSS
receiver, which is 2 Hz.
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Figure 6.8: Altitude Changes of the High Tatra Mountains Railway Line
Figure 6.9: Test Train for High Tatra Mountains Railway Line
6.4.3 Reference Measurement Platform Composition
The setup of the reference measurement system is based on the idea of independent
evaluation and identification of GNSS receiver localisation results. For approval
or certification purposes of GNSS on railway train localisation applications, the
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Figure 6.11: DemoOrt Reference Measurement System Structure (qDemoOrt)
basic proof of RAMS has to be enhanced by a safety case according to CENELEC
standards [149].
The reference measurement system generates train reference location in real time.
It performs almost the same functionality as a GNSS receiver but not related to
GNSS or affected by GNSS at all. Besides, it is not environment sensitive, when the
GNSS SIS is affected by the environment, the reference measurement system is still
available. Since the output of the reference measurement system is compared with
GNSS at the same timestamp, the deviation between GNSS and reference measure-
ment system can be calculated for every location for all the test runs. The reference
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measurement system sensor outputs are all inputs for qDemoOrt sensor fusion pro-
cess. The whole process is presented in Figure 6.11. The deviation between each
GNSS receiver location and reference location is calculated for RAMS evaluation
based on the accuracy evaluation process described in Chapter 6 Section 6.1.
6.5 Numerical Results of Performance Evaluation
The measurements along the track are collected for almost one year. So the eval-
uation process not only needs to consider the performance of each function, but
also needs to consider the performance in different environments or in different sea-
sons. According to the evaluation results, the season doesn’t have large effect on
the accuracy evaluation results.
6.5.1 GNSS Receiver Measurement General Statement
The GNSS for train localisation performance evaluation procedure is implemented
according to the methodology proposed in this chapter before. The data is used to
evaluate all the properties for the requirements described in Figure 5.13 (Chapter 4
Section 5.3) thoroughly. Double tracks only exist on four stations, so the line can be
treated as a medium density line. According to the requirement stated in Chapter 5,
the acceptable accuracy level should be lower than 10 m (95%), and alarm limit is
20 m.
According to the measurement setup of the train localisation, the GNSS receiver is
installed on the locomotive as part of OBU, the GNSS receiver is always powered
on. So the 24 hours measurements are logged. For the evaluation, only the test
runs are considered, so it is necessary to omit the operations like shunting, standby
for the night, etc. The measurements from the end station to the nearest station
are ignored, which means the measurements from Poprad-Tatry to Vel’ky´ Slavkov
and from Sˇtrbske´ Pleso to Popradske´ Pleso are not considered, since there always
exists systematic offsets in the two parts. And the data chosen to be evaluated is
on 16 May 2008 and 3 February 2009.
6.5.2 Accuracy Evaluation
Accuracy evaluation is based on the deviation of the GNSS receiver locations in the
test runs. According to the parameters settled in Chapter 5, the accuracy level is
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Figure 6.12: Deviation of One Test Run from Popradske´ Pleso to Vel’ky´ Slavkov
10 m (d1 = 10 m) which is considering 95% of all the deviations, the alarm limit is
20 m (d2 = 20 m). The parameters are considered for a medium density line.
On the whole day of GNSS receiver locations on 16 May 2008, there are four com-
plete test runs. Two test runs are from Sˇtrbske´ Pleso to Sˇtrbske´ Pleso, the other
two are the way back. The deviation of the fourth test run from Popradske´ Pleso
to Vel’ky´ Slavkov is shown in Figure 6.12.
In Figure 6.12, the biggest deviation reaches 27.86 m, this deviation has already
exceeds the alarm limit. The percentage of the data that is under accuracy level
10 m is only 82.48%. The deviations are fitted into possible distributions as shown
in Figure 6.13. The deviations are calculated and then fitted into the possible dis-
tributions (Rayleigh distribution and Log-normal distribution). The Log-normal
distribution and Rayleigh distribution are both left skewed (negative skew), ac-
cording to the significance of the two distribution fitting results, the Log-normal
distribution fits better than Rayleigh distribution.
Since the deviation between the GNSS receiver location and reference measurement
location and the GNSS location is actually represented by two axises. The deviation
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Figure 6.13: δt Fitting of One Test Run
calculation is generated by RSS. When the µx = µy = 0 and σx = σy = σ, the RSS
follows Rayleigh distribution. And when the µx >> σx and µy >> σy, then the
RSS follows normal distribution. In other situations, the RSS follows Log-normal
distribution. According to the deviation measurements of the DemoOrt project, the
jitter of the messages from the GNSS receiver and reference measurement system
gives measurement uncertainty of the deviations. Besides, the accuracy level of the
reference measurement system also provides uncertainty of the measurements. For
example, in Figure 6.12 the deviation never reaches 0, which means a measurement
uncertainty with d0 exists in the measurements.
Since the measurement uncertainty is not the concern of this dissertation, the follow-
ing sections and chapters will live on the accuracy level of the reference measurement
system and generate the quantitative values based on that. For the Log-normal dis-
tribution of the deviations, the parameters for Log-normal distribution are also µ
and σ. In order to be identical with the requirements of the 95% of the deviations,
the deviation limit for the 95% is also applied. The percentage of the 10 m accuracy
level is also calculated for comparing the two percentage values. The parameters of
the four test runs on 16 May 2008 is shown in Table 6.3.
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Table 6.3: Deviation Log-normal Distribution Fitting Parameter on 16 May
2008
parameter test run a1 test run a2 test run a3 test run a4
µ (m) 6.02 6.31 5.57 6.84
σ (m) 29.71 14.13 27.51 24.11
δt 95% (m) 16.48 13.81 14.74 14.98
10 m percentage 89.50% 88.41% 90.49% 82.48%
Table 6.4: Deviation Log-normal Distribution Fitting on 3 February 2009
δt test run b1 test run b2
µ (m) 4.02 8.69
σ (m) 10.07 52.73
δt 95% (m) 10.67 12.31
10 m percentage 93.95% 87.6%
Besides the test runs on that day, other test runs are also evaluated. For example,
the test run from Vel’ky´ Slavkov to Popradske´ Pleso on 3 February 2009 is also
evaluated. The mean value and standard deviation for both test runs fitting in
Log-normal distribution are shown in Table 6.4.
So when not considering the signal loss, only evaluating the available GNSS location
measurements, the 95% of the measurements can be regarded as 13.83 m based on
the six test runs shown above.
6.5.3 Reliability and Availability Evaluation
General reliability and availability evaluations are estimating the MTTF and MTTR
then calculating the availability percentage. This has been illustrated in Chapter 6
Section 6.3. The examples to be shown are also on 16 May 2008 and 3 February
2009.
Like the accuracy evaluation, only the data collected during the movement of the
train is used for reliability and availability evaluation. When considering the test
runs on each day, the MTTF value is higher than the whole day.15 The criteria for
the reliability and availability are listed again:
• ∃ δt, and δt < 20 m,
15Because the whole day consists the time train is in the area without any GNSS signal reception.
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Figure 6.14: Deviation and HDOP thresholds for the first test run on 16 May
2008
• HDOP < 6.
Based on these two listed criterions, the reliability and availability analysis in each
test run is evaluated. And the information of deviation, HDOP, and timestamp loss
is shown in Figure 6.14.
With the evaluation of the six test runs on both days. The MTTF can be calculated
through the failure numbers and total up and degraded states time. The availability
of GNSS receiver measurements is also attributed to HDOP, number of visible
satellites, deviation smaller than 20 m. So in the evaluation below, the availability
of the first test run on 16 May 2008 is considered as:
• δt > d2 faulty state time: 111.5 seconds,
• @ δt faulty state time: 353.5 seconds,
• up and degraded states time: 2742 seconds.
So the availability is represented as
A =
2742
2742 + 111.5 + 353.5
= 85.50%
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Table 6.5: Reliability and Availability of Each Test Run on 16 May 2008
Test Sequence test run a1 test run a2 test run a3 test run a4
MTTF (sec) 161.29 312.11 104.81 75.24
Availability 85.50% 80.30% 81.29% 72.31%
Table 6.6: Availability of Each Test Run on 3 February 2009
Test Sequence test run b1 test run b2
MTTF (sec) 393.75 62.74
Availability 92.44% 81.69%
Each MTTF and available percentage for each test run on 16 May 2008 is shown
in Table 6.5, accordingly the information about the test runs on 3 February 2009 is
shown in Table 6.6.
So based on the six test runs, the MTTF for them all is:
MTTF = 184.99 seconds
A = 82.26%
6.5.4 Transition Distribution in the Stochastic Petri net Model
With the reliability and availability evaluation, the Petri net model proposed in
Chapter 4 can be quantitatively modelled not only for the states but also for the
transitions. The Petri net model is redrawn from Figure 6.5 (c) in Chapter 6 to
Figure 6.15. In the model, the distribution of the six transitions can be fitted from
the measured individual time span staying in one state to another.
The same six test runs in reliability and availability evaluation are analysed together
to provide enough data for the transition firing time fitting. In this section, the
parameter calculation method for MTTF is not applied for the transition firing
time estimation, the distribution fitting is used to find the distribution of the firing
time. The time to alarm is already defined as lower than 6 seconds (Chapter 5
Table 5.5), this is also taken into consideration for the transition fitting.
The time from up state to degraded state transition and the time from degraded
state to up state transition time are both categorised in Figure 6.16. It shows that
the time to the other state distribution can be regarded as negative exponential
distribution for both transitions in a primary approximation. The other four trans-
itions are also analysed and modelled as shown in Figure 6.17. The results show
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Figure 6.15: Petri net Model for States and Transitions
Table 6.7: Distribution of Each Transition and Parameter
Transition mean time (sec)
up state to degraded state transition 15.31
degraded state to up state transition 2.46
up state to faulty state transition 20.79
faulty state to up state transition 5.91
degraded state to faulty state transition 2.88
faulty state to degraded state transition 6.71
that all six transitions can be fitted to negative exponential distributions. The mean
value is calculated and rate is also estimated in Table 6.7.
Remark 6.2 Illustration of Negative Exponential Distribution
The transition from any of the three states are evaluated, the result shows that they
all obey the negative exponential distribution. The negative exponential distribu-
tion is memoryless which represents the measurement series of GNSS receiver very
well. Each dynamic measurement is independent with each other.
According to the evaluation result, the probability of staying in the up state is
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Figure 6.16: Time for the Two Transitions between Up State and Degraded
State
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Figure 6.17: Time for the Rest Four Transitions between Three States
73.69%, staying in degraded state is 7.92% and staying in faulty state is 18.39%.
Based on this, the parameter for the transitions are now simulated, this structure
will be useful for the safety evaluation and further localisation unit evaluation.
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Table 6.8: Time of Signal Loss in the Test Run
Test Sequence Signal Loss (min) Total Test Time (min) Percentage
test run a1 (on 2008-05-16) 5.89 53.45 11.02%
test run a2 (on 2008-05-16) 10.84 58.30 18.60%
test run a3 (on 2008-05-16) 7.49 51.58 14.53%
test run a4 (on 2008-05-16) 11.48 50.29 22.83%
test run b1 (on 2009-02-03) 3.86 56.79 6.79%
test run b2 (on 2009-02-03) 6.19 60.17 10.29%
Table 6.9: Time of Deviation Bigger than 20 m
Test Sequence Big Deviation (min) Total Test Time (min) Percentage
test run a1 (on 2008-05-16) 1.86 53.45 3.48%
test run a2 (on 2008-05-16) 0.64 58.30 1.10%
test run a3 (on 2008-05-16) 2.16 51.58 4.18%
test run a4 (on 2008-05-16) 2.44 50.29 4.86%
test run b1 (on 2009-02-03) 0.43 56.79 0.76%
test run b2 (on 2009-02-03) 4.83 60.17 8.02%
6.5.5 Safe Failures to the Faulty State
According to the evaluation in the last section, the faulty state is formed by 18.39%.
In that, one part of the faulty state is signal loss (@ δt), actually signal loss occupies
a large portion among the measurements. The signal loss in the six measurements
are shown in Table 6.8.
Basically, the signal loss failure can be detected by the GNSS receiver itself, the
reference measurement system or the localisation unit. So the signal loss failures is
accepted as safe failures.
6.5.6 Dangerous Failures to Faulty State
This kind of faulty is the faulty we need to deal with in most cases, the GNSS
receiver location deviation is bigger than threshold δ2, then it is a unacceptable
deviation for train localisation on the medium density line.
In this situation, with the reference location, the GNSS receiver location deviation
can be calculated. Similar to safe failures, the percentage of the dangerous failure
to dangerous faulty state is calculated as shown in Table 6.9. Comparing the both
table of the portion of safe faulty state and the dangerous faulty state, it is easy to
see the safe failures play great role in all the faulty states.
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Figure 6.18: Open Area Snapshot from Nova Polianka to Danielov dom
Since GNSS for train localisation is a safety-related application, it is necessary to
investigate the dangerous failures in each environmental scenarios and identify the
dangerous failure rates rather than the percentage of the dangerous faulty states
in the whole faulty states quantitatively in accordance with the requirement in
Table 5.5.
6.5.7 Dangerous Failure Rate in Open Area Scenario
Open area means there are almost no high dense trees or bridges along the railway
track. As in the test track, between station Danielov dom and station Nova` Polianka
0.87 km track can be treated as a short clip from open area. Figure 6.18 is shown
as an example of open area scenario.
On 16 May 2008, the GNSS receiver locations were collected between the two sta-
tions for 4 times, the average time to travel between the two stations is 60 sec, one
of the test run is shown in Figure 6.19. The mean value of HDOP is 1.4, the number
of visible satellites is 6, the mean deviation for the 4 test runs is 5.43 m. There are
no dangerous failures in open area during this day. The availability is estimated as
100%.
The whole test in May showed that in open area there are also some situations
there is no GNSS signal (18 May 2008) or HDOP is too high (20 May 2008). The
availability of this scenario is 95.78%. The dangerous failure rate of this scenario is:
λD open area = 5.22× 10−7/h
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Figure 6.19: Number of Visible Satellites, HDOP, and Deviation in Open Area
(16 May 2008)
Even not considering the diagnostic coverage, this dangerous failure rate still meets
safety integrity level (SIL) 2. This dangerous failure rate needs to be compared with
the requirement of the medium density line train localisation, then the acceptance
of the GNSS receiver for train localisation can be made.
6.5.8 Dangerous Failure Rate in Forest Scenario
In High Tatra Mountains, there are a few clips of the tracks surrounded or even
covered by trees, as shown in Figure 6.20. It is also a level crossing, the track is
covered by trees.
The length of the track to be analysed is 1.12 km. There are 6 test runs through
this scenario on 16 May 2008, and the average time for travelling through this forest
is 99 s. The deviation and other parameters for one of the test runs are shown in
Figure 6.21. As seen from the figure, the deviation goes up to 15.2 m, and the
HDOP also goes greater than 6. Besides, there are also some timestamps no GNSS
information at all. The availability is 10.33% for the all the test runs used earlier
in this chapter.
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Figure 6.20: Forest Snapshot between Pod Lesom and Nova Lesna
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Figure 6.21: Number of Visible Satellites, HDOP, and Deviation in Forest (16
May 2008)
According to the requirement proposed in Table 5.5, for a medium density line, the
alarm limit is 20 m. In the test run shown in Figure 6.21, there are no dangerous
failures since all the deviation are smaller than 20 m. But considering other test
runs, for example on 18 May 2008 also in forest scenario there are 10 measurement
deviations greater than 20 m, which means 5 seconds. So the dangerous failure rate
for the test runs evaluated is:
λD forest = 5.25× 10−2/h
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The dangerous failure rate is really high at this scenario. Other localisation sensors
should be installed as supplement to solve this critical situation. So a GNSS-based
localisation unit is needed for forest scenario to perform safe train localisation.
6.6 Identification of Evaluation Results and Proposed Require-
ments
In Chapter 5, the properties of GNSS for train localisation are migrated. Then a
quantitative requirement based on the existing values from the GNSS applications
is proposed. The quantitative requirement is always mentioned in the numerical
results of the performance evaluation. With the throughout evaluation of the char-
acteristics in GNSS for train localisation, it is necessary to compare the evaluated
results with the proposed requirement values.
The comparison of the proposed requirements and evaluation results is shown in
Table 6.10. The accuracy is not comparable, because the evaluation result is using
the proposed requirement of 10 m as the threshold for the up state. Without the
threshold, the mean value will be much greater. Both the reliability and availability
values of GNSS for train localisation in the test track do not meet the proposed
requirements. In that the evaluated GNSS receiver location reliability is denoted in
MTTF , not in failure rate, it is then converted to failure rate. As seen from the
evaluation result, there is impossible for GNSS SPS receiver alone to provide always
below 10 meters accuracy in the test track since the train is going through different
environmental scenarios. Other localisation sensors are highly required together
with GNSS SPS receiver to deliver more accurate locations in order to meet the
proposed requirements.
Considering individual environmental scenarios, the evaluated safety integrity res-
ults are only in dangerous failures λD not as required λDU . Since for one system
the λD > λDU , the dangerous failure rate in open area scenario meets the proposed
requirement. The availability in open area is also greater than the generalised num-
ber show in the table, but still smaller than the proposed requirement. For forest,
it is the other way round. The dangerous failure rate is already far greater than the
required dangerous undetected failure rate.
The evaluated results show a very clear signal: using a stand-alone GNSS SPS
receiver is not sufficient for train localisation application in each environmental
scenario. But this evaluation methodology and process is still applicable for other
localisation sensors for train localisation.
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Table 6.10: Identification of Proposed Requirements and Evaluation Results
Properties Characteristics Proposed
Requirements
Evaluation Results
Accuracy 95% confidence level 10 m 13.83 m
Reliability failure rate λall <
2× 10−4/ h
λall ≈ 19.46/ h
Availability percentage 99.98% 82.26%
Safety Integrity hazard rate λDU 6
4.77× 10−6/ h
varies in different
environmental scenarios
λD open area ≈
5.22× 10−7/ h
λD forest ≈
5.25× 10−2/ h
6.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter evaluates the four properties proposed in Chapter 5. Since the accuracy
is the foundation of the other GNSS for train localisation properties, the reference
measurement system is used to calculate the deviation between the GNSS receiver
location and reference location. That is δt. δt inspires a total formalisation of the
properties and proposed characteristics from Chapter 5.
The GNSS receiver locations are modelled into a stochastic Petri net model, the
states of the model are: up state, degraded state, and faulty state. The states in
the model help to identify the performance of GNSS receiver location. The states
in the model also help the formalisation of the characteristics. The individual TTFi
is calculated, then the reliability and availability are evaluated based on it. The
individual TTFi is also plotted and fitted for the six transitions in the Petri net
model. So the deviation δt identifies the three states, then derived TTFi helps to
estimate the firing rate distributions of the transitions in the Petri net model.
The successful formalisation of the characteristics in GNSS for train localisation
generates the sample-based evaluation process. Real data collected in the High
Tatra Mountains are evaluated using the introduced evaluation process. The evalu-
ation parameters are using the proposed requirements in Chapter 5. After that, an
identification between the proposed requirements and the evaluated results is car-
ried out. The result shows that with a GNSS SPS receiver alone cannot meet the
proposed requirements in general. This requires other localisation sensors together
forming a GNSS-based localisation unit to deliver more accurate locations.
Chapter 7
GNSS-based Train Localisation Unit
Performance Verification
The performance verification is to check whether the GNSS receiver measured train
location can be trusted. The verification process requires the support of other
localisation sensors, thus a GNSS-based train localisation unit is designed.
7.1 From GNSS Receiver to GNSS-based Localisation Unit
The GNSS receiver locations are normally not directly on the railway track, it is
necessary to snap the GNSS receiver location to the track using the digital track
map. Thus, the track-snapped location is generated. The track-snapped location
needs to be verified together with other localisation sensors to see whether it can be
accepted as a safe train location. That is the necessity to move from a stand-alone
GNSS SPS receiver to a GNSS-based localisation unit.
7.1.1 From External Evaluation to Internal Operation
The evaluation of the GNSS receiver performances has been issued in Chapter 6
through the help of the reference measurement system. The reference measurement
system is an external source to understand the GNSS receiver performance. In
railway systems, building the whole reference system along the track costs too much.
The evaluation results represent the GNSS receiver location performance in general
and also in different environmental scenarios. The evaluated results of the GNSS
for train localisation can be used for internal operation.
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Table 7.1: Four Types of Locations, POI, and Distance
No. Location Name Abbreviation
1 GNSS receiver location G
2 track-snapped location M
3 localisation unit location L
4 reference location R
5 distance of track-snapped location and GNSS receiver location D
6 POI in digital track map POI
The internal operation uses other train localisation sensors together with the GNSS
receiver and the studied GNSS receiver performance to execute the real-time veri-
fication of the measured GNSS receiver location. There is also a special advantage
of railway than other means of transportation, the railway tracks. The railway
tracks are already determined when the tracks are constructed, the track informa-
tion can be also applied in the internal operation phase for GNSS receiver location
verification.
7.1.2 Four Types of Locations
The GNSS receiver generates GNSS receiver location. Through the track-snapping
process, the track-snapped location is generated. Then with the verification pro-
cess, the localisation unit will deliver the localisation unit location. The external
evaluation part, the reference measurement system generates the reference location
together with the GNSS receiver location. These four locations are actually all train
locations, but measured or estimated by different systems or algorithms.
To provide a clear written expression for mathematical equations, the GNSS re-
ceiver location, track-snapped location, localisation unit location, and the reference
location are defined as the abbreviations in Table 7.1.
So, let Gi = (xi,G, yi,G)|i=1...n be vector of GNSS receiver location at time i, i is the
timestamp.
Let POIj = (xj,POI , yj,POI) be the vector of the POI in the digital track map, j is
the POI ID.
Let Mi = (xi,M , yi,M)|i=1...n be vector of the track-snapped location at time i of
GNSS receiver location Gi to the digital track map based on the POI polygon.
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Figure 7.1: GNSS Receiver Location Track-snapped to the Railway Track
Thus, Di =
−−−→
GiMi = (xi,D, yi,D)|i=1...n be vector of the distance between GNSS
receiver location and the track-snapped location, in that i is the same timestamp
as Gi.
Let Ri = (xi,R, yi,R)|i=1...n be vector of the reference locations of each GNSS receiver
location Gi.
In Chapter 6, the GNSS receiver performance evaluation is based on the deviation
between reference Ri and GNSS receiver location Gi. This chapter will consider
more about the distance between the GNSS receiver location Gi and track-snapped
location Mi, that is |−−−→GiMi|.
7.1.3 From GNSS Receiver Location to Track-snapped Location
The GNSS receiver location, track-snapped location, and the localisation unit loc-
ation compose the whole localisation process of the train localisation by means of
GNSS-based localisation. The first step is to get the track-snapped location from
the GNSS receiver location, this requires the digital track map.
With the digital track map the measurement of the distance between GNSS receiver
location and the track-snapped location |−−−→GiMi| is similar to the measurement of
GNSS receiver location with reference location δi. The track-snapping process is
illustrated in Figure 7.1. Without the reference measurement system, the POIs
stored in the digital track map is the resource to snap the GNSS receiver location
to the railway track correctly.
The components in the map are basically points, points compose lines, lines form
the map. So a basic track snapping problem can be treated as a point to point, point
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Figure 7.2: GNSS Receiver Location to Be Snapped into Track Section
to line, or line to line problem. Both point to point and point to line problem can
be regarded as the search problem, and the line to line problem can be treated as a
statistical estimation problem. With the available digital track map, it provides the
constrains of the localisation space. A train is only possible to run on the railway
track and unlikely to go other places. The cartographic information of the map
described in Chapter 4 is considered as a set of sections formed by POIs. Each
section comprises a start POI and an end POI, with several intermediate nodes.
The track map structure has already been defined clearly in Chapter 4 Figure 4.4.
In the defined structure, the digital track map is divided into track sections, each
track section is composed by nodes. A list of all the sections is used for a rough
track snap. The GNSS receiver location is compared with the section POIs to find
the appropriate section of the GNSS receiver location as shown in Figure 7.2. The
binary search algorithm (also called half-interval search) is applied. At every step,
the GNSS receiver location is compared with the section POIs, the minimum two
distances are adopted for the next step. Finally only one section is left.
After the section has been determined, the nearest nodes for the GNSS receiver
location are estimated according to a characteristic of the section. Each track
section is divided with a single direction without circuity, which means when the
GNSS receiver location is attributed to a track section, the track-snapped location
is always between two POIs and also between two inner nodes in each track section.
Assume the GNSS receiver location to be located is Gi, the two track section POIs
found with the binary search algorithm are POIjstart and POIjend . Inside the section,
7.1 From GNSS Receiver to GNSS-based Localisation Unit 145
there are nodes called nodek = (xk,node, yk,node) in that {k = 1, ...,m}. The track-
snapped location Mi is located in two adjacent nodes k and k+ 1 (1 6 k 6 m− 1),
when:
xi,G − xk,node
xi,G − xk+1,node < 0
or
yi,G − yk,node
yi,G − yk+1,node < 0
With this basic rule, a second binary search algorithm in the specified section is
done until the adjacent nodes in the digital track map is found. The flow chart of the
algorithm is shown in Figure 7.3. This shows both the track section matching and
the node matching. With the track-snapping algorithm, the track-snapped location
Mi can be correctly located into two adjacent nodes. Nodes and POIs are actually
in the same format in the Gauss-Kru¨ger coordinate. So for simplicity, both nodek
and POIj are treated the same in this dissertation later as POIj.
With the correct decision of the adjacent two nodes, denoted as POIk and POIk+1,
the track-snapped locationMi can be determined according to two vector properties:
• If two vectors −→a , −→b are orthogonal, then −→a · −→b = 0.
• If two vectors −→a , −→b are parallel, then −→a ×−→b = −→0 , thus the determinant of
the two vectors det(−→a ,−→b ) = 0
So with the vector properties, it has the following equation:

−−−→
GiMi · −−−−−−−−−→POIjPOIj+1 = 0
det[
−−−−−→
POIjMi,
−−−−−−−−−→
POIjPOIj+1] = 0
(7.1)
Expand the equation array in Equation 7.1, the GNSS receiver location track-
snapped to the track can be calculated as in the form of Ax = b to calculate
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no
begin
  low = 1
  end = POI_table_length
  mid = (low+end)/2
max(sumlow,summid,sumend) 
=sumend
  low = mid
  end = high
  mid = (low+end)/2
high>low+1
  low = low
  end = mid
  mid = (low+end)/2
yes no
  sumlow = distance(low_start,location)+distance(low_end,location)
  summid = distance(mid_start,location)+distance(mid_end,location)
  sumend = distance(end_start,location)+distance(end_end,location)
yes
  section number = mid
  low = 1
  end = section_Node_length
  mid = (low+high)/2
high>low+1
  dislow,x = xlocation-xlow,node ; dislow,y = ylocation-ylow,node
  disend,x = xlocation-xend,node ; disend,y = ylocation-yend,node
  dismid,x = xlocation-xmid,node ; dismid,y = ylocation-ymid,node 
 dislow,x/dismid,x<0 or
dislow,y/dismid,y<0
  low = mid
  end = high
  mid = (low+end)/2
  low = low
  end = mid
  mid = (low+end)/2
  low = node1
  end = node2
yes
noyes
no
end
distance(a,b) is a function calculating the distance between two points.
Figure 7.3: GNSS Receiver Location Nodes Decision Flow Chart
the M(xi,M , yi,M):[
xj+1,POI − xj,POI yj+1,POI − yj,POI
yj+1,POI − yj,POI −(xj+1,POI − xj,POI)
][
xi,M
yi,M
]
=
[
xi,G yi,G
−yj,POI yj,POI
][
xj+1,POI − xj,POI
yj+1,POI − yj,POI
]
=
[
xi,G · (xj+1,POI − xj,POI) + yi,G · (yj+1,POI − yj,POI)
−yj,POI · (xj+1,POI − xj,POI) + yj,POI · (yj+1,POI − yj,POI)
]
In the equation, define:
xj+1,POI − xj,POI = ∆xPOI
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and
yj+1,POI − yj,POI = ∆yPOI
the equation is simplified as:
[
∆xPOI ∆yPOI
∆yPOI −∆xPOI
][
xi,M
yi,M
]
=
[
xi,G ·∆xPOI + yi,G ·∆xPOI
−yj,POI ·∆xPOI + yj,POI ·∆xPOI
]
(7.2)
With the calculated Mi, each GNSS receiver location Gi is attributed to a track-
snapped location on the track.
7.2 Architecture of the GNSS-based Localisation Unit
The verification process calls for several localisation sensors together to compose
the GNSS-based localisation unit.
7.2.1 Redundancy and Voting Structure
Redundancy is the inclusion of extra critical components of a system with the in-
tention of increasing reliability of the system, usually in the instance of a backup or
fail-safe. Redundancy is also named as voting logic. In GNSS for train localisation,
the information redundancy is used for GNSS receiver location dangerous faulty
state detection. This information redundancy provides elimination performance de-
clension by monitoring performance of individual components, and this monitoring
is used in voting logic.
The voting logic includes at least two components, they are primary and alternative
component. They both give similar output, but the output of the alternative com-
ponent remains inactive during normal state (up and degraded states). The action
of the alternative component depends on the voting scheme. When the primary
detects a fault, the alternative component can either take over the function from
the primary component, or cause the output of the system to be off.
As advised from IEC 61508-6, in the continuous mode of operation, a 1oo2, 1oo2D,
2oo2, and 2oo3 are needed. For 1oo2, 1oo2D, 2oo2, and 2oo3 components or sub-
systems, it is assumed that any repair is on-line [17]. If an E/E/PE safety-related
system is configured such that on any detected fault the EUC is put into a safe
state, then the probability of failure on demand will be improved. The degree of
improvement will be dependent on the diagnostic coverage. An example of the two
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sensor 1
sensor 2
input 
module
input 
module
logic voting 
element
Sensor Component
Figure 7.4: Example of Two Sensors Configuration
channel sensor component configuration is listed in Figure 7.4. This structure has
been structurally verified as safe for train localisation, also based on a Petri net
model in a previous paper written by the author of this dissertation [150].
7.2.2 GNSS-based Localisation Unit Design
The verification of a safe train location can be done through voting of the measured
train location from two independent sources. The Doppler radar and the GNSS
receiver both deliver velocity measurements but not affected by each other.16
The GNSS receiver not only provides location measurement of the moving object,
but also provides velocity measurement using Doppler effect of the moving object,
this could have common cause failure from the GNSS transmitted signals. But from
the measurement principles, the error source affecting GNSS receiver locations are
not related to GNSS receiver velocities [151]. The common cause failure is in the
situation that there are no GNSS signal, as stated in the evaluation methodology
it is regarded as a safe failure.
To implement the voting structure, another sensor to measure the train velocity is
needed. The Doppler radar can be used. The principle of the Doppler radar velocity
measurement and GNSS receiver velocity measurement are similar. But they are
not affected by each other.
With one GNSS receiver and one Doppler radar, the voting structure of the train
velocity is settled. Then the acknowledged train velocity at time t(i) together with
acknowledged train location at time t(i − 1) can estimate the next train mileage
according to the direction of the train. This estimated train mileage can be used
16Doppler radar velocity measurement is in the object body coordinate, GNSS receiver velocity
measurement is in the navigation coordinate. The coordinates are different, in this dissertation
the velocity measurements from the two coordinates shows high conformability, so the velocity
measurements are used without conversion.
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Figure 7.5: Two Layer 2oo2 GNSS-based Localisation Unit Structure in Reli-
ability Block Diagram
together with the independent map-matched location from the GNSS receiver and
the digital track map to form another voting structure of the train location. This
is a two layer 2oo2 structure, as shown in Figure 7.5.
This two layer 2oo2 structure uses three resources and then compares the resources
to determine the correct train location. They are the pseudorange measurement,
the Doppler effect by the GNSS signal transmission, the Doppler effect by the
microwave transmitted from the Doppler radar. The diversity of the voting scheme
reduces the probability of systematic or common cause dangerous failures affecting
the reliability and availability of the system.
7.3 Verification Methodologies for the Locations
The two layer 2oo2 has two voting logic schemes. The hardware redundancy voting
logic compares the two sources of input, when the two inputs are exactly the same,
then the 2oo2 structure can deliver a safe result. But there will be small differences
in value between the GNSS receiver measured train velocity and Doppler radar
measured train velocity, so a hypothesis testing based voting logic is introduced.
There are three hypothesis testings for location verification: testing of GNSS re-
ceiver location on the track, testing of GNSS receiver velocity same as Doppler
radar velocity, testing of track-snapped location same as the estimated location.
After these three steps, the localisation unit train location can be trusted and ac-
cepted. The whole procedure can be explained in the Petri net model clearly through
Figure 7.6.
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Figure 7.6: Two Layer 2oo2 GNSS Location Verification Structure in Petri net
7.3.1 Verification of GNSS Receiver Location on the Track
Considering the process of GNSS receiver location Gi to track-snapped location Mi,
the distance |Di| = |−−−→GiMi| should be as reasonably low as possible. This distance
can be treated as perpendicular deviation of the GNSS receiver location. When
the perpendicular deviation is acceptable, then the GNSS receiver location can be
accepted as on the track.
This hypothesis testing is to test whether the perpendicular deviation is acceptable.
The best result is that |Di| = |−−−→GiMi| = 0, but it is normally not in the case. A
specific threshold can be adopted as acceptable, namely D0 = µ ± 2σ as the 95%
of the normal distribution. So the hypothesis testing of GNSS receiver location on
the track can be set as:
• null hypothesis: H0 : |Dt| 6 µ± 2σ(D0),
• alternative hypothesis: H1 : |Dt| > µ± 2σ(D0).
In hypothesis testing it is called directional test or one-tailed test.
One directional GNSS receiver locations can be regarded as normal distribution.17
So actually, the perpendicular deviation to the track of the GNSS receiver locations
can be assumed as a point belong to the normal distribution function. The origin
17For different measurements, different distributions can be fitted. Normal distribution is used
as the most common distribution among these distributions.
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Figure 7.7: GNSS Receiver Location on the Track Hypothesis Testing
of the distribution coordinate should be located on the snapped railway track. This
relation can be shown in Figure 7.7.
For GNSS receiver location real-time hypothesis testing, only a small amount of
GNSS receiver locations sample can be used. For testing of a small sample, one
way is to test the mean value, the other way is to test the variance. Using variance
is based on the assumption that the mean value is not suitable to be used for
hypothesis testing.
In the evaluation results, the mean value µ0 and the variance σ for the up state
is already determined with a large number of measurement samples. This can be
used as a parameter for the hypothesis testing. But since GNSS receiver location
accuracy varies in different environments, the traditional z − test is not suitable to
be used as a test statistic for this application. Based on the real-time small samples,
the standard deviation of the small samples can be used as the parameter for the
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test statistic. So the test statistic can be created as:
t =
|Dt| −D0
s/
√
n
In that, D0 is using the evaluation results of the accuracy evaluation of the 95%
from Chapter 6. s is using the small sample with n = 5.
So when H0 is true, t ∼ t(n − 1) is a t-distribution. The rejection region for
directional testing is:
PH0{|t| > tα} = α
The rejection region is regarded as:
C = {|t| > tα}
In that α = 0.05 in consistency with the significance level.
7.3.2 Voting of GNSS Receiver and Doppler Radar Velocities
Considering the GNSS receiver velocity Vt and Doppler radar velocity Rt measured
at the same time t. they are two samples with nV = nR = n when there are no
signal loss.
Remark 7.1 R Interpretation
In this section R is used as the velocity measurement from the Doppler radar, con-
sidering the performance evaluation in Chapter 6 the R is used as the abbreviation
for reference location. This section is using R intentionally. The two samples hypo-
thesis testing can be applied to test the measurement consistency of GNSS receiver
velocity V and radar velocity R. It will also be used to test the measurement con-
sistency of GNSS receiver location G and reference location R. By this means, they
are interchangeable.
Considering the GNSS receiver velocity V and the radar velocity R, it is applied
as every timestamp of V there is always a radar velocity R. So they are generated
at the same time, and it is suitable to apply two samples hypothesis test.
For GNSS receiver velocity and radar velocity, the hypotheses are:
• null hypothesis H0 : E(vi−ri) = 0 is interpreted as the GNSS receiver velocity
is the same as the radar velocity,
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• alternative hypothesis H1 : E(vi − ri) 6= 0, which means the measurement of
GNSS receiver and radar velocities are different, and it cannot be used for
train localisation purpose.
This test is for every i = 1 : n for each GNSS receiver velocity and the correspond-
ing radar velocity measurement. The two measurement samples vi and ri can be
considered as both the mean value and variance unknown beforehand. So the two
samples unknown mean value and unknown variance can be adopted for the t test
statistic. According to a study of the collected GNSS receiver velocity and Doppler
radar velocity, the variance of both velocities can be treated as the same in the
measurement sample. So V and R are considered as having σ2V = σ
2
R = σ
2, the test
statistic can be taken as:
T =
xv − xr
sω
√
1
nv
+ 1
nr
=
xv − xr
sω
√
2
nv
(7.3)
in that,
s2ω =
(nv − 1)s2v + (nr − 1)s2r
nv + nr − 2 =
s2v + s
2
r
2
(7.4)
Considering Equation Equation 7.3, when H0 is true:
T =
xv − xr
sω
√
2
nv
∼ t(2nv − 2) (7.5)
That is to say the test statistic follows student t-distribution when H0 is true.
With the accepted velocity, the result of the first layer 2oo2 can be transferred to
the second layer 2oo2.
7.3.3 Voting of Estimated and Track-snapped Locations
At time t − 1, the accepted localisation unit location Lt−1 and the voted velocity
as Vt−1 are both used to estimate the localisation unit location L
′
t at time t. The
estimation process of L
′
t is as follows:
1. Determine the travelling direction of the train;
2. Determine the mileage at time t according to Lt−1;
3. Determine the estimated mileage of L
′
t according to Lt−1 and Vt−1.
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At time t, the measured GNSS receiver location Gt is track-snapped to the railway
track as track-snapped location Mt. So at time t, the estimated train location L
′
t
and the track-snapped location Mt needs to be verified to see whether both are the
same with each other. This is the second layer 2oo2 voting.
Similar to the velocity voting, the “two sample unknown µ and unknown σ” hypo-
thesis testing can be applied. The hypotheses are:
• null hypothesis: H0 : |
−−→
L
′
tLt| = 0,
• alternative hypothesis: H1 : |
−−→
L
′
tLt| 6= 0.
This voting scheme concludes the acceptance of the train location measurement by
the GNSS-based localisation unit.
7.4 Safety Margin Estimation
After the successful verification of the GNSS receiver location, then the successful
voting result implemented by the localisation unit, the acceptable localisation unit
location is generated as safe train location. Based on the safe train location, the
safety margin for this train location can be estimated for moving block train control
system. The definition of safety margin is as follows:
Definition 7.1 Safety Margin [9]
A safety margin is a zone for the current train that no other trains are allowed to
enter.
To determine the safety margin, the driving direction of the train, the velocity of the
train, the length of the train, and the braking distance of the train are all needed as
pre-information. And as already seen from the evaluation results, the environmental
scenarios play great role on affection of GNSS receiver location accuracy level. Since
the safety margin estimation is related to location measurement accuracy level, it
is also related to environmental scenarios [33].
The evaluation of GNSS receiver location accuracy is based on δt = |−−−→GtRt|. Then
the perpendicular accuracy is considered for GNSS receiver location on the track
verification, that is |Dt| = |−−−→GtMt|. Now for safety margin generation, along the
track accuracy (or 1D accuracy) is required, that is ∆t = |−−→LtRt|. The trusted train
location Lt and the trusted reference location Rt are both on the track, thus ∆t
shows the deviation of on the track. Large number of samples can be evaluated to
get the parameter for each environmental scenario. The standard deviation for each
environmental scenario can be finally attributed as in Table 7.2.
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Table 7.2: Standard Deviation Estimation of St in Different Environmental
Scenarios
No. Environment Standard Deviation
1 Open Area σ1,∆t
2 Forest σ2,∆t
3 Tunnel no information
4 ... ...
In consideration of appropriate parameters, the safety margin18 can be estimated
according to:
Safety Margin(t) = Kt ×HDOPt × σi,∆t + Sbraking curve (7.6)
In that, i is the environmental scenario number from Table 7.2, the first part of the
equation forms the GNSS specific safety margin. Kt is determined according to a
mean value in the last 10 measurements in real time, HDOPt is the value of the
current measurement19, Sbraking curve is the braking curve of the current train.
With the estimated safety margin in Equation 7.6, the trains are achieving the
safety goals by being constrained on the track.
One thing still needs to mention, this section only introduces the possible methodo-
logies to generate the safety margin for GNSS-based train localisation, the numerical
results of safety margin for each voted train location is not estimated because of
lacking the information of the train model, train braking curve information, etc.
7.5 Numerical Results of Performance Verification
The data for performance verification is also the data collected in the High Tatra
Mountain railway line. Since the reference location is not used for performance
verification, the data collected by Doppler radar is used as the information for the
other sensor in the GNSS-based localisation unit.
18This safety margin estimation is the first approach as a suggestion for calculating the margin.
The actual calculation is not presented in this dissertation, and the parameters may need to be
modified or improved for further calculations.
19Since the HDOP is used for safety margin calculation, the safe aspect of HDOP also needs to
be calculated.
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Figure 7.8: A Short Clip of GNSS Receiver Location, Track-snapped Location,
and Map Polygon in Open Area Scenario
7.5.1 GNSS Receiver Location Track-snapping
The measurement on 16 May 2008 is used for the track-snapping procedure. The
complete GNSS receiver location in a test run is too large to see the track-snapped
result in detail, so a data clip in open area scenario with 141 samples is used as
an example in Figure 7.8. In this clip the train was approaching a railway station,
then stopped in the station for several seconds, and then moved to another station.
In that, only one GNSS receiver location has big perpendicular distance, the other
GNSS receiver locations are all acceptable on the track.
Another data clip in forest scenario is shown in Figure 7.9. Signal loss is still the
biggest problem in forest scenario. The GNSS receiver locations compared with
the ones in open area scenario are a little bit far away from the corresponding
track-snapped locations on the track.
Both the open area scenario and the forest scenario are drawn with offsets in the
Gauss-Kru¨ger Easting and Northing for easier reading of the distances. The follow-
ing location measurement figures are all displayed with offsets.
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Figure 7.9: A Short Clip of GNSS Receiver Location, Track-snapped Location,
and Map Polygon in Forest Scenario
7.5.2 Hypothesis Testing of GNSS Receiver Location on the Track
The test statistic to test the GNSS receiver location on the track is built as:
t =
x−D0
s/
√
n
In that, D0 = 13.83 m as adopted from the evaluated accuracy information for up
state. For each GNSS receiver location, the test is based on
H0 : |Dt| 6 13.83 ↔ H1 : |Dt| > 13.83
The rejection threshold for not accepting GNSS receiver location on the track should
be:
C =
{
|Dt|−4.54
s/
√
n
> tα(n− 1)
}
in that α = 0.005.
The hypothesis testing results are both concerning two environmental scenarios.
The open area scenario, as shown in Figure 7.8, the GNSS receiver locations are all
accepted as on the track, so the figure for the hypothesis testing result in open area is
not shown in this part. But the hypothesis testing result in forest scenario is shown
in Figure 7.10. In that figure, the five-pointed stars are the GNSS receiver locations
not acceptable as on the track. This result proves further that the environmental
scenarios need to be considered for the GNSS-based localisation applications.
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Figure 7.10: GNSS Receiver Location on the Track Hypothesis Testing in Forest
Scenario
It is also necessary to test the performance of the hypothesis testing algorithm,
that is to test the detection ratio (λDU) and false alarm (λFA) of the algorithm.
As stated by optimal detection theory, the detection for a safety-related system
will have detected and undetected failures. For this purpose, a large samples clip
is used for testing the hypothesis testing algorithm performance. The verification
methodology gives the acceptance of the GNSS receiver location. Meanwhile, the
reference measurement system and GNSS receiver delivers the δt, it compares with
the specification for the medium density line, the acceptance of GNSS receiver
location can also be made. The two detections can be compared.
Figure 7.11 shows the big deviation δt > d2 by the reference on the upper figure, then
shows the hypothesis testing results of the GNSS receiver location not acceptable
on the track on the under figure. The testing results in Figure 7.11 show that each
GNSS dangerous faulty states are detected by the testing algorithm.
More samples are analysed for a statistical representation of the hypothesis testing
algorithm in Table 7.3. The hypothesis testing algorithm of GNSS receiver location
on track verification results show that the safe failures are all detected, no up or
degraded states are false detected as signal loss. The λDU is evaluated as 1.37 ×
10−4 / hour, and for the false alarm, the algorithm could have 14 false alarms per
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Figure 7.11: GNSS Receiver Location Hypothesis Testing of on the Track Over-
view
Table 7.3: Statistical Results for the Hypothesis Testing Algorithm
Category of Failure Rate Rate
@ δt safe undetected failure rate λSU 0
up or degraded as safe failure rate λFA 0
δt > D0 dangerous undetected failure rate λDU 1.37× 10−4 /hour
up or degraded as dangerous failure rate λFA 1.40× 101 /hour
hour, which is a little bit too high, but not causing safety problems, since they are
detected. But this will cause lower reliability performance of the localisation unit.
7.5.3 Two Layer 2oo2 Voting of Velocities and Locations
There are two voting schemes, the first is velocity voting, the second is location
voting. They are shown in Figure 7.12. The data in the figure is in a open area
scenario.
Velocity voting is the basic comparison of Vt and Rt, the test result in this sample
clip shows that there are two measurements different from each other. So these two
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Figure 7.12: GNSS Receiver Velocity, Doppler Radar Velocity, Map-matched
Location Two Layer 2oo2 Voting
velocity measurements can not be trusted. Then for location voting, the maximum
|
−−→
L
′
tLt| value is 5.34 m. This process brings one sample as not acceptable. This
result shows that the two layer 2oo2 can be used for real-time verification of the
safe train location.
7.6 Chapter Summary
The objective of the performance verification methodology is to show how to trust
the measured train location in real time. Thus the GNSS receiver is integrated into
a GNSS-based localisation unit to provide self verification of the measurements by
different sensors.
The self verification requires the digital track map instead of the external reference
measurement system. The method to match the GNSS receiver location on the track
is introduced. Then the necessity of the GNSS-based localisation unit is designed
for the purpose of delivering safe train locations based on voting scheme.
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In the structure of the localisation unit, there are three steps of verification. The
first verification is to verify the GNSS receiver locations to be acceptable on the
track. This is to verify |Dt| = |−−−→GtMt| to be as low as required using the evaluation
results from the last chapter. Then the following two steps are identical with the two
layer 2oo2 voting scheme. The two layer 2oo2 voting scheme is basically to check
whether the two outputs are the same using the hypothesis testing methods. This
is using a two samples unknown mean value unknown variance hypothesis testing
method. The performance of the verification processes are tested using the data
collected in the High Tatra Mountain railway line.
These three parts forms the real-time verification process of the GNSS for train
localisation. This answers the question proposed in the purpose of the dissertation of
how to apply GNSS GNSS into train localisation according to the related standards,
specifications, and advisories, and then generate a safe train location for the purpose
of train control.

Chapter 8
Conclusions and Recommendations
The following Section 8.1 states conclusions for whole process from terminology
migration, to performance evaluation, till performance verification introduced in
this dissertation. After that, the methodologies goes up to an universal approach for
GNSS in surface transportation safety-related applications in Section 8.2. Finally,
recommendations for further possible researches are introduced in Section 8.3.
8.1 Conclusions
This dissertation considers the formalised GNSS performance properties migration
of applying GNSS into train localisation. The GNSS for train localisation should
conform both the GNSS QoS and railway RAMS performances. The properties
and their definitions are analysed under the same attribute hierarchy based on the
service provider standards [22] [4] [131] and user application specifications [133] [64]
[18] [20]. The definitions of all the properties are structurally compared. The mi-
gration of both performance properties comes to accuracy, reliability, availability,
and safety integrity. Accuracy is regarded as the fundamental basis for the other
three properties. The reliability, availability, as well as safety integrity are derived
according to the accuracy thresholds. This provides the evidence for performance
evaluation and verification methodologies of GNSS for train localisation in the fol-
lowing chapters.
The performance evaluation is to demonstrate the quantitative values of GNSS for
train localisation in different scenarios. The GNSS receiver location accuracy is
evaluated at the first step, this requires a more accurate reference measurement
system together to calculate the deviation of each GNSS receiver location. The
GNSS receiver locations are divided into three states according to the accuracy
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levels as: up state, degraded state, and faulty state. The three states make iden-
tification of the four properties transformed into state recognition, this makes the
performance evaluation in a more formal way. The accuracy evaluation for the up
state shows that the trueness is 4.54 meter, the precision is 2.05 meter. The MTTF
as the characteristic for reliability property is 184.99 seconds, and the stationary
availability is estimated as 82.26%. The dangerous failure rate λD is recognised as
the characteristic for safety integrity property. From the safety engineering view-
point, the safety integrity property needs to be analysed according to the functions
and operation conditions. Thus different environmental scenarios are analysed for
dangerous failure rate. The dangerous failures are determined as exceeding the
alarm limit (δt > d2). The open area and the forest environmental scenarios are
analysed. The values of the characteristics for the migrated four properties are de-
termined, the values are identified with the proposed GNSS for train localisation
specification inherited from the advisories and standards. The identification results
shows that only in open area environmental scenario GNSS SPS receiver meets the
specification, in other scenarios all performance values are under the request of the
specification. So a GNSS SPS receiver only is not enough for train localisation.
The other localisation sensors are needed to perform a more reliable and available
train localisation function. So a Doppler radar is adopted to form a GNSS-based
localisation unit.
The performance verification is then based on the GNSS-based localisation unit.
The verification methodology directly benefits from the evaluation values of the
GNSS receiver performance for train localisation. In the performance verification
process, the reference measurement system is not used any more. The GNSS re-
ceiver locations are map-matched to the railway track. The distance between the
GNSS receiver location and the map matched location |Dt| is calculated, then the
hypothesis testing of |Dt| acceptable on the track is performed. A two layer 2oo2
structure for the GNSS-based localisation unit is designed, the two 2oo2 voting
schemes respectively velocity voting and location voting are also using the hypo-
thesis testing methods. With the verification of GNSS receiver location on the
track, then the map-matched location on the correct mileage, the safe localisation
unit location is delivered for train control purpose.
8.2 Universal Approach
The proposed GNSS for train localisation performance evaluation and verification
process is a universal approach. The methodologies can also be applied to other
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localisation sensors into different means of transportation for the evaluation and
verification of other applications (for example: automatic cruise control, automatic
vehicle identification, etc.).
The GNSS QoS and railway RAMS terminologies migrated in this dissertation
are based on the existing understanding of GNSS requirements, standards, and
guidelines either general or application oriented purposes. However, none of the
GNSS documents provide appropriate requirements for GNSS in surface transport-
ation safety-related applications. The property migration chapter uses a common
attribute hierarchy structure for the GNSS QoS and railway RAMS. This attribute
hierarchy representation of the performance is generally applicable for any applica-
tions to find the relations and differences between different performance documents.
The GNSS for train localisation performance properties and the corresponding char-
acteristics are not only suitable for train localisation but also for road vehicle de-
tections.
The methodologies for GNSS performance evaluation can be regarded as a gen-
eral evaluation methodology of a certifiable process for GNSS-based safety-related
applications in surface transportation. The GNSS receiver location measurements
are formally categorised into three states. The characteristics of other properties
are formalised according to the states. This makes the evaluation process easy to
recognise and apply. Besides, this evaluation process can be expanded with more
properties or more characteristics attaching to the proposed evaluation process.
The Petri net model for the GNSS receiver location states is applicable for any loca-
tion applications. The firing time delay can be studied and fitted into a distribution,
the data belonging to a state can be studied and fitted into another distribution.
Then the measurements are generalised into different distributions. This gives more
possibility for the analysis of the general performance of the measurements.
The whole sequence of define the properties, evaluate the properties, then apply the
property values into operation is the natural process of investigating any problems.
8.3 Recommendations
This dissertation has provided considerable baseline for the properties to be evalu-
ated and verified with the purpose of GNSS for train localisation. The characterist-
ics for each property can still be expanded for other GNSS for railway safety-related
applications, thus bring more possibilities for GNSS in railway domain.
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The main function of the GNSS-based systems in this dissertation is the train
localisation. The functions listed in Table 4.2 also show other functions like GNSS
receiver location integrity checking and train driving direction determination.
The GNSS receiver location integrity can be evaluated using EGNOS data and other
related techniques from the GNSS receiver side. With so many satellites on the sky,
it is necessary to use the supplemental satellites and SBAS satellites to provide
more integrity and more accuracy from the GNSS side, then the safety integrity of
the localisation unit can be assured from GNSS SIS side. The techniques of the
combination of the information from the satellites and the information from the
GNSS receiver or the localisation unit can be studied to provide a more trustable
location measurement.
The driving direction and the track selectivity can be studied with the help of a
localisation unit. The performance of the driving direction identification and track
selectivity can also be tested in different environmental scenarios. This will improve
the localisation unit functionality to a higher level.
The evaluation process for GNSS can be further scandalised as a process for GNSS
receivers in various transportation localisation applications. Other legislation and
laws need to be investigated to find the requirements for GNSS-based localisation
unit for trains. With a complete evaluation based on the standardised evaluation
process, the Satellite-based Localisation Unit for Train (SaLUT) can finally be
approved by assessment bodies. This brings SaLUT as a certified system for train
localisation.
The evaluation of the environmental scenarios in this dissertation show a glimpse
of how the environments affect the quality of the GNSS measurements. The envir-
onmental scenarios can be further clearly defined, and the affection of the factors
can be identified and then settled to a known constant. With the fixed factors,
the testing scenarios can be built. Then the values of the characteristics related
to the performance of different GNSS receivers can be easily tested and compared
in these determined environmental scenarios. GNSS receivers in extreme environ-
mental scenarios can be tested, the performance of the safety-related functions will
be quantified, thus bring the standard of GNSS receiver for safety-related applica-
tions testing into reality.
Appendix A
Index of Abbreviations
APOLO Advanced Position Locator
APV Approach Procedure with Vertical guidance
BDS BeiDou Navigation Satellite System
CENELEC Comite´ Europe´en de Normalisation E´lectrotechnique
CNTD Coordinate based continuous Numerical Track Description
DC Diagnostic Coverage
DIN Deutsches Institut fu¨r Normung
DOP Dilution Of Precision
ECEF Earth Centred Earth Fixed
ECS Eddy Current Sensor
E/E/PE Electric/Electronic/Programmable Electronic
EGNOS European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service
ERTMS European Rail Traffic Management System
ESA European Space Agency
ETCS European Train Control System
EU European Union
EUC Equipment Under Control
FA False Alarm
FP Framework Programme
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FR Failure Rate
FRP Federal Radionavigation Plan
GBAS Ground Based Augmentation System
GDOP Geometric Dilution of Precision
GIC Ground Integrity Channel
GLONASS Globalnaya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite Systems
GPS Global Positioning System
GSM-R Global System for Mobile Communications for Railway
HDOP Horizontal Dilution of Precision
HPL Horizontal Protection Limit
HR Hazard Rate
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IMU Inertial Measurement Unit
INS Inertial Navigation Sensor
IOC Initial Operation Capability
IOV In-Orbit Validation
ITCS Incremental Train Control System
KLUB-U Integrated Train Protection System
LAAS Local Area Augmentation System
LPV Localiser Performance with Vertical guidance
MD Missed Detection
NMEA National Marine Electronics Association
MOPS Minimum Operational Performance Standards
MSI Misleading SIS Information
MTBF Mean Time Between Failure
MTTF Mean Time To Failure
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MTTR Mean Time To Repair
OBU On-Board Unit
PDF Probability Density Function
PDOP Position Dilution of Precision
PN Petri nets
PNT Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
POI Point of Interest
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment
PTC Positive Train Control
QoS Quality of Service
RAIM Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
RAMS Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Safety
RBC Radio Block Centre
RG Reachability Graph
RMS Root Mean Square
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics
RSS Root Sum Square
RTK Real Time Kinematic
SARPs Standards And Recommended Practices
SaLUT Satellite-based Localisation Unit for Train
SBAS Space Based Augmentation System
SIL Safety Integrity Level
SIS Signal in Space
SoL Safety of Life
SPN Stochastic Petri nets
SPS Standard Positioning Service
TTF Time to Failure
TCC Train Control Centre
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TDOP Time Dilution of Precision
TOA Time of Arrival
UERE User Equivalent Range Error
UML Unified Modeling Language
URA User Range Accuracy
URAE User Range Acceleration Error
URE User Range Error
URRE User Range Rate Error
USA United States of America
UTCOE UTC Offset Error
VDOP Vertical Dilution of Precision
VPL Vertical Protection Limit
WAAS Wide Area Augmentation System
WGS World Geodetic System
Appendix B
GNSS-based Localisation Unit
Hazard Rate Simulation
As introduced in Chapter 7, the GNSS-based localisation is composed by a GNSS
receiver and a Doppler radar sensor. The both sensors form a two layer 2oo2 archi-
tecture as shown in Figure 7.5. For GNSS-based localisation unit as a safety-related
application, it is necessary to undertake the related risk analysis in the localisation
unit as required in the system lifecycle [18]. This appendix shows possible ways to
estimate the hazard rate of the localisation unit.
The hazard rate is introduced in the dissertation as dangerous undetected rate λDD.
The dangerous undetected failure events are the GNSS receiver deviation δt > d2,
and this is not detected by the localisation unit.
The GNSS receiver locations have been formalised into three states as: up state,
degraded state, and faulty state in Chapter 6 Section 6.2. The dangerous undetected
faulty are caused by dangerous undetected event. Thus, the dangerous undetected
faulty state is part of the faulty state. So the modelled GNSS receiver location
states is the basis for the whole localisation unit simulation. The parameters for
the transitions in the GNSS receiver location measurement states Petri net model
has been evaluated in Chapter 6 Section 6.5. In the localisation unit simulation, it
can be directly adopted.
The GNSS receiver velocity and the Doppler radar velocity can also be modelled
as the up state, degraded state, and faulty state. But the threshold should be
the velocity measurement deviations. With the evaluation of the measured GNSS
receiver velocity and the Doppler radar velocity evaluation results, the distribution
of the transitions in the Petri net model can also be fitted similar to GNSS receiver
location measurements.
The GNSS receiver location with the track-snapping process can derive the accept-
ance of the GNSS receiver location by real-time verification. The verification al-
gorithm performance shows the dangerous undetected failure rate. Then the faulty
state are divided into detected faulty state and undetected faulty state. The en-
tering of the two states are decided by the failure event category. As shown in
the dissertation, the GNSS receiver location exceeding the required threshold d2 is
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regarded as a dangerous failure event. This is the basic call for other sensors to
detect this failure event.
The GNSS receiver velocity and the Doppler radar velocity voting is doing the first
layer 2oo2 voting. When both GNSS receiver velocity and Doppler radar velocity
are in up state or degraded state, then the voting scheme provides correct voting
results. The dangerous failure events exist when both are deliver faulty velocity
measurements. Similar to the location measurement, the faulty velocities are also
divided into two parts as detected faulty state and undetected faulty state.
The localisation unit dangerous undetected faulty state exist when GNSS receiver
location, GNSS receiver velocity, and Doppler radar velocity are all in faulty states,
but this situation is not detected, thus the localisation unit is in a hazard state.
The parameters for the GNSS receiver location has been identified by the evalu-
ation of the GNSS receiver location states and the verification of the GNSS receiver
location on the track. Using the same methodology, the parameters for the velo-
city estimation transitions can also be calculated. With all the parameters for the
transitions bounded in the dashed boxes as shown in Figure B.1, the hazard rate of
the localisation unit can be estimated.
In the combination of up state and degraded state for different measurement com-
ponent, the localisation unit is delivering safe train location correctly. So they are
drawn only one “usable velocity” as an example for all other states. For simplicity
of the figure, the other combinations are omitted.
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Figure B.1: Localisation Unit Hazard Rate Simulation Petri net Model

Bibliography
[1] Minnie Chan. Beidou launches navigation data for Asia-Pacific re-
gion: Satellite navigation network launches tracking data for Asia-
Pacific region in warning to GPS. South China Morning Post,
28.12.2012. URL http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1113896/
beidou-launches-navigation-data-asia-pacific-region. (checked on
23.10.2013).
[2] Jonathan Amos. Galileo: Europe’s version of GPS reaches key phase. BBC
NEWS Science & Environment, 12.10.2012. URL http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/science-environment-19933989. (checked on 23.10.2013).
[3] Xinxin Gao. Towards Navigation Based on 120 Satellites: Analyzing the New
Signals. PhD thesis, Stanford University, Stanford and California, 2008.
[4] European Commission. Galileo Mission High Level Definition Document
(HLD) 3.0, 2002.
[5] European Commission. EGNOS Safety of Life Service Definition Document:
EGN-SDD SoL, V1.0, 2011.
[6] Tony Godber. Train Detection Principles. In IRSE Australasia Technical
Meeting, Melbourne, 2010.
[7] European Union. Directive 2004/50/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 29 April 2004: amending Council Directive 96/48/EC on the
interoperability of the trans-European high-speed rail system and Directive
2001/16/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the interop-
erability of the trans-European conventional rail system, 2004.
[8] Peter Stanley. ETCS for engineers. Eurailpress, Hamburg, 1 edition, 2011.
ISBN 978-3-7771-0416-4.
[9] ERTMS Users Group and International Union of Railways. ETCS Implement-
ation Handbook. UIC, 2.1 edition, 2008. ISBN 2-7461-1499-2.
[10] Eckehard Schnieder and George Barbu. Potenziale satellitenbasierter Ortung
fu¨r Eisenbahnen. ETR - Eisenbahntechnische Rundschau, 1(Nr. 01+02), 2009.
[11] Eckehard Schnieder. Nutzung von Satellitenortungssystemen fu¨r Eisenbahnen
im rechtlichen Rahmen: Use of satellite based localisation for railway in legal
context. ZEVrail, 133(9):351–357, 2009.
175
176 Bibliography
[12] International Electrotechnical Commission. IEC 61508-1: Functional safety of
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems — Part
1: General requirements, 1997.
[13] International Electrotechnical Commission. IEC 61508-2: Functional safety of
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems — Part
2: Requirements for electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-
related systems, 1997.
[14] International Electrotechnical Commission. IEC 61508-3: Functional safety of
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems — Part
3: Software requirements, 1997.
[15] International Electrotechnical Commission. IEC 61508-4: Functional safety of
electrical/electronic/ programmable electronic safety-related systems — Part
4: Definitions and abbreviations, 1997.
[16] International Electrotechnical Commission. IEC 61508-5: Functional safety of
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems — Part
5: Examples of methods for the determination of safety integrity levels, 1997.
[17] International Electrotechnical Commission. IEC 61508-6: Functional safety of
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems — Part
6: Guidelines on the application of parts 2 and 3, 1997.
[18] European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization. CENELEC EN
50126: Railway applications - The specification and demonstration of Reliab-
ility, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS), 2007.
[19] European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization. CENELEC EN
50128: Railway applications - Communications, siganlling and processing sys-
tems - Software for railway control and protection systems, 2001.
[20] European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization. CENELEC EN
50129: Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing sys-
tems - Safety related electronic systems for signalling, 2003.
[21] Eckehard Schnieder. Qualita¨t dynamischer Satellitenortung im Eisenbahn-
verkehr. Technisches Messen, 4(79 (2012) 4):210–219, 2012. ISSN 0171-8096.
[22] United States Department of Defense. Global Positioning System Standard
Positioning Service Performance Standard, 2008. URL http://www.gps.gov/
technical/ps/2008-SPS-performance-standard.pdf.
[23] P.J. Cross. A Journey Through Train Detection. In IRSE Australasia Tech-
nical Meeting, Sydney, 1993.
[24] Dietmar Klimmek. Modell fu¨r die Bewertung von Navigationssystemen im
Landverkehr. PhD thesis, Technische Universita¨t Braunschweig, Braunsch-
weig, 1985.
Bibliography 177
[25] Dirk Leinhos. Analyse und Entwurf von Ortungssystemen fu¨r den Schien-
enverkehr mit Strukturierten Methoden. PhD thesis, Technische Universita¨t
Braunschweig, Braunschweig, 1996.
[26] Stefan Hensel. Wirbelstromsensorbasierte Lokalisierung von Schienenfahrzeu-
gen in topologischen Karten. PhD thesis, Karlsruher Institut fu¨r Technologie
(KIT), Karlsruhe, 2011.
[27] Railway Group Standards. General Information on Track Circuits:
GK/RC0752, 1998. URL http://www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_
Group_Standards/Control%20Command%20and%20Signalling/Codes%
20of%20Practice/GKRC0752%20Iss%202.pdf. (checked on 15.11.2013).
[28] Railway Group Standards. Axel Counters: Code of Practice for Reset-
ting and Restoration to Services: GK/RT0027, 1998. URL http://
www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_Standards/Control%20Command%
20and%20Signalling/Codes%20of%20Practice/GKRC0527%20Iss%201.pdf.
(checked on 15.11.2013).
[29] Union Industry of Signalling. UNISIG ERTMS/ETCS - Class 1: Fit
Functional Interface Specification (FFFIS) for Eurobalise: SUBSET-036,
27.09.2007.
[30] Baigen Cai, Jian Wang, Qin Yin, and Jiang Liu. A GNSS Based Slide and
Slip Detection Method for Train Positioning. In Asia-Pacific Conference on
Information Processing, pages 450–453, Shenzheng, 2009.
[31] Baigen Cai. Train Integrated Positioning Methods for Low-cost Train Control
System. PhD thesis, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, 2010.
[32] Lei Yuan and Datian Zhou. Error Correction Method for Train Speed Meas-
urement Using Doppler Radar in Train Control System. In Autonomous De-
centralized Systems, Mexico City, 2013.
[33] Debiao Lu, Federico Grasso Toro, and Eckehard Schnieder. RAMS Evalu-
ation of GNSS for Railway Localisation. In IEEE International Conference
on Intelligent Rail Transportation, Beijing, 2013.
[34] Alesˇ Filip, Hynek Mocek, and Lubor Bazant. Zugortung auf GPS/GNSS-Basis
fu¨r sicherheitskritische Anwendungen. SIGNAL+DRAHT, 5:16–21, 2001.
[35] Pierre Mertens, Jean-Pierre Franckart, and Antonin Starck. LOCOPROL: A
low cost Train Location and Signalling System for ”Low Density” Lines. In
Proceedings of Word Congress on Railway Research, Edinburgh, 2003.
[36] Andrew Simsky, Frank Wilms, and Jean-Pierre Franckart. GNSS-based fail-
safe train positioning system for low-density traffic lines based on onedimen-
sional positioning algorithm. In 2nd ESA Workshop on Satellite Navigation
User Equipment Technologies, Noordwijk, 2004.
178 Bibliography
[37] Xiaogang Gu. Feasibility of GNSS/Galileo-based train location for safety
relevant applications. SIGNAL+DRAHT, (97) 1+2:29–34, 2005.
[38] GADEROS: Galileo Demonstrator for Railway Operation System: Project
Overview, Project deliverable, 2002.
[39] ECORAIL: GNSS for Safe Railway Road Cross Application: GNSS
Applications- Final Presentation, 2006.
[40] A. Albanese and L. Marradi. The RUNE project: the integrity performances
of GNSS-based railway user navigation equipment. In Joint Railroad Confer-
ence, volume 29 of RTD Ser, pages 211–218, New York, March 2005. ASME
Press. ISBN 0-7918-3752-1.
[41] George Barbu. Railway Geodesy (GEORAIL), 2008. URL http://www.uic.
org/spip.php?article696. (checked on 15.09.2013).
[42] Bryan Jenkins, Alvaro Urech, and Maria Jose´ Garcia Prieto. GNSS Introduc-
tion in the RAIL sector. In The Institution of Engineering and Technology
Seminar on Global Navigation Satellite Systems, pages 143–155, Piscataway
and N.J, 2007. IEEE. ISBN 978-0-86341-794-8.
[43] Livio Marradi, Andrea Galimberti, Lucio Foglia, Alberto Zin, Cristina Pec-
chioni, and Manuel Doronzo. GNSS for Enhanced Odometry: The GRAIL-2
results. In 6th ESA Workshop on Satellite Navigation Technologies : ”Multi-
GNSS Navigation Technologies Galileo’s Here”, pages 1–7, Noordwijk, 2012.
ISBN 978-1-4673-2010-8.
[44] Hansjo¨rg Manz. Galileo Localisation for Railway Operation Innovation (GaL-
oROI) Project Proposal, 2011.
[45] Jaizki Mendizabal. EATS: ETCS Advanced Testing and Smart Train Posi-
tioning System, 2013. URL http://www.eats-eu.org/index.html. (checked
on 15.11.2013).
[46] Sven Bernhard Kiriczi. Signaltechnisch sichere Fehlergrenzen fu¨r die Erfas-
sung der Bewegungszusta¨nde von Bahnen. PhD thesis, Technische Universita¨t
Braunschweig, Braunschweig, 1996.
[47] Karl-Albrecht Klinge. Konzept eines fahrzeugautarken Ortungsmoduls fu¨r den
spurgebundenen Verkehr. PhD thesis, Technische Universita¨t Braunschweig,
Braunschweig, 1997.
[48] Gert Bikker and Martin Schroeder. Methodische Anforderungsanalyse und
automatisierter Entwurf sicherheitsrelevanter Eisenbahnleitsystem mit kooper-
ierenden Werkzeugen. PhD thesis, Technische Universita¨t Braunschweig,
Braunschweig, 2002.
[49] Gert Bikker, Uwe Becker, Lorenz Da¨ubler, and Eckehard Schnieder. SATNAB
Phase II: Endbericht, 2002.
Bibliography 179
[50] Jan Poliak. Validierung von satellitenbasierten Eisenbahnortungssystem. PhD
thesis, Technische Universita¨t Braunschweig, Braunschweig, 2009.
[51] Frank Ha¨nsel. Zur Formalisierung technischer Normen. PhD thesis, Technis-
che Universita¨t Braunschweig, Braunschweig, 2008.
[52] Marco Wegener. U¨ber die metrologische Qualita¨t der Fahrzeugortung. PhD
thesis, Technische Universita¨t Braunschweig, Braunschweig, 2014.
[53] David Shirres. Russian railways shoot for Olympic gold. The Rail En-
gineer, 02.08.2012. URL http://www.therailengineer.com/2012/08/02/
russian-railways-shoot-for-olympic-gold/. (checked on 08.03.2013).
[54] Izhevskiy Radiozavod. Unified Integrated Locomotive Safety System KLUB-
U, 2013. URL http://en.irz.ru/products/20/70.htm. (checked on
08.03.2013).
[55] Patrick Jarvis. GE Wins Order From Chinese Ministry of Railways for 78 Lo-
comotives Second Contract Awarded for Incremental Train Control System,
2005. URL http://www.getransportation.com/rail/rail-products/
signaling-a-communication/signaling-a-train-control/
incremental-train-control-system-itcs.html. (checked on 21.09.2010).
[56] Greg Hann. Incremental Train Control System. IEEE Vehicular Technology
Magazine, 5(4):50–55, 2010. doi: 10.1109/MVT.2010.939108.
[57] Michael Schabas. Eko Rail wins Lagos Blue Line concession. Metro Report
International, 3, 2012.
[58] Bob Pemberton. Leveraging New Technology to Create Higher Capacity Net-
works. In International Railway Safety Conference, Melbourne, 2011.
[59] Burkhard Stadlmann. Zugleitsystem fu¨r Regionalstrecken. In INFORMATIK,
2003.
[60] Burkhard Stadlmann. GPS Based Train Control System in Austria. In ZEL-
GNSS WORKSHOP, Zilina, 2008.
[61] Liesbeth de Jong. UIC launches SATLOC, a new EU funded project for the de-
velopment of satellite based operation of local low rail traffic lines, 13.02.2012.
URL http://www.uic.org/com/IMG/pdf/cp_uic_launches_satloc_en-2.
pdf. (checed on 12.06.2013).
[62] Mike Agron. GNSS Performance Standards & Certification Beyond Spectrum
Protection. Inside GNSS: Prensentation Slides, 2013.
[63] Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics. RTCA DO-208: Minimum
Operational Performance Standards for Airborne Supplemental Navigation
Equipment Using Global Positioning System (GPS), 1991.
180 Bibliography
[64] Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics. RTCA DO-229D: Minimum
Operational Performance Standards for Global Positioning System/Wide
Area Augmentation System Airborne Equipment, 2006.12.13.
[65] Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics. RTCA DO-253C: Minimum
Operational Performance Standards for GPS Local Area Augmentation Sys-
tem Airborne Equipment, 2008.12.16.
[66] Sam Pullen, Todd Walter, and Per Enge. SBAS and GBAS Integrity for
Non-Aviation Users: Moving Away from ”Specific Risk”. In International
Technical Meeting of the Institute of Navigation, pages 533–545, San Diego,
2011.
[67] Alesˇ Filip, Hynek Mocek, and A. Suchanek. Significance of the Galileo Signal-
in-Space Integrity and Continuity for Railway Signalling and Train Control.
In Proceedings of Word Congress on Railway Research, Paris, 2008.
[68] Alesˇ Filip. A Relation among GNSS Quality Measures and Railway RAMS
Attributes. In CERGAL, Braunschweig, 2008.
[69] Alesˇ Filip, Julie Beugin, Juliette Marais, and Hynek Mocek. Interpretation of
the Galileo Safety-of-Life Service by Means of Railway RAMS Terminology.
Transactions on Transport Sciences, 1(2):61–68, 2008. ISSN 1802-971X.
[70] The Institute of Navigation. ION STD 101 Recommended Test Procedures
For GPS Receivers, 1997.
[71] Alesˇ Filip. Which of EGNOS Navigation Modes for Railway Siganlling: Pre-
cision Approach or En Route? In CERGAL, Rostock, 2010.
[72] Alesˇ Filip, Lubor Bazant, and Hynek Mocek. The experimental evaluation
of the EGNOS safety-of-life services for railway signalling. In COMPRAIL,
Beijing, 2010.
[73] Julie Beugin and Juliette Marais. Simulation-based evaluation of depend-
ability and safety properties of satellite technologies for railway localiza-
tion. Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, 22:42–57, 2012.
ISSN 0968090X. doi: 10.1016/j.trc.2011.12.002.
[74] Patrick Y. HWANG and R. Grover Brown. From RAIM to NIORAIM: A
New Integrity Approach to Integrated Multi-GNSS Systems. Inside GNSS, 3:
24–33, 2008.
[75] David M. Bevly. GNSS for Vehicle Control. GNSS technology and applica-
tions series. Artech House, Boston, 2010. ISBN 1596933011.
[76] Young C. Lee. Analysis of Range and Position Comparison Methods as a
Means to Provide GPS Integrity in the User Receiver. In Proceedings of the
42th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Navigation, Seattle, 1986.
Bibliography 181
[77] Bradford W. Parkinson and Penina Axelrad. Autonomous GPS Integrity
Monitoring Using the Pseudorange Residual. NAVIGATION: Journal of the
Institute of Navigation, 35(2):255–274, 1988. ISSN 0028-1522.
[78] Boris S. Pervan, David G. Lawrence, Clark E. Cohen, and Bradford W. Par-
kinson. Parity Space Methods for Autonomous Fault Detection and Exclusion
using GPS Carrier Phase. In IEEE/ION PLANS, pages 649–656, Atlanta,
1996. ISBN 0-7803-3085-4.
[79] R. Grover Brown. A Baseline RAIM Scheme and a Note on the Equivalence of
Three RAIM Methods. NAVIGATION: Journal of the Institute of Navigation,
39(3):301–316, 1992. ISSN 0028-1522.
[80] Igor V. Nikiforov. Integrity Equation for Safe Train Positining Using GNSS.
In ENC GNSS, Graz, 2003.
[81] Eckehard Schnieder, Karl-Albrecht Klinge, and Gert Bikker. RailOrt - Ortung
um spurgebunden Verkehr auf der Basis von Satelliten-Navigation: Project
Report, 2001.
[82] Adrian Waegli, Ste´phane Guerrier, and Jan Skaloud. Redundant MEMS-IMU
integrated with GPS for Performance Assessment in Sports. In IEEE/ION
PLANS, pages 1260–1268, Monterey, 2008.
[83] Jiang Liu, Tao Tang, Baigen Cai, Jian Wang, and DeWang Chen. Integrity
assurance of GNSS-based train integrated positioning system. Science China
Technological Sciences, 54(7):1779–1792, 2011. ISSN 1674-7321. doi: 10.1007/
s11431-011-4395-z.
[84] Jana Heckenbergerova. GNSS Train Position Integrity Monitoring by the
help of discrete PIM algortihms. Journal of Applied Mathematics, 2(3):73–80,
2009.
[85] Grady Booch, James Rumbaugh, and Ivar Jacobson. The unified modeling
language user guide. The Addison-Wesley object technology series. Addison-
Wesley, Reading Mass, 1999. ISBN 0201571684.
[86] Deutsches Institut fu¨r Normung. DIN 2342: Begriffe der Terminologielehre,
2011.08.
[87] Lars Schnieder. Formalisierte Terminologien technischer Systeme und ihrer
Zuverla¨ssigkeit. PhD thesis, Technische Universita¨t Braunschweig, Braunsch-
weig, 2010.
[88] Hansjo¨rg Manz, Lars Schnieder, Matthias Hu¨bner, and Eckehard Schnieder.
Modeling of domain spanning technologies for satellilite based localization
systems by specifying terminologies. In IAIN, Stockholm, 2009.
[89] Marco Wegener, Matthias Hu¨bner, and Eckehard Schnieder. Anforderungen
an ein Referenzmesssystem zur Untersuchung der GPS-Messqualita¨t. Tech-
nisches Messen, 78(7-8):354–363, 2011. ISSN 0171-8096. doi: 10.1524/teme.
2011.0199.
182 Bibliography
[90] Felix Reinbold, Marco Wegener, and Eckehard Schnieder. QualiSaR - Develop-
ment of a Qualification Procedure for the Usage of Galileo Satellite Receivers
for Safety Relevant Applications. In ENC GNSS, Gdan´sk, 2012.
[91] Jo¨rg Rudolf Mu¨ller. Die formalisierte Terminologie der Verla¨sslichkeit tech-
nischer Systeme: Habilitationsschrift, 2012.
[92] Rudolf Carnap. Physikalische Begriffsbildung. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesell-
schaft. Philosophische Bibliothek. Felix Meiner, Darmstadt, 1966.
[93] International Electrotechnical Commission. IEC 19505-1: Information techno-
logy – Object Management Group Unified Modeling Language (OMG UML)
– Part 1: Infrastructure, 2012.
[94] Eckehard Schnieder. Verkehrsleittechnik: Automatisierung des Straßen- und
Schienenverkehrs. Springer, Berlin, 2007. ISBN 3540482962.
[95] Eckehard Schnieder. Methoden der Automatisierung: Beschreibungsmittel,
Modellkonzepte und Werkzeuge fu¨r Automatisierungssysteme. Vieweg Ver-
lagsgesellschaft, Wiesbaden, 1999. ISBN 3528065664.
[96] Verein Deutscher Ingenieure. VDI 4004-5: Leitfaden zur formalisierten Be-
griffsmodellierung zentraler Termini der technischen Zuverla¨ssigkeit, 2012.
[97] Esther Schmalkuche. iglos User Manual, 2014.
[98] Carl Adam Petri. Kommunikation mit Automaten. PhD thesis, Technische
Universia¨t Darmstadt, Darmstadt, 1962.
[99] Winfrid G. Schneeweiss. Petri nets for reliability modeling: (in the fields of
engineering safety and dependability) // Petri nets for reliability modeling:
In the fields of engineering safety and dependability. LiLoLe-Verlag, Hagen,
1999. ISBN 3934447007. URL http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/43337111.
[100] Carl Adam Petri. Nets, time and space. Theoretical Computer Science, 153
(1-2):3–48, 1996. ISSN 03043975. doi: 10.1016/0304-3975(95)00116-6.
[101] Claude Girault and R. Valk. Petri nets for systems engineering: A guide to
modeling, verification, and applications. Springer, New York, 2003. ISBN
978-3-540-41217-5.
[102] Gustavo Callou, Paulo Maciel, Dietmar Tutsch, Julian Arajo, Joo Ferreira,
and Rafael Souz. A Petri Net-Based Approach to the Quantification of Data
Center Dependability. In Pawel Pawlewski, editor, Petri Nets - Manufacturing
and Computer Science. InTech, 2012. ISBN 978-953-51-0700-2. doi: 10.5772/
47829.
[103] Falko Bause and Pieter S. Kritzinger. Stochastic Petri nets: An introduction
to the theory. Advanced studies in computer science. Vieweg, Wiesbaden, 2nd
edition, 2002. ISBN 3528155353.
Bibliography 183
[104] Sheldon M. Ross. Stochastic processes. Wiley series in probability and stat-
istics. Probability and statistics. Wiley, New York, 2nd edition, 1996. ISBN
0471120626.
[105] Morris H. DeGroot. Probability and statistics. Addison-Wesley series in
statistics. Addison-Wesley, Reading Massachusetts, 2nd edition, 1986. ISBN
020111366x.
[106] Bernd Bertsche and Gisbert Lechner. Zuverla¨ssigkeit im Fahrzeug- und
Maschinenbau: Ermittlung von Bauteil- und System-Zuverla¨ssigkeiten. VDI-
Buch. Springer, Dordrecht, 3rd edition, 2004. ISBN 978-3-540-34996-9.
[107] Marvin K. Simon. Probability distributions involving Gaussian random vari-
ables: A handbook for engineers, scientists and mathematicians. Springer,
New York and NY, 1. softcover printing edition, 2006. ISBN 1402070586.
[108] Frederick J. Gravetter and Larry B. Wallnau. Statistics for the behavioral
sciences. Wadsworth, Belmont and CA, 8th edition, 2009. ISBN 0495602205.
[109] E. L. Lehmann and Joseph P. Romano. Testing statistical hypotheses. Springer
texts in statistics. Springer, New York, 3rd edition, 2005. ISBN 0-387-98864-5.
[110] Josef Bo¨rcso¨k. Functional safety: Basic principles of safety-related systems.
Practice. Hu¨thig, Heidelberg, 2007. ISBN 3778529862.
[111] Josef Bo¨rcso¨k. HIMA dictionary of safety-related technology. VDE-Verlag,
Berlin, 2011. ISBN 9783800733170. URL http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/
703891282.
[112] Mohamed Mahmoud. Performance and QoS: Lecture Slides, 2013.
[113] Niels Klußmann and Arnim Malik. Lexikon der Luftfahrt. Lexikon der
Luftfahrt, 2012.
[114] Noah Webster. The Merriam-Webster dictionary. Merriam-Webster, Spring-
field and Mass, 2005. ISBN 087779636X.
[115] European Railway Agency. ERTMS/ETCS Functional Requirements Spe-
cification FRS: ERTMS/ETCS FRS v 5.00, 2007.
[116] Bernhard Hofmann-Wellenhof, Klaus Legat, and Manfred Wieser. Navigation:
Principles of Positioning and Guidance. Springer Vienna, Vienna, 2003. ISBN
9783211008287.
[117] Mohinder S. Grewal, Angus P. Andrews, and Chris G. Bartone. Global Nav-
igation Satellite Systems, Inertial Navigation, and Integration. John Wiley &
Sons Inc, New York, 3 edition, 2013. ISBN 978-1-118-44700-0.
[118] Charles Jeffrey. An Introduction to GNSS: GPS, GLONASS, Galileo and
other Global Navigation Satellite Systems. NovAtel Inc., Calgary, 1st edition,
2010. ISBN 978-0-9813754-0-3.
184 Bibliography
[119] Sterling Udell. Beginning Google Maps mashups with mapplets, KML, and
GeoRSS: From novice to professional. The expert’s voice in web development.
Apress and Distributed by Springer-Verlag New York, Berkeley and CA and
New York and NY, 2009. ISBN 9781430216209.
[120] Andreas Heckmann and Sebastian Streit. The Modeling of Energy Flows
in Railway Networks using XML-Infrastructure Data. In 9th International
MODELICA Conference, pages 125–132, Munich, 2012.
[121] Ju¨rgen Beyer. Contribution to Safety Relevant Navigation: New Analytical
Approach towards Optimal Data Fusion: am Institut fu¨r Meß- und Regel-
technik der Eidgeno¨ssische Hochschule ETH in Zu¨rich, 1998.
[122] ERTMS Users Group. ODOMETER Form Fit Functional Interface Specific-
ation (FFFIS): EEIG 97E267, 1998.
[123] Jan Poliak, Juliette Marais, and Frank Ha¨nsel. Validation Process for Us-
age Galileo in Railways. In Proceedings of the 15th International Symposium
Eurnex - Zel 2007 ”Towards the competetive rail system in Europe”, Zilina,
2007.
[124] Elliott D. Kaplan and Christopher J. Hegarty. Understanding GPS: Principles
and applications // Understanding GPS: Principles and applications. Artech
House, Boston and Mass, 2nd edition, 2006. ISBN 9781580538947. URL
http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/803725789.
[125] Harry Evers and Gu¨nther Kasties. Kompendium der Verkehrstelematik: Tech-
nologien, Applikationen, Perspektiven. Vlg. TU¨V Rheinland, Ko¨ln, 1998.
ISBN 3824904217.
[126] Paul D. Groves. Principles of GNSS, Inertial, and Multisensor Integrated
Navigation Systems. GNSS technology and application series. Artech House,
Boston, 2nd edition, 2013. ISBN 1608070050.
[127] Pratap Misra and Per Enge. Global positioning system: Signals, measure-
ments, and performance. Ganga-Jamuna Press, Lincoln and Mass, 2nd edi-
tion, 2011. ISBN 0970954425.
[128] Richard B. Langley. NMEA 0183: A GPS Receiver Interface Standard. GPS
World, July(July), 1995.
[129] European Commission. EGNOS Service Definition Document Open Service,
2009.
[130] European Commission. New European satellite navigation service in-
creases aviation safety, 02.03.2011. URL http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-11-247_en.htm?locale=en. (checked on 16.02.2013).
[131] European Commission. EGNOS Safety of Life Service Definition Document:
EGNOS SDD SoL, 2013.
Bibliography 185
[132] Erwin Lassooij. Overview of APV: ICAO EUR APV Workshop: Slides, 2010.
URL https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=
web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CC0QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.paris.icao.
int%2Fdocuments_open_meetings%2Fdownload.php%3Fmaincategory%
3D84%26subcategory%3D86%26file%3DDay3_1_ICAO.pdf. (checked on
15.11.2013).
[133] United States Department of Defense, United States Department of Homeland
Security, and Department of Transportation. 2010 Federal Radionavigation
Plan: DOT-VNTSC-RITA-08-02/DoD-4650.05, 2010.
[134] International Civil Aviation Organization. ICAO Annex 10 to the Convention
on International Civil Aviation: Aeronautical Telecommunications, Volume
1, Radio Navigation Aids, 2006.
[135] George Barbu, J-M Wiss, P Frosig, M Schro¨der, K Walter, Alesˇ Filip, A Sage,
and S Forsyth. GNSS Rail User Forum: Requirements of Rail Applications,
2000.
[136] International Electrotechnical Commission. IEC 60050-191: International
Electrotechincal Vocabulary (IEV) - part 191: Dependability and Quality
of Service, 2002.
[137] International Organization for Standardization. ISO/IEC Guide 51: Safety
aspects - Guidelines for their inclusion in standards, 2012.
[138] International Electrotechnical Commission. IEC 60300: International stand-
ards on dependability, 2006.
[139] Marvin Rausand and Arnljot Høyland. System reliability theory: Models,
statistical methods, and applications. Wiley series in probability and statistics.
Applied probability and statistics. Wiley-Interscience, Hoboken and NJ, 2nd
edition, 2004. ISBN 047147133X.
[140] Morris Chudleigh. Risk Analysis and Mitigation: Presentation to MHRA:
Presentation Slides, 2010.
[141] Debiao Lu, Daohua Wu, and Eckehard Schnieder. Hazard Analysis for GNSS-
based Train Localisation Unit with Model Based Approach According to
EGNOS and Railway RAMS. In IAIN, Cairo, 2012.
[142] Marco Wegener and Eckehard Schnieder. Application of the GUM method
for state-space systems in the case of uncorrelated input uncertainties. Meas-
urement Science and Technology, 24(2):025003, 2013. ISSN 0957-0233. doi:
10.1088/0957-0233/24/2/025003.
[143] Ju¨rgen Beyer. Regelungstechnische Ansa¨tze zur Steigerung der Betrieb-
squalita¨t und Trassenkapazita¨t im Eisenbahnverkehr: Regelungstechnisches
Kolloquium an der RWTH Aachen, 2008.
186 Bibliography
[144] International Electrotechnical Commission. IEC 62551: Analysis techniques
for dependability – Petri net modelling, 2012.
[145] Roman Slovak. Methodische Modellierung und Analyse von Sicherungssystem
des Eisenbahnverkehrs. PhD thesis, Technische Universita¨t Braunschweig,
Braunschweig, 2006.
[146] James D. Hamilton. Time series analysis. Princeton University press, Prin-
ceton and N.J, 1994. ISBN 0691042896.
[147] European Space Agency. User Guide for EGNOS Application Developers,
2009.
[148] DLR. Entwicklung eines Demonstration fu¨r Ortungsaufgaben mit Sicher-
heitsverantwortung im Schienengu¨terverkehr: DemoOrt. Abschlussbericht der
Phasen 1 und 2. DLR, Braunschweig, 2009. ISBN ISSN 1866-721X.
[149] Uwe Becker, Jan Poliak, Alexander Geistler, Carsten Hasberg, and Mi-
chael Meyer zu Ho¨rste. DemoOrt repositions trains with satellite. EURAIL-
mag Business & Technology, 18:216–219, 2008.
[150] Debiao Lu, Hansjo¨rg Manz, Jo¨rg Rudolf Mu¨ller, and Eckehard Schnieder.
Integrity Verification for Satellite based Train Localisation Unit Structure by
Means of Petri net. In ENC GNSS, London, 2011.
[151] Liyan Li, Jie Zhong, and Minjian Zhao. Doppler-Aided GNSS Position Estim-
ation with Weighted Least Squares. IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Tech-
nology, 60(8):3615–3624, 2011. ISSN 0018-9545. doi: 10.1109/TVT.2011.
2163738.
